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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED ON

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SOCIAL STRUCTURES, EPISTEMOLOGY

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SUMMARY

In this thesis a set of interlocking arguments is fashioned. Each argument serves a dual purpose: it contributes to the acceptability of the main theme developed in the thesis and it increases the acceptability of the other arguments. At all stages the price paid for refusing to accept the conclusions drawn is cited.

There are two driving forces behind the construction of the set of arguments. The first involves a recognition that there is a need for some 'underlabouring' work to be done for the Social Sciences; the second, relatedly, that there is a need to relocate the current debate in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy on the question of Personal Identity.

The colligation of the arguments accomplishes an 'underlabouring' task for the Social Sciences. This task consists of the identification of some of the implications of the acceptance (whether tacit or explicitly stated) of two notions: the notions of what constitutes a person and what constitutes society.

It is argued that possible uses of the concept of a person, inherent in any interpretation of social phenomena, will constrain the explanatory power of any social scientific theory (or even of a common system of beliefs) in which the interpretation is embedded. If one accepts a social scientific theory (or any common system of beliefs) which subsumes a concept of a person which does not see persons as essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially knowledge-seeking then one has to pay a series of penalties. Foremost among the penalties is the sacrifice of the possibility of the expansion of the understanding of social phenomena.

There are two concepts of society, embedded in contrasting systems of beliefs, whose acceptance has the effect of reinforcing the constraint on the explanatory power of the systems. One concept involves a view of society as an object with causal powers, the other sees only individuals as social causal agents. Whether it is implicit or explicitly stated, the acceptance of either

concept of society will cement the constraint on the expansion of one's understanding of social phenomena. The arguments go on to show that only the acceptance of a concept of society seen as an ensemble (itself devoid of detectable causal power) of social structures with causal powers can induce a lifting of some of the restrictions on the expansion of one's understanding of social phenomena.

At the core of the arguments lies a fundamental distinction. This is the distinction which needs to be made between the functions of epistemological and ontological concepts which underpin one's understanding of social phenomena. It is argued that, while such a distinction needs to be made, the relationship between the two functions is a symbiotic one - neither can operate without the other. The differentiation between the two functions is achieved by focusing on the distinction between knowledge and being - encapsulated in Chapter 2 by the distinction made between 'cultural environments' and 'social environments'.

Linked to, and sustaining, the distinction between social and cultural environments is a distinction between two aspects of cognitive interactions between individuals. These two aspects involve a contrast between an individual's sense of 'interacting with' and a sense of 'being with' other individuals. The former involves individuals in operating 'social kinds' while the latter involves them in sustaining the operating parameters of social kinds: operations of social kinds are needed for changes in states of understanding to occur (in other words the operations have epistemological significance); by contrast the sustaining of the operational parameters of social kinds is significant with respect to the functions of ontological concepts.

The failure of many theories of Personal Identity to address the problems generated by conflating epistemology and ontology in the social sciences renders such theories inadequate to the task of providing a comprehensive analysis of Personal Identity. The arguments in the thesis pinpoint the nature of this inadequacy, and show how it might be avoided.

PREFACE

This essay consists of an examination of one aspect of the basis on which our understanding of social phenomena is built. This aspect consists of the concept of a person. The discussion in the essay itself enables one to substantiate the proposition that the concept of a person forms part of such a base. It also enables one to understand some of the constraints which have to be placed on the development and use of all concepts, including the concept of a person, if one is to be able adequately to carry out certain tasks. As such the essay consists of a discussion in which an abstract structure is put together - an abstract structure into which concepts will have to be placed. At each stage of the discussion the price to be paid by anyone who wishes to deny the claims being made is cited. This means that the nature of the necessity identified in the essay is contingent upon the prior acceptance of the desirability of the avoidance of the payment of the price cited in the discussion.

The nature of the subject-matter makes it difficult for the discussion to take the standard form of *Introduction* followed by *exposition* followed by *conclusion* - the introduction and conclusion cannot differ in any significant respect. The difficulty should become more apparent to the reader as he or she proceeds through the text. The reason for directing the reader to the first three parts of Chapter 5 for the introduction to the essay should also become apparent; these three parts constitute the introduction to the essay. At the end of Part 3 of Chapter 5 the musical instruction DC will be found. This instructs one to go *da capo* - return to the beginning - which, in this case, involves returning to the beginning of Chapter 1. For convenience the first page of Chapter 5 is reproduced immediately after the listing of the contents.

CHAPTER 1

UNDERLABOURING FOR THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

PART 1: INTRODUCTION	...1
Theories Of Personal Identity As Underpinning Theories In The Social Sciences	...1
The Analysis Of The Concept Of The Self	...3
PART 2: INDIVIDUATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS	...4
Definitions And Persons	...4
Particular Concepts Of Individuals In Specific Bodies Of Knowledge	...6
Individuating Knowledgeable Beings	...7
PART 3: EXPERIENCES, INTERPRETATIONS AND ACTIONS (a preliminary examination)	...9
PART 4: INTERPRETATIONS AND EXPERIENCE	...17
Communication And Cognitively Interpreted Action:	
(I) (The Transmitter Of Signals)	...19
(II) (The Receiver Of Signals)	...20
Action And The Concept Of Otherness	...21
Individuation Processes And Their Associated Structures	...22
The Ontological Underpinning Of Process Involving Individuation	...23
Types Of Objects Involved In Individuation Processes	...25
Processes Of Individuating Objects	...30
Processes Of Individuating Objects And The Possibility Of Teaching/Learning	...31

PART 5: THE DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT EQUIVALENCE (The distinction between social and natural structures vindicated)	...34
Mechanisms Which Determine Meaning Equivalence	...34

PART 6: 'KNOWLEDGEABLE BEINGS' AND THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY	...39
---	--------------

CHAPTER 2

THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

PART 1: INTRODUCTION	...42
PART 2: FROM NATURAL KINDS TO SOCIAL KINDS	...45
Natural Kinds	...45
Outline Of The Path From Natural To Social Kinds	...46
Preparing for the Definition of a Social Kind	...49
Distinguishing Natural From Social Kinds:	
(i) (Conceptualisations)	...50
(ii) (Explanations)	...52
The Social Kind Defined	...54
Conceptualising Individuals And Social Kinds	...56
Social Space:	
(i) (Its Various Forms)	...59
(ii) (Social And Cultural Environments Distinguished)	...61
(iii) (The Importance of the Social/Cultural Environment Distinction)	...64
(iv) (Background To (v): Social/Cultural Environments And The Self)	...66
(v) (Social And Cultural Environments And The Self)	...67
Self And Society: An Outline Of The Arguments	...68

PART 3: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL KINDS (Introducing 'persons')	...71
Social Kinds And Natural Kinds:	
(i) (Their Causal And Dispositional Properties)	...71
(ii) (Their Component Parts)	...72
(iii) (Introducing The Notion Of 'Force')	...73
 PART 4: EXPLANATIONS AND SOCIAL KINDS (natural and social forces)	 ...74
Social Forces	...74
Social Forces: (ii) (The Primary/Derived Distinction Justified)	...76
The Internal Structure Of A Non-CI Social Kind	...80
 PART 5: THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON	 ...81
Introduction	...81
Distinguishing Between Social And Cultural Environments	...83
Distinguishing A Person From A Conceptualising Individual	...84
The Distinction Between A Person's And A CI's Abilities To Conceptualise	...85
The Implications Of A Person's Attempts To Understand The Environment In	
Which He/She Operates	...87
Persons And Second Order Monitoring: A Corollary	...88
The Argument In Part 5 Summarised and Completed	...89
 PART 6: CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL KINDS (Including the	
boundaries within which understanding of persons can be obtained)	...92
Sustaining A Social Environment Through Changes In The Properties Of	
Social Kinds:	
(i) (The Necessity For The Presence of Two Persons)	...93
(ii) (The Necessity for the Presence of More Than Two Persons)	...96
The Ineliminability of the Person	...99

Contents

The Possibility That Persons Who Help To Sustain One Cultural Environment Can Operate In Another Distinct Cultural Environment	...100
PART 7: AN OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS IN PARTS 3 TO 6	...103
PART 8: TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIETY	...104
Introduction	...104
The Person And Society: Some possibilities	...106
Bhaskar's Transformational Model Of Social Action	...108
A Re-formed Transformational Model Of Social Action	...111
Interpretation Of The Re-Formed TMSA	...115
Society As An Ensemble Of Social Kinds, Practices And Conventions	...118
Two By-products Of Accepting The Person/Society Analysis In The TMSA	...120
PART 9: CONCLUSION	...121
PART 10: FOOTNOTE	...123
Criticism Of The Arguments Presented In The Chapter	...123

CHAPTER 3

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE SELF

PART 1: INTRODUCTION	...124
The Development Of The Arguments Summarised:	
The Critiques Of (I) Kant And (II) Poincaré	...126
(I) The Critique Of Kant	...126
(II) The Critique Of Poincaré	...127
The Aims Of Chapter 3	...129

	<i>Contents</i>
PART 2: A CRITIQUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S THEORY OF OUTER SENSE	...130
The Permanence Of Material Or Natural Space	...130
Some Criticisms Of Kant's Arguments	...132
Kant's Argument Extended: An Outline	...134
Kant's Argument Extended	...135
Implications Of The Extended Kantian Argument:	
(i) Subjectivity And Objectivity	...138
(ii) The Simultaneous Interdependence and Independence of Social and Material Spaces	...140
Natural And Social Kinds And The Modal Aspects Of Cognitive Experience	...143
Implications Of The Extended Kantian Argument: (iii) A Summary	...146
PART 3: THE IMPACT OF POINCARÉ ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF	...148
The Significance Of Poincaré's Theories Of Space, Displacement, Solidity And Action	...149
Debunking Kant's Anthropocentric Naturalism	...151
The Significance Of The Debunking Of Kant's Anthropocentric Naturalism	...154
PART 4: SOCIAL AND NATURAL KINDS DIFFERENTIATED	...156
The Cross-Cultural Nature Of Some Natural And Some Social Kinds	...158
The Delineation Of The Boundaries Between Natural And Social Kinds	...162
PART 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	...162
Summary	...162
Conclusion	...165

CHAPTER 4

CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

PART 1: INTRODUCTION	...166
Summary Of The Argument In Chapter 4	...171
PART 2: THE SENSE DATUM THEORY DEBUNKED	...173
The Humean Simple Impression	...174
PART 3: MODIFICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE	...176
The Identification Of The Inadequacy Of Atomistic Accounts Of Conscious Experience	...177
The Power To Affect One's Own Conscious States And The Bedford Question	...179
The Extension And The Scope Of The Bedford Question	...180
The Power To Cope With One's Own Environment (Bedford Question (I))	...181
The Drive (Bedford Question (II))	...182
The Power (Bedford Question (III))	...183
The Contrast Between Self-regulating Natural Kinds And Persons	...184
The Individual's Power To Affect Conscious Interactions With His Environment Is Not Necessarily Consciously Exercised	...186
Alterations In Conscious States May Have Many Causes	...187
PART 4: THE EMOTIONS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE	...188
Behaviourist, Feeling, Psycho-Analytic And Cognitive Theories	...188
Collingwood's Theory Of The Emotions	...190

Contents

PART 5: COLLINGWOOD'S THEORY EXTENDED	...194
Ambiguity In Experience	...195
Ambiguity And Expectation	...196
The Sense Of Self	...197
The Normative Aspects Of Experience And The Repercussions On The Nature Of Social Kinds	...200
The Need For Evidence	...201
 PART 6: CONCLUSION	 ...202
 Addendum 1 (from *p. 160) Other Areas Of Human Activity	 ...204
Addendum 2 (from p. 162) The Restrictive Nature Of Philosophy Which Ignores The Analysis Of Social Phenomena	...205
Addendum 3 (from p. 170) Conscious Experiences And Atomism	...205
Addendum 4 (from p. 187) Experience Constructed On More Than One Level: A Justification	...207

CHAPTER 5

A CRITIQUE OF THE DEBATE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

PART 1: INTRODUCTION	...209
 PART 2: A FOUNDATION FOR A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY (summarised)	 ...213
The Contexts In Which Theories Of Personal Identity Arise	...213
The Requirements Generated By The Studies Of The Contexts In Which Persons Operate	...215
The Social And Material Aspects Of The Context Distinguished	...217

The Social Aspects Of The Context And The Impact Of Changes In Knowledge	
(i) Changes In The Social Context	...218
(ii) Changes In The Non-Social Context	...221
Conceptualisations Of Agency And The Interpretations Of Environments	...223
(i) The Individual's Interpretations Of Sensory Information	...223
(ii) The Individual's Perception Of His Power To Affect Social And Material Objects	...225
(iii) The Individual's Motivation For Interacting With Her Environment...	226
PART 3: PERSONAL IDENTITY	...229
Persons And Their Contexts	...229
The Conceptualisation Of Material And Social Objects In Their Environments	...230
The Uniqueness Of The Concept Of A Person	...232
A Model Within Which The Concept Of A Person May Be Developed	...233
Towards A Critique Of Theories Of Personal Identity	...234
PART 4: A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY	...237
Introduction	...237
Thought Experiments And Theories Of Identity	...238
Two Thought Experiments Described	...240
The First Experiment	...241
The Second Experiment	...243
Thought Experiments Assessed	...247
Beyond Thought Experiments	...250
(i) Lucas' Gödel Argument	...252
Beyond Lucas	...255
(ii) Criterion Theories Of Personal Identity And The Memory Theory	...256

	<i>Contents</i>
The Memory Theory	...257
Criterion Theories	...258
(iii) The Self As An Unanalysable Entity	...259
Possible World Analysis	...262
 PART 5: CONCLUSION	 ...265
 ADDENDUM CHAPTER 5	 ...266
 NOTES AND REFERENCES	
Chapter 1	...268
Chapter 2	...277
Chapter 3	...291
Chapter 4	...300
Chapter 5	...306
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 ...312

A CRITIQUE OF THE DEBATE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter 5 serve a dual function: they both introduce the arguments set out in this essay and provide a conclusion for them.

PART 1: INTRODUCTION (to Chapter 5)

In this chapter two tasks will be carried out. In the first of these, to be developed in Part 2, the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 will be brought together and synthesised into a coherent basis from which a theory of Personal Identity could be constructed. The acceptance of this basis will involve the reader in accepting a relocation of the current debate on Personal Identity. Within the scope of this relocation the second task will be carried out in Parts 3 and 4. In Part 3 the issues raised in Part 2 will be brought together to show how the concept of a person may be developed. This will lead, in Part 4, to a critique of some current and traditional theories.

Bringing together the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 will enable one to focus on the main principle which has underpinned those arguments. It is the acceptance of this principle which leads to the relocation of the debate on Personal Identity. The principle was not explicitly stated until Chapter 2, Part 1:

The identity of the self is not a specific instance of some general notion of identity, but general notions of identity rest upon an already existing grasp of the notion of Personal Identity. ... (P1)

It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay have themselves

ratified the principle which underpins them. This means that any theory of Personal Identity is built on the somewhat paradoxical proposition that the concept of Identity is logically posterior to the concept of Personal Identity; in other words Personal Identity and non-person Identity are distinct types of concepts which need to be analysed differently.

It will be shown that the arguments in the previous four chapters have demonstrated that the paradox is unavoidable; indeed, one of the few certainties when dealing with questions of Identity is that this particular paradox is unavoidable. The source of the paradox is found in the relationship which exists between individuals and social structures - the social structures being those which operate in the cultural environments within which concepts of Identity are developed. It is this relationship which lies at the centre of the relocated debate on Personal Identity.

The paradoxical nature of the subject-matter is derived partly from the

(The Introduction to the essay continues on page 202)

UNDERLABOURING FOR THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

PART 1: INTRODUCTION♦

Theories Of Personal Identity As Underpinning Theories In The Social Sciences

The main purpose of the study carried out in this essay is the clarification of our understanding of one of the bases upon which theories in the social sciences are constructed. This basis consists of the concept of a person. It will be argued that the concept both underpins the development of, and supports the acceptability of, any given explanation of social phenomena. The concept of a person, whether tacitly assumed or explicitly stated within a given system of explanations of social phenomena, will be seen to be parasitic upon a unique and symbiotic relationship. This relationship is the one which exists between the conceptualisations of individuals and the development of social structures.

The mutual dependence arises from the operations of processes by which concepts are developed; processes which consist of the manifestation of the properties of social structures. The development of concepts is facilitated by the operations of objects whose behaviour is dependent upon the conceptualisations of some individuals. Any analysis of the relationship is therefore bound to involve an element of circularity: a circularity which stems from the fact that conceptualisations determine, and are determined by, the behaviour of social objects.

The acceptance of the symbiotic nature of this relationship will be seen to

♦NOTE: As stated in the Preface, the Introduction to this study is presented at the beginning of Chapter 5 - which serves both as conclusion and Introduction.

The acceptance of the symbiotic nature of this relationship will be seen to lead to various conclusions, not all of which are widely accepted by modern philosophers. Not least of these conclusions consists of the assertion that the concept of the identity of an object, which is not a person, is logically dependent upon the concept of a person; and so upon the symbiotic relationship referred to above. Personal Identity is not a particular instance of a general notion of Identity; and general notions of Identity are not independent of the subjective, and partly non-analysable, forces which generate concept development.

The arguments will lead to further conclusions about the essentially paradoxical properties of persons. These arguments will be of a similar type: in each the price to be paid by anyone wishing not to accept its conclusions will be cited. In particular it will be seen that the circularity can only be avoided at a price. The price consists of restricting the application of explanations developed in the given social theory only to those social contexts in which concepts cannot alter.

The groundwork for the development of the arguments is laid in this chapter. Here the structure within which concepts in general - and concepts of personal Identity in particular - are developed, is examined. The results of the examination lead to the identification of the need for further examinations.

The further examinations, concerning the relationships between the individual and his social and natural environments, will be undertaken in subsequent chapters. No excuse is offered for the seemingly arbitrary starting point of the examination. Indeed, since one of the main tenets of the thesis developed here is that 'linear' (*1) analyses of social phenomena cannot be carried out without the implicit acceptance of a restricted concept of social change, preference for a particular starting point cannot be justified. Further, any starting point will necessarily seem abrupt and condensed. Clear, precise starting points with concepts which are simple to grasp, can only be offered if

those concepts can be grasped in isolation from the other concepts in the analysis. One of the claims being made here is that such isolation is not possible. With this in mind the arbitrary starting point for the examinations which are to be carried out subsequently, is an analysis of the concept of the self.

The Analysis Of The Concept Of The Self

The analysis of the concept of the self is rooted in a cultural system of inter-related concepts, as indeed is any analysis. In Part 2 below, there will be an examination of some of the constraints which the rootedness and such an analysis place both on the concept of the self and on the system of concepts within which the concept can be applied. This will be done by noting that a general recognition of the *need* for an analysis of a concept of the self carries with it some assumptions. (*2)

The acceptance of these two assumptions enables one to claim that, in order for the analysis of a concept to get off the ground, there exists a system of concepts which is used by beings which have certain capabilities (*3). These capabilities include the capability (a) to have conscious experiences, (b) to interpret those experiences, (c) to communicate the interpreted experiences and (d) to act - or to initiate changes which result in the alteration of both their own experiences and those of others. An acceptance, that this last capability - (d) - is needed by beings who use a system of concepts, itself involves a presumption of two further assumptions:

(i) that these active, experiencing and interpreting beings can distinguish between the means, or mechanisms, by which they communicate their experiences and the beings with which they are communicating - in other words the possibility of the operation of agency presupposes the existence of objects in an environment which are distinguishable both from the agent and from the object which is altered by the agent's activities;

(ii) that it is possible both to effect a change in the state and to affect changes in the state of understanding of another being - in other words it is possible to bring into play a learning process.

Each of these last two assumptions (d) (i) and (ii) will be seen to play significant roles in the examination of the relationships between the self and the social environment (Chapter 2), between the self and the natural environment (Chapter 3) and between self and the forces which drive the self's own conscious experience (Chapter 4). Of particular significance to most of the arguments will be (d)(ii): that it is possible that changes in states of understanding not only occur but that they can be brought about as a result of intentional acts.

PART 2: INDIVIDUATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS

Definitions And Persons

There is something of a paradox attached to analyses of concepts. In order to analyse something one must already have some understanding of what is to be analysed. However, with the conscious awareness of this understanding, the need for the analysis changes. It may recede if one is merely interested in using the concept, as when one learns to use the word for bread in another language, or it may become sharper as when one comes to understand what a stable marriage is. The function of the analysis is then not to describe and pinpoint some entirely new and previously inexplicable phenomenon but rather either to make explicit some of the understanding which is already existent regarding the phenomenon or to develop the understanding of a partly understood phenomenon.

So it is with a person. When attempting to analyse the concept of a person, one must already be versed in some aspect of what one thinks a person is - so that one already has a yardstick against which to assess the analysis. This tacit understanding would be a common sense notion. It would include most

of the commonly held preconceptions of what a person is. These would probably include: a person is someone/thing which (a) has a physical body with certain enduring characteristics, (b) in general has the ability to move that body, (c) has the ability to interact with other persons and (d) has the capability of having and generating emotional experience; having and inciting aesthetic experience; exercising and inciting the use of the imagination; etc...

It is not being suggested that any combination of (a),(b),(c) and (d) is either necessary or sufficient for the development of an acceptable analysis of the concept of a person. But what will now be suggested is that any criterion of Personal Identity which is to be included in such an analysis will have one thing in common with (a),(b),(c) and (d). This sharing of a condition will involve the acceptance of the presupposition of an already existent body of knowledge within which the analysis - and the development of any concept flowing from the processes which sustain the body of knowledge - can acquire meaning. It will be seen that the use of this body of knowledge will itself involve a presupposition of the existence of a group of 'knowledgeable beings' (*4) who sustain the body of knowledge.

It should be noted that inherent in the argument in this essay is the assumption that the use of the concept of a person must, at minimum, enable any individual who uses concepts to individuate certain specific individuals. These are the individuals who are active agents in the formation and development of concepts. The acceptance of this assumption carries with it the acceptance of the possibility that persons can learn or come to understand concepts of which they were not previously cognizant. In other words, the use of the concept of a person must enable one to individuate beings with the capability to learn the use of concepts.

The argument will also focus attention on the forces which generate an individual's need to develop an understanding of her environment. It is the drive to satisfy this need which underpins the requirement for the existence of

understandable processes by which concepts are formed and developed. The acceptance that there is a *need* for a process by which concepts are formed and developed carries with it some constraints. These constraints place requirements on the range of qualities which can be properly attributed to persons. It will be seen below that any analysis of the concept which facilitates the individuation of individual members of the group of beings who sustain a given body of knowledge needs to allow for the incorporation of certain specific characteristics.

Particular Concepts Of Individuals In Specific Bodies Of Knowledge.

There is no necessary connection between (i) the concept which enables one to individuate individual members of the group of beings who, through their agency in the formation and development of concepts, sustain the body of knowledge within which concepts are developed and (ii) the specific concept of a person in a given body of knowledge. It is perfectly possible for a particular group of beings to endow personhood to trees and horses - Caligula made his horse, Incitatus, a consul of Rome! Whether there are any non-'knowledgeable beings' conceptualised as persons is contingent upon the mechanisms which exist within the cultural environment (formed by the group of 'knowledgeable beings') for individuating persons. In order not to stray totally into the realm of arbitrary conceptualisations, it will be assumed here that the use of the concept of personal identity in any cultural system incorporating a given body of knowledge, must enable one to individuate the members of the group of 'knowledgeable beings' who help to sustain and modify that body of knowledge. Whether or not the concepts enable one to individuate anything else is a contingent characteristic of the given body of knowledge.

Further, while the specific form which a definition of a person takes may be contingent upon the cultural system within which it is developed, the process of analysis which leads to such development is not itself context specific.

Personal Identity cannot be subsumed into a thorough-going relativistic world view. There are characteristics of persons which any process of analysis of concepts in any cultural system must take on board. These characteristics will be identified in the remainder of this chapter.

The identification will be achieved by carrying out two tasks. The first will consist of an analysis of the conditions which must hold in order that a group of 'knowledgeable beings' can differentiate themselves one from another; this being seen as a condition of their being able to formulate a concept of a person. Secondly there will be an analysis of how a mechanism by which individual persons are individuated is developed and of how it can change.

Individuating Knowledgeable Beings

In order for individuals to differentiate themselves one from another, certain conditions must hold. These are identified and analysed extensively below. The satisfaction of these conditions necessitates the possession of a given set of characteristics by each member of the group of 'knowledgeable beings'. This set of characteristics includes: the ability to have experiences, the ability to interpret experiences and the ability to communicate these interpretations.

Each member must be able to have and interpret experiences - since the possession of such capabilities is a precondition for an individual's ability to grasp a concept. Each member must also be able to communicate the interpretations of his experiences since this is a precondition for the existence of a body of knowledge shared and sustained by a group of beings. The ability to communicate knowledge itself has as a precondition the ability to affect both one's own and the experiences of another being. The ability to affect experiences, both her own and those of others, will be termed an individual's "ability to act".

This would mean that, in order that any analysis of any concept may get off

the ground, there exists a body of knowledge whose use has, as a precondition, the existence of a group of beings which are capable of:

- (a) Experiencing
- (b) Interpreting their experiences
- (c) Communicating their interpretations
- (d) Action, or at minimum affecting the conscious states of others.

It should be noted that justification for the claim supporting the existence of individuals within the group has sprung from a perceived *need* for the analysis of concepts. Symbiotically linked with this need, are the possibility of, and need for, changes in knowledge or states of understanding.

In other words *the possibility that some individuals can learn is a precondition of the intelligibility of the analysis of any concept.*

Normal practice in current literature on Personal Identity, has tended to ignore this principle. Rather, there have been attempts to particularise general specifications for the identity of objects into a specific requirement for the identity of an individual. There seems to be no recognition of the impact which the general requirements have on the specific ones or *vice-versa*. The identified individual is seen as typical of those capable of changing both his own and others' states of understanding (*5). However, as is demonstrated below, the interplay between the general and the specific requirements will have constraining effects on both. These constraining effects will set some necessary conditions such as (a), (b), (c), (d) - and perhaps others - on the formation of a concept of a person (*6).

The bulk of the argument in this essay will result from examinations of the constraining effects alluded to in the previous paragraph. In Chapter 2 the social structures underpinning the interpretation and communication of experiences will be examined with regard to the constraints they place on the development of the concept of a person. In Chapter 3 the actions of individuals will be examined with regard to

- (i) the constraints these impose on an individual's conceptualisations of a person and of the the objects which persons find in their environment (restricting attention to that part of the environment whose operations are seen by the persons as not being dependent on the interactions between persons) and*
- (ii) the relationships between the persons and such independent objects.*

In Chapter 4 experiences themselves will be examined. The examination will be confined to one aspect of experiences: the emotional aspect. This confinement is designed to serve the interests of brevity and to fulfil the expectation that this one aspect will permit some generalisation with regard to other aspects of the affective domain of experience.

The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with preparing the ground for these examinations. This will begin with an analysis of the relationships between experiences, interpretations and actions in the context of the ways in which they affect, and are affected by, individuals. The reason for focussing on these relationships is the recognition that experiences, interpretations, and interactions constitute necessary requirements for the satisfaction of the need to analyse concepts.

An examination of the relationship between an individual and other individuals will now be undertaken - this relationship may be either a binary relationship between two individuals or a multiple one between several individuals. The chapter will conclude with some references to current theories of Personal Identity so laying the foundations for their critique in Chapter 5.

PART 3: EXPERIENCES, INTERPRETATIONS AND ACTIONS

(a preliminary examination)

Interpretations of experiences are here equated with changes in states of mind involving changes of knowledge or belief. This means that 'interpretation'

and 'experience' are in some sense technical terms. By 'experience' what is meant is the occurrence of something in the consciousness of a being whether or not the occurrence is brought about by the being itself, some other agency, or the being and some other agency in combination with each other. By 'interpretation' what is meant is the ordering, separating, uniting - in other words the analysis of - experiences, together with the attaching meaning to experiences.

Prima facie, there seem to be no *a priori* conditions which can be affirmed regarding the exact relationship between sets of experiences, sets of interpreters of experiences and sets of agents who can act. Indeed, some writers have postulated possibilities of one set of experiences being shared by more than one interpreter (*7), of one agent and/or interpreter of experiences branching into more than one agent (*8), and of more than one agent and/or interpreter fusing into a single one (*9). It will be seen that the apparent lack of an *a priori* link between experiences, interpreters of experiences and agents is illusory. *A priori* arguments can be adduced. These rest on conditions for the possibilities of two types of occurrence: the first consists of learning processes and the second of communication which either induces learning processes or makes individuals aware that such learning processes have occurred.

Given the meanings of the terms outlined above, an argument will now be set out using the format of a rigorous mathematical proof. The argument will support the contentions that (I) individuals who interact cognitively with others are structured entities (II) such individuals operate in a structured social environment and (III) this structured social environment pre-exists any particular individual but cannot be sustained without the interpreted actions of the individuals. Underpinning these contentions, and simultaneously justified by their acceptability, is a conception of the individual as a second order monitor of her own activities. The individual not only has access to the

mechanisms which make up her own structure, but she can also monitor the access, and so has the capability to alter the structure itself.

The reasons for offering a rigorous analysis of the interactions between individuals rather than a straightforward commonsense analysis are themselves straightforward. A rigorous analysis will lead to the identification of the precise areas in which the supporters of objective analyses of social phenomena face their greatest difficulties. The argument will show that the structure of the individual is such that the connections between experience, interpretation and action are not arbitrary. This means that some theorists, such as those referred to in (*7),(*8) & (*9), who arbitrarily break these connections will pay a price - see Chapter 5, Part 4. The argument will also enable one to appreciate the significance of the role played by the intentionality of the individual in the formation and maintenance of the social structures which sustain and facilitate changes in interactive processes between 'knowledgeable beings'.

The argument hinges on the unacceptability of denying one of its main premisses. This premiss, C5 below, consists of the statement that communication which leads to alterations in states of understanding does, in practice, occur. The denial of the acceptability of this statement is either self-contradictory or self-defeating; for such a denial involves an attempt to alter the state of understanding of a being who is capable of cognitive experience.

The reader who is unfamiliar with the format of rigorous expositions in mathematics will note that each symbolically presented stage is accompanied by a 'lay' interpretation. The claims made in the argument are set out in the form of nine statements, C1 - C9. The 'lay' interpretation given after C3 provides a simple synopsis of the complete argument. In Part 4, page 16, the validity of each statement is justified and the final compound claim (C9) is substantiated.

Suppose we gather together all the experiences of all individuals and place them in a set E. ...(C1)

(* The very possibility that one can list experiences in a set involves a presupposition that experiences can be separated from one another. The arguments in later chapters, particularly in Chapters 2 and 4, shows that such separation leads to the imposition of restrictions on the nature of change in a given cultural environment. In other words a 'linear' analysis of the concept of a person affects the structure of the cultural environments in which the concept is formulated and used, see note (*1). The arguments in later chapters also show that some of these effects are unavoidable in any given analysis of cognitive interactions - since any formulated analysis by any given individual must be 'linear'. The unavoidability of these effects forms the basis of the arguments which establish the essentially subjective nature of persons. *)

Subsets of the set of all experiences E, however formed, are to be termed $E_1, E_2, E_3, \dots, E_k$. These subsets may be formed according to any desired 'gathering' principle; temporal contiguity and/or psychological connectedness are variously used as gathering principles which then are assumed to yield a means by which individuals may be individuated. ...(C2)

Suppose we similarly gather all the interpretations into a set I with subsets I_1, I_2, \dots, I_h and gather all agents into a set A with subsets A_1, A_2, \dots, A_p(C3)

So E_q represents a set of *experiences* ($0 < q < k+1$)
 I_r represents a set of *interpretations* ($0 < r < h+1$)
 A_t represents an *agent* ($0 < t < p+1$)

(* The subsets can be considered to be all the possible subsets of sets E, I and A. The intention is to demonstrate that the constraints which communication

places on action and interpretation ensure that the relationships between the interpretations, experiences and actions of a 'knowledgeable being' *are not arbitrary*. They are based on relatively stable functions - symbolically identified below as f_1 , f_2 , g_1 , g_2 etc... - which make the communication possible; and with communication, they make concept development possible. *)

We now focus on a requirement which individuating processes need to fulfil.

If individuating processes are to serve as means by which to pick out a specific 'knowledgeable being' then the formation and development of concepts which facilitate the individuation of such beings becomes possible. ...**(C4)**

We now draw attention to one of the premisses of the argument.

Communication leading to alterations in states of understanding is possible - since it is by such communication that the formation and development of concepts occur. ...**(C5)**

The argument will now direct attention towards the need to facilitate and enable the activation of two tasks: the permitting of communication between individual 'knowledgeable beings' and the facilitation of changes in their states of knowledge and/or belief.

The individuation of a 'knowledgeable being' is adequate to such tasks only if each 'knowledgeable being' has a unique relationship with a given set of interpretations of experiences. ...**(C6)**

Further, these interpretations in turn are uniquely related to the experiences of which they are interpretations. ...**(C7)**

Finally, both the interpretations and the experiences are uniquely related to a

single agent.

...(C8)

In the formal terms set out below, this claim indicates that functions f_1 , f_2 and f_3 can only relate *one* individual with agency A_n to *one* set of experiences and to *one* set of interpretations of experiences. The only access agent A_n has to the agency and interpretative faculties of another individual is through functions such as g_2 by which the experiences of the individual with agency A_n can be affected.

In other words, it is impossible for me as an agent to have access to the interpretations of experiences which accompany the actions of a distinct agent. It is also, ipso facto, impossible for me to experience what another individual is experiencing.

The claims made in C1 to C8 can be collated into a single claim (the mappings and functions refer to Fig.1 on page 15):

An individuating process, which itself depends upon the nature of the identity of the individuated object, can only be carried out if

(i) there exists a one-one mapping f_1 from a set E_n onto a set I_n (where E_n and I_n are sets of experiences gathered together under the auspices of belonging to an individual who is a 'knowledgeable being')

(ii) there exist functions f_2 and f_3 which relate all the elements in I_n and E_n respectively to a single agent A_n(C9)

Claim C9 will be substantiated in the next two sections.

(* f_1 is a function which *connects experiences with their interpretations*. This means that a set of experiences can be uniquely connected with a set of

interpretations. The operation of f_1 will be seen to be such that only the individual with agency A_m has access to that operation – the use of this access is usually thought of as involving the use of the imagination. 'External' agencies will only have indirect access to this function through affecting experiences.

f_2 is the function which *makes the activities of an agent meaningful*. It is by the invocation of f_2 that an individual interprets his actions. Since f_1 maps each set of interpretations onto a set of experiences, each action, being interpreted, is also part of an experience. This means that function f_3 can be expressed in terms of f_1 and f_2 . *)




Figure 1

Referring now to Figure 1, the following points will be substantiated:

- (i) f_1 (or f_4) is a one-one mapping from E_m (or E_n) onto I_m (or I_n)
 (* the uniqueness of individual interpretations of experience *)
- (ii) f_2 and f_3 (or f_5 and f_6) are functions from sets E_m (or E_n) and I_m (or I_n) to set A relating all the elements in E_m and I_m (or E_n and I_n) to a single element A_m (or A_n) in set A
 (* the uniqueness of the agency of the experiencing individual *)
- (iii) g_1 (or g_2) is a relationship but not a mapping between A_m (or A_n) and the elements of set E_n (or E_m)
 (* a relation which enables one to affect another's experiences *)
- (iv) There are no relationships such as f_3 from A_w to set I_r if there is a function f_v relating A_w to I_u where u does not equal r .
 (* the uniqueness of the experience of individual agency *)

The argument is partly logical and partly rests on experience. The logical aspect turns on the nature of the concept of experience and its relationship with the notion of an interpretation. The empirically based part of the argument rests on the consequences of accepting, or the price paid by rejecting, the possibility of the occurrence of certain processes.

In the more logical part it will be argued that the notion of an experience which can form the basis from which a 'knowledgeable being' might communicate understanding carries with it the requirements that the experience is interpreted and that the interpretation is itself interpreted. In other words the nature of the concept of a communicable experience is such that it necessitates the possession of a second order monitoring device by the individual having the experience. The more empirical part will consist of an examination of the preconditions which must hold if communication which induces changes in the cognitive contents of experience is to be possible.

PART 4: INTERPRETATIONS and EXPERIENCE

In examining the relationship between experiences and interpretations it is fruitful to draw a distinction between an experience which is devoid of cognitive content (*10) and one which is not. The distinction will help to highlight the impact which changing interpretations have on experiences.

An experience is principally a psychic phenomenon. If it makes sense to talk of such a thing as being devoid of cognitive content then one might be talking of the experiences of an animal or perhaps the awareness in consciousness of the motor functions of one's body. Such phenomena may be seen to be indistinguishable, in category, from the registering of a picture on a camera film when the shutter opens or the alteration of the contents of a particular address in the main memory of a computer when an input device sends an impulse along a particular address bus. However, when an experience is interpreted it cannot be devoid of cognitive content. Similarly an experience which has cognitive content must be in some sense interpreted otherwise it could not be known that it had cognitive content.

The significance of the cognitive content of an experience is that, because it is necessarily accompanied by an interpretative process, it ensures that the experience must be subjective. This subjectivity does not preclude the possibility that the experience can have an objective component to it. The subjectivity of an experience with cognitive content does, however, preclude the possibility that the experience can be shared by more than one interpreter of experiences. Since an interpretation of an experience giving it cognitive content changes not just the status of the experience but also the experience itself, the simultaneous interpretation of a cognitive-free experience by more than one interpreter would simultaneously alter the putatively single experience into more than one experience! If the interpreters were to fuse into a single interpreter (or were to exchange bodies and so exchange operations g_1 and g_2 as

well as the current uninterpreted experience; with f_1 remaining as it is while f_2 and f_3 have to be reformulated!) then the experience would revert to being subjective (*11). But it is logically impossible for the cognitive content of the experience to survive either the process of fusion or of body exchange. It is, of course, logically possible for two separate interpreters to give separate cognitive content to a single 'cognitive-free' experience but the result would be that there would be two separate experiences.

What is being argued in short is claim C9, p. 14 above: (i) that each experience with cognitive content is uniquely linked to an interpretation and that each interpretation can only be an interpretation of a particular experience and no other - so that f_1 is a one-one mapping from a set of experiences E_n onto a set of interpretations I_n - and (ii) that both the interpretations and the experiences are linked to a single interpreter. This last point begins the analysis which justifies the claim that the relationships f_2 and f_3 are functions relating the experiences and interpretations in sets E_n and I_n with a single agent A_n .

The individual whose agency is manifest through A_n has the ability through process g_2 to affect experiences other than his own. Functions f_2 and f_3 are also such that the individual can affect his own experiences by operating through either f_2 or f_3 or both. The affecting of experiences via the operation of f_1 involves the use of the faculty of imagination while the affecting of experiences via the operations of g_2 , f_2 and f_3 involves action.

The operations of these functions, which involve action are necessary for the operations of communicative processes and so are necessary for the development of concepts. The relationships between an individual's interpreted experiences and her actions is central to the process of concept development. This centrality stems from the role played by the individual's actions both in individuating other individuals and in communicating even partially understood concepts. It is with an examination of action that the analysis will now

proceed.

Communication And Cognitively Interpreted Action:

(1) The Transmitter Of Signals

The analysis of experiences and interpretations has spotlighted the subjectivity of experiences which have cognitive content. The emphasis will now shift to intentionality. The specific type of intentionality (*12) which circumscribes the analysis of action will be that which is seen as the characteristic of consciousness which points beyond itself.

It was argued above - *p.7 - that the ability of a 'knowledgeable being' to affect both her own experiences and those of others is a precondition of the existence of a cultural system centered on a body of knowledge within which a 'knowledgeable being's' state of awareness might be altered. The precise mechanism by which this is achieved in a specific setting was not described (*13). What was seen as necessary was the possibility that each member of the group of 'knowledgeable beings' should either be able to communicate or be able to learn to communicate her interpretations to other members of the group. The communication of experiences with cognitive content involves the presupposition that both transmitter and recipient are aware that they are transmitting and receiving respectively. If the transmitter is aware that he is transmitting then this awareness will affect the content of what is present in his consciousness and so affect the nature of his experience. The awareness of the transmission alters the interpretation of the experience and so modifies the experience.

It is the awareness of either the transmitter or receiver of the communication which is intentional in the sense referred to above. The transmission itself might be routinised and, at a conscious level, not deliberate. But since interpretation is inseparable from an experience with cognitive content, it is impossible that the transmitter of the experiences is

not also the the interpreter of the same experiences. *I cannot communicate your experiences nor you mine, and the impossibility is a logical rather than just a practical one.*

One interesting result which follows from this analysis of the logic associated with the communication of concepts is that, while 'knowledgeable beings' might actually be machines, they can never see themselves as such. This point is crystallised by R.D. Laing when he states: "A man who says that men are machines may be a great scientist. A man who says that he *is* a machine is depersonalised in psychiatric jargon." (Laing's emphasis) (*14). What Laing is driving at is a feature of interactions between 'knowledgeable beings' which obliges each one to see himself as the sole being with access to his experiences. In these interactions consciousness has to perform a dual role: first, it has to point to something which is beyond itself namely to the transmitted signal and to the recipient as well as to the experience being transmitted which, like a novel, once written, leaves its author for a public domain (*15); secondly, consciousness has to turn inwards and comply with the subjectivity required by an experience with cognitive content.

It is in attempting to satisfy consciousness' requirement to point to something beyond itself that the individual acts (*16). Being part of communication, the action must be interpreted by the agent; in this case the agent is a 'knowledgeable being'. Since it is interpreted, the action must modify the experience. So g_2 (the process by which the agent A_n affects the experiences of 'knowledgeable beings' whose agency is manifest through other agents such as A_n) is itself an interpreted process.

(II) The Receiver Of Signals

When you, with agency A_n , are talking to me, agent A_n , I must be effecting changes in the environment which in turn affect your conscious states. I effect such changes by operating g_1 . I must be letting you know that I am listening.

The process g_1 , by which a 'knowledgeable being', whose agency is

manifest through A_n , affects the experiences of the 'knowledgeable being', whose agency is manifest through A_n , must also be operational during communication even if it is A_n which is the agent deemed to be 'transmitting' the experience. Process g_1 would be a feed-back process by which 'knowledgeable being' with agency A_1 could become aware that the receiver of the communication was actually becoming aware either of the cognitive content of the communicated experience or simply of the fact that communication was being attempted. Process g_1 would then also be an interpreted process and become part of the experience within which a 'knowledgeable being' with agency A_n communicates with a 'knowledgeable being' with agency A_n . In other words it is impossible for one individual to communicate with another unless each individual is affecting the conscious states of the other.

Action And The Concept Of Otherness

Focussing attention for the moment on the 'knowledgeable being' who operates as agent A_n one can, without loss of generality, identify the factors which any theory of personal identity must incorporate if the persons identified are to be capable of communication. If action by such a 'knowledgeable being' is to take place in the context of communication as outlined above, then the 'knowledgeable being' must have some notion of herself as being distinct from things which are 'beyond herself'. She must also have a notion of the operations of processes g_2 , f_2 and f_3 by which she affects the experiences of others. She need not have a concept of f_1 , the function relating experiences to her interpretations of those experiences; but, of course, in using imagination she will operate function f_1 . Further, if she is to be capable of interpreting both the process g_2 , by which she affects the experiences of others, and the process g_1 , by which her experiences are affected by others, then she must also have a concept of another being 'beyond herself' - she must have a generalised concept of 'the other' with which she is communicating.

It is through action that this generalised concept of 'the other' is developed. For it is only through the operation of the self's agency that an awareness of the separation of the self from what is other than the self is achieved. So the manifestation of the agency of the individual both generates the need for, and is determined by the notion of, the separateness of other individuals.

Individuation Processes And Their Associated Structures

The discussion so far has indicated that the analysis of the notions of experience, interpretation and action reveals a mutuality of dependence between two requirements. The first is the requirement that 'knowledgeable beings' be able to differentiate themselves one from another (p.7 above); in the second requirement we find that such 'knowledgeable beings' are both operators of, and assimilators of, the results of the operations of processes and functions such as f_1 , f_2 , f_3 , g_1 and g_2 - functions which describe the relationships between the agency and interpreted experiences of individuals who interact with each other. Both these requirements flowed from the need to facilitate communication, which itself stemmed from the need to facilitate changes in the states of understanding, which in turn rested on a need to facilitate the formation and development of concepts.

The analysis has been logical in nature in that it has concentrated on the relationship between concepts such as experience, interpretation, understanding and communication. Such a logical analysis has not, however, been carried out in an abstract world. The processes referred to in the analysis are rooted in the contingencies of what can occur in any possible world, so that fulfilling the requirements outlined in the last paragraph is itself not a logical process.

The core of the argument in this essay rests on an attempt to fulfil these requirements. Chapter 2 involves a detailed analysis of the conditions and constraints which must apply if the operations of g_1 and g_2 , by which

Individuals interact with one another, are to facilitate the occurrence of learning by 'knowledgeable beings'. Chapter 3 involves an analysis of the context or environment which both supports processes such as g_1 and g_2 and which is seen by the 'knowledgeable beings' as being 'beyond themselves'. Chapter 4 involves an analysis of the functions f_2 and f_3 to the extent that they are affected by both the structure of the individual - outlined in the remainder of the present chapter and in Chapter 2 - and by the structures within which g_1 and g_2 operate. The remainder of this section of this chapter will begin the task of specifying the conditions which have to apply if individuation of 'knowledgeable beings' through the operations of processes such as g_1 and g_2 is to be possible.

The Ontological Underpinning Of Process Involving Individuation

Until now the discussion has revolved around the examination of phenomena: experiences, processes and functions have been the objects of analysis. Some references have been made to the 'knowledgeable beings' who have and interpret experiences. No attempt has been made as yet to examine the nature of such beings or even to specify, in a similar manner to Hume's and Kant's analyses (*17), the limitations to which any such examination might be subjected. No attempt has yet been made to determine the constraints placed upon functions and processes f_1 , f_2 , f_3 , g_1 and g_2 by the requirement to facilitate processes by which 'knowledgeable beings' might be individuated (functions and processes f_1 , f_2 , f_3 , g_1 and g_2 are those which relate the experiences, actions and interpretations of an individual to each other). Given that communication between such beings can only take place if a process of individuation exists, the determination of the constraints becomes relevant to any theory in which attempts are made either to explain the behaviour of persons or to determine their nature.

Further, no attempt has yet been made to specify what sort of things change

in order that both the processes of individuation and its component processes f_1 , f_2 , f_3 , g_1 and g_2 can occur. In short there has been no attempt to provide any ontological underpinning for the phenomena which have been examined.

The route which will be followed in order to provide this ontological underpinning will begin with the justification of two claims: firstly, that the facilitation of individuation processes requires the presence of certain structures; and secondly, that the specific facilitation of processes which individuate 'knowledgeable beings' itself constrains the process which it facilitates. It will be seen that a distinction has to be made, among individuating processes, between two types of individuating process. There is a fundamental distinction between processes by which 'knowledgeable beings' individuate objects which interpret experiences and processes by which they individuate objects which do not interpret experiences: the former objects, but not the latter, through their interpretations contribute both to the operation of the processes of individuation and to the formation and development of the criteria for determining valid and invalid individuating processes.

The existence of a process by which a 'knowledgeable being' can individuate another is a prerequisite of the occurrence of communication between such beings as long as the communication is temporal (across time). Both the transmitter and the receiver of the signals involved in the communication must have some means of ensuring that they continue to communicate with the same individual while the communication is taking place, otherwise communication would break down. In these circumstances the individuating process will take into account the fact that each 'knowledgeable being' involved in the communication assents, usually tacitly, to the proposition that the other 'knowledgeable being', through interpreting his experiences, contributes to the individuating process.

In this section two claims will be substantiated; they flow from these general points. The first is that an individual 'knowledgeable being's' subjectivity is an integral part of the process, not only by which she

individuates others, but also by which she is individuated (*18). In the second claim one notes that as well as contributing to the process by which he is individuated, a 'knowledgeable being' also contributes to the formation, the development and possibly the codification of the process itself - and so also to the formation, development and possible codification of the use of concepts in general. The mechanisms involved in such formulations, developments and possible codifications will be examined in Chapter 2.

Types Of Objects Involved In Individuation Processes

Now, communication between two or more 'knowledgeable beings' involves each one of them utilising a process such as g_1 (see fig.1 p.15) to affect the experiences of another 'knowledgeable being'. Such a utilisation necessitates each 'knowledgeable being' having the capacity to distinguish between the process g_1 , which he activates, and the changes in experiences which are brought about by the process. This capacity can only become operational if each 'knowledgeable being' can individuate, and in so doing activate, the mechanism by which process g_1 becomes functional.

In order to avoid attempting to interpret an infinite regress of processes which affect experiences, each one itself forming part of an interpreted experience, a 'knowledgeable being' must assume that at least one of the mechanisms by which she affects the experiences of another 'knowledgeable being' does not itself experience and interpret the changes she is undergoing as part of the process of communication between the 'knowledgeable beings'. If a mechanism were to experience and interpret the changes it would thereby modify the changes and so modify the communication process. In such a scenario the 'knowledgeable beings' would be communicating with the mechanisms as well as with each other. The communication with the mechanism would require a process similar to g_1 . A regress would set in, only to be stopped by a mechanism which did not experience and interpret the changes it underwent in the communication

process between the 'knowledgeable being' and, either another 'knowledgeable being', or some mechanism which had and interpreted experiences (*19). (In cases where the mechanism which facilitates the communication either is a social structure, such as a multinational company through which a message is sent, or is an individual acting as language interpreter, it is reasonably easy to see that interpretations by the mechanism or its parts can modify the process by which communication takes place.) One can conclude that communication between 'knowledgeable beings' involves them in assuming both that there is a medium through which mechanisms which affect others' experiences and interpretation of experiences operate and that some of the mechanisms and their operations are not imbued with subjectivity.

This means that 'knowledgeable beings' must be capable of individuating objects which either have or lack the ability to contribute cognitively to the individuating process. The ability to make such a contribution ranges from the participation in the formation and development of processes of individuation, to their cognitive use and possibly to the codification of such processes.

The reason why an object might lack the ability to make a contribution to the formation, development and possible codification of individuating processes is either because it cannot communicate any interpreted experiences it might have (e.g. it is a stone, book, tree or an electromagnetic impulse) or because the 'knowledgeable beings' either ignore or fail to understand any such interpreted experiences as may be the case with animals and perhaps even plants.

So far it has been argued that the need to accommodate the conditions which are necessary for the existence of processes of concept development has generated a requirement that a distinction be drawn between two types of object: those objects which are members of the group of 'knowledgeable beings' who utilise the concepts used in processes of individuation and of concept development and those which are not members of the group.

Within this fundamental difference lies the distinction between the human

and the natural sciences. An object whose behaviour is studied in the natural sciences does not, as far as is known, through its own interpretations of its relationships with the 'knowledgeable beings' (who comprise the group in whose body of knowledge concepts are formed and developed) alter, or have the capacity to alter, the processes which individuate, and so distinguish one from another, the members of the group of objects to which it belongs. Some objects studied in the human sciences, such as persons, have this capacity, while some others operate by means of objects which have the capacity, such as social institutions.

Objects which, because of their inability to interact cognitively with 'knowledgeable beings', cannot participate in the processes of concept formation and development will be categorized as objects of Type-1. Objects which do have the ability to participate, whether or not they actually do so in practice, will be categorized as objects of Type-2. Because objects of Type-2 can interact cognitively with 'knowledgeable beings' they must be capable both of interpreting experiences and of activating processes such as g_2 which affect the interpreted experiences of 'knowledgeable beings'.

Objects every one of whose component parts is an object of Type-1 will normally also be objects of Type-1. So a motor car which consists of components which do not have and interpret experiences will itself not have and interpret experiences. The possibility that emergent properties of compound objects may include the ability to have and interpret experiences is not here ruled out *a priori*. The question regarding whether an object whose component parts consist of objects of Type-2 should also be an object of Type-2 is also not ruled out *a priori*; this issue is discussed in Chapter 2.

The method which will be employed to examine the implications of drawing the distinction between Type-1 and Type-2 objects concerns itself with the relationship between two processes: the process of formulating and developing concepts and the process of individuation in which use is made of such developed

concepts. It is by looking at the practical uses which are made of concepts in operations such as individuation that it will be possible to determine the areas in which one has to look in order to specify any *a priori* conditions which constrain the conceptualisation of what a person is in any given body of knowledge.

The processes by which objects of Type-1 and Type-2 can be individuated can be represented diagrammatically as in Figures 2 and 3.




Figure 2

PI = Paradigm Individuator - a model member of the group of 'knowledgeable beings' who has the capability to individuate objects and so use concepts.

E₁ = Experiences of the PI which are brought about by the operation of its own causal agency

E₃ = Experiences of the PI which are brought about by causal agencies other than the PI's

I₁ = PI's interpretation of E₁

I₃ = PI's interpretation of E₃

I₁/E₁ and I₃/E₃ are the interpreted experiences which permit the PI correctly to individuate a specific object of Type-1




Figure 3

I_1/E_1 and I_3/E_3 are the same as they are in Fig.2 except that E_3 does not include the PI's experiences which are brought about by the causal agency of the object of Type-2.

E_2 = Experiences of the PI brought about by the causal agency of the object of Type-2 which is associated with its capacity for cognitive interactions with the PI.

◆NOTE: If an object is abstract in nature, such as 'happiness' or '42', or indeed is itself a concept, then it may be the case that experiences E_3 may be either non-existent or only indirectly related to the object being identified.

Y_1 , Y_2 & Y_3 are the object of Type-2's interpretations of what it conceives the PI's interpretations I_1 , I_2 & I_3 to be. Should Y_1 , Y_2 & Y_3 affect E_1 , E_2 & E_3 in any way then new experiences E_4 , E_5 & E_6 would be generated with interpretations I_4 , I_5 and I_6 which in turn generate Y_4 , Y_5 & Y_6 .

The process of generation is potentially infinite but, in practice, if individuation is to occur, it will be finite.◆

Processes Of Individuating Objects

Since it is not a single experience but a set of interpreted experiences which are needed in a process by which a PI individuates objects of either Type-1 or Type-2, the PI must have the capability not just to interpret experiences and give them meaning, but also to interpret sets of the PI's own interpreted experiences. So the process of individuation involves a PI in operating a second order monitoring device by which interpreted experiences are

◆NOTES (a): *The distinction between E_2 and E_3 would be captured by the experiences of a PI who heard an individual utter a word (experience E_2) while seeing the shape and colour of the individual's face (experience E_3). Neither are brought about by the PI's agency but the former and not the latter is brought about by the agency of the object of Type-2 (the individual being identified).*

(b): *In both Model(A) and Model(B) the appearance and behaviour of the individuated object is central to the process of individuation. So that the movements, colour, shape, texture etc... of the individuated object are noted and the note is interpreted by the PI. In the case of Model(B), it is also the Type-2's own interpretations of its own behaviour which is interpreted by the PI. So the PI will generate a series of interpreted experiences -- interpretations of its experiences brought about by the impact of functions such as f_1 , f_2 and f_3 described in Figure 1, page 16.*

(c): *The series of interpreted triples (l_1/E_1 , l_2/E_2 , l_3/E_3); (l_4/E_4 , l_5/E_5 , l_6/E_6); ... etc... will permit the PI to individuate objects of both Type-1 and Type-2. In the case of an object of Type-1 being identified, E_2 is empty and Y_1 , Y_2 and Y_3 are not operational so only the first triple is used. As indicated above, this means that an analysis of the processes involved in individuating objects of Type-2 will, ipso facto, include an analysis of the processes involved in individuating objects of Type-1.*

themselves interpreted.

In the light of the diagrammatical representation of the processes of individuating objects of Type-2, it can be seen that such objects, by means of their interpretations (Y_1, Y_2, Y_3), (Y_4, Y_5, Y_6), ... contribute in a subjective way to their own individuation. If, further, an object of Type-2 has access to the concept-developing mechanisms which determine the parameters which permit individuation (at minimum this involves being able to substitute for a PI), then it will also contribute to the formation and development of concepts of objects in general and of itself in particular. *It was the attempt to actualise the possibility of such access which set in motion the underlabouring process of this chapter.*

The next part of this chapter will concern itself with the nature of concept-developing mechanisms, but first a little more needs to be said about the nature of a Paradigm Individuator (PI) and the criteria which apply if an object of Type-2 is to substitute for a PI in an individuating process. The criteria will include the possession by the object of Type-2 of the second order monitoring device referred above. Being a necessary characteristic of a PI, the possession of a second order monitoring device must also be a characteristic of anything which can substitute for a PI. The criteria for substitution for a PI, will also include the condition that the Type-2 object has access to the concept-developing mechanisms operational in the cultural system. Arguments justifying the inclusion of this condition, will be incorporated into a brief examination of the notion of a PI.

Processes Of Individuating Objects And The Possibility Of Teaching/Learning

Central to the acceptability of the model is the conception one has of the Paradigm Individuator. Should the PI be specified by some entity which is exogenous to the cultural system within which the conceptions (used in individuation processes) are formed, then there would be no need for the

development of concepts in the cultural system. The criteria determining whether a given attempted process of individuation were valid would be specified by the exogenous entity. The need for the analysis of concepts would always be met by the entity's decrees. In cultural systems where there is disagreement over the validity of any process of individuation, and the requirement for teaching and learning processes involves an assumption that such agreement does not exist, there are two possibilities regarding the exogenous entity. Firstly, it may be assumed that it exists and that means have to be discovered to find out what its decrees are such that disagreements regarding meanings can be settled. Such an assumption underpins the cultural system in Plato's Republic where the Guardians are charged with the task of discovering the decrees. Secondly, it may be assumed that no such exogenous entity operates, in which case the means of determining the validity of processes of individuation must be developed within the cultural system itself. In both these cases there will be mechanisms to which 'knowledgeable beings', who can determine valid individuations, have access which themselves determine whether a given object of Type-2 can substitute for a PI. Without such access individuation of objects would not be possible. This impossibility is accompanied by the impossibility of the occurrence of learning and teaching (*20).

Not only are the means of determining which objects can substitute for PIs to be available to the objects which can make the substitution, but also Type-2 objects which can substitute for PIs must have access to the processes which determine valid and invalid individuations.

Justification for this claim would follow similar lines to the argument in the previous paragraph. As in that argument, should there be no disagreements in need of settlement regarding valid individuations of objects then the need for access to the processes would disappear.

There is a mutuality of dependence between the two arguments. If a 'knowledgeable being' can individuate an object and then subsequently, through access

to the mechanism by which individuation processes develop, alters the manner in which he individuates a given object, then that 'knowledgeable being' will have changed his own powers and capabilities. He will then need to be individuated by a different procedure. So if 'knowledgeable beings' who use concepts have access to the *development* of the processes by which they individuate objects, they must also have access to the *development* of the processes by which they individuate each other. The absence of access to such development processes was seen, above, to carry with it unacceptable consequences.

Further, we can conclude that, since the process of individuating an object is parasitic upon the process of formulating a concept of the object, 'knowledgeable beings' who individuate each other contribute to the process by which each one of them is defined. And finally, we can conclude from the same argument that these 'knowledgeable beings' must have access to the means by which the meanings of concepts are both developed and reaffirmed - the history of ideas is not independent of the individuals who use them in communicating with each other (*21).

This last point, which has flowed from an analysis of the process of communication, is not surprising. Communication involves the assumption by the participants that there is an equivalence of meaning among the concepts they use. This, in turn, involves the assumption that each individual has access to the means by which meanings of concepts can change. The arguments in Part 4 have made these points in rather a detailed fashion. Part 5 will consist principally of the fashioning of an analysis of the means by which the meanings of concepts can change or by which they are reaffirmed.

Before producing this analysis a small gap in the present analysis will need to be filled. There is a presumption in all the arguments above that 'knowledgeable beings' have some second order activating and monitoring devices by which they operate and control the functions such as f_1 , f_2 , f_3 and g_2 in Figure 1, page 16. The justification of this presumption is to be found in the

entire essay, but put succinctly one might state that it rests on the price paid by anyone who attempts to deny its validity. The denial would be accompanied by the absence of the intelligibility of processes involving concept communication.

PART 5: THE DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT EQUIVALENCE

(The distinction between social and natural structures vindicated)

Mechanisms Which Determine Meaning Equivalence

Once one accepts that the application of concepts involves processes whereby objects are individuated, one recognises the need (within a system in which concepts are used) for the existence of mechanisms which determine the equivalence of the meanings of the concepts which are used. The need becomes more acute if the meanings of the concepts are liable to shift or change in any way.

There are at least three conditions which such mechanisms have to meet. Firstly, they must be accessible to any individual who can communicate concepts and so can individuate others and other objects. The justification for accepting this first condition was given in the last section. Secondly, the operation of the mechanism must utilise a process such as g_2 in fig. 2 in order to affect the experiences of an individual and thereby affect the individual's interpretative functions (captured by the operation of f_1 in fig. 2). The necessity to accept this second condition stems from the requirement that future operations of functions such as f_1 , f_2 and f_3 have to take into account any changes in meaning of the concept. The interpretations and actions of individuals need to account for alterations in meanings if communication is to be possible when meanings alter. Thirdly, it must be possible for the mechanisms which determine meaning equivalence to be available for use during any interaction between individuals. The lack of availability of such a

mechanism during an interaction, would prevent communication from occurring if differences existed, between the communicating individuals, concerning the meaning of a concept.

If one is to take the point (that individuals who communicate have access to the mechanisms by which meanings change) seriously, then the second and third condition outlined in the last paragraph oblige one to accept that the mechanisms must operate through interactions between individuals. Since interactions must involve constant mutual individuation by the individuals involved in the interactions, Model(B) *page 30 for Individuating objects of Type-2 can be used with the minor amendment that the Type-2 object can also substitute for a PI (*22). The model for an interaction between individuals which incorporates the mechanisms for determining concept equivalence between the concepts held or understood by the individuals, can be represented diagrammatically in figure 4 below.

In the operation of the model, it is assumed that individuals P and Q are going through a process by which they are determining whether their respective conceptualisations of some object correspond sufficiently closely for them to be able agree to the identification of the object and communicate that agreement. Individual P holds concept C_p and individual Q holds concept C_q .




Figure 4

Figure 4 represents the interaction by which individuals P and Q attempt to determine the equivalence of the concept C_P and C_Q

EP_3 and EQ_3 = Experiences of P and Q respectively which are brought about by neither P's nor Q's causal agencies

EP_1 and EQ_2 = Experiences of P and Q respectively which are brought about by P's causal agency

EP_2 and EQ_1 = Experiences of P and Q respectively which are brought about by Q's causal agency

(I_1, I_2 & I_3) & (Y_1, Y_2 & Y_3) = interpretations by P and Q respectively of (EP_1, EP_2 & EP_3) & (EQ_1, EQ_2, EQ_3) ♦ (See foot of page 37)

The acceptance of any interactive model, such as Model(C), which represents part of the operation of a concept equivalence determining mechanism, commits one to the assumption that each individual, such as P or Q, interacts with the other in accordance with a structured set of intersubjectively accepted principles. As was claimed earlier in the chapter, each individual brings his own subjectivity to the interaction; and the claim that the subjectivity operates in a structure which is also accepted by the other subjectively operating individual, is justified by reference to the conditions which have to apply if the interaction is to be intelligible. The intelligibility of each individual's participation in the interaction would be lost unless: firstly, each individual assumes that the other is attempting to interact using the same or similar mechanisms; secondly, each individual assumes that both interacting

◆NOTE: The diagram is simplified by the fact that here individual P will also interpret what he or she conceives individual Q's interpretations Y_1 , Y_2 & Y_3 to be, giving rise to I_4 , I_5 & I_6 and modifying EP_1 , EP_2 & EP_3 giving rise to the possibility of further interpretations as was the case with Model(B). But here the picture is more complex since individual Q is also interpreting; and uncertainties regarding the sequence of interpretations can, and, in practice, often do set in.

This complex interplay of interpretations was exploited by Peter Sellers in the comic film *Dr. Strangelove* where, as a spy, he informs one government that the other knows a sensitive fact, then informs the first that the second in fact knows that it knows, then informs the second that the first knows that it knows that it knows this sensitive fact. The process of informing each government that the other knows that it knows etc... continues until at last the point was reached when Dr. Strangelove actually tells one government a piece of information of which it was not cogniscent, that the other knows that it knows etc... This last piece of information is deemed to be highly significant!

Individuals are using structures which are in harmony and which, not only facilitate communication, but also allow for reciprocity in the interactive process; and thirdly, each assumes that the results of the operations of the interactions in determining new, or reaffirming existing, meanings of concepts are transferable to other interactions.

The reciprocity and transferability of its results ensure that the interaction is structured and that the structure influences the means by which each individual affects the interpreted experiences of the other. Incorporated in such a structure would be the language, and the rules by which language is used, along with all other social structures which allow meaning to be associated with non-linguistic experiences. If the structure is to be used then its parts will consist of objects which can be individuated and so consist of objects of Type-1 and Type-2.

Since each individual involved in the interactive processes which determine concept equivalence must recognise that the other individual's subjectivity is needed for the processes to achieve their purpose, one can conclude that an individual assumes, even tacitly, that her own participation in the interaction is necessary for its operation. In other words the individuals assume that they sustain the structure which facilitates the interaction through using the self-same structure.

Bringing together the points made in this section one finds that interactions involving the development or reaffirmation of concepts have, as necessary conditions for their operation;

(a) the pre-existence of a 'social structure', and possibly a 'natural structure', which facilitate concept-developing and meaning-reaffirming interactions between individuals which the individuals can recognise as such interactions when they occur;

(b) the existence of individuals who can recognise themselves as, on one hand, sustaining and being partly defined in terms of that 'social structure'

through their interactions yet, on the other hand, as not being derivatives of the operations of that structure.

These points will be developed more fully in the next two chapters. The present purpose is to record the foundations on which the points rest. The final section of this chapter will involve an outline of how all the points raised so far are likely to impinge upon theories of Personal Identity.

PART 6: 'KNOWLEDGEABLE BEINGS' and THEORIES of PERSONAL IDENTITY

The scenario painted above enables one to see much of the modern analytical philosophy which concerns itself with Personal Identity in a wider perspective than such philosophy usually sees itself. Such philosophy concerns itself largely with the problem of codifying the characteristics of what is assumed to be the archetypal individual. These are concerns which are met by the use of, rather than an analysis of, processes represented by Model(C). Attempts are made to discover the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for an object to be defined as a person (*23). These attempts base themselves on often unrecognised assumptions, not only that the group within which the individual is located, presumably the whole of humanity, and the individuals within the group, have at least some fixed characteristics in the same way as the objects of enquiry in the natural sciences are seen to have fixed characteristics, but also that these fixed characteristics can be determined or discovered from observations of the behaviour of people and from the construction of theories based on these observations.

P.F. Strawson (*24) went some way towards casting aside the shackles of these assumptions. He pointed out firstly that definitions of individuals are dependent upon the cultural system within which they are located. Secondly, he pointed out that such definitions should not contravene the rules of the use of

the language within which they are formulated (in view of his contention that such rules reflect or embody the structure of the cultural system).

Unfortunately Strawson's insight has lain dormant for some time and only his conclusions regarding a specific cultural system have been criticised - and these have been criticised as if he were making universal claims about persons rather than a specific claim about a specific cultural system (*25).

Strawson's insight, if accepted, leads one to examine the inter-relationships between individuals, who through their interpreted experiences and action sustain the structures of the cultural system. It also leads one to examine the structures themselves. This examination would also highlight the static nature of Strawson's own argument as well as the unproductive nature of those arguments which involve *a priori* assumptions of the possibility of discovering criteria of personal identity which are not tied to a specific cultural system. Even those who, following Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler (*26), assert that the self is unanalysable, tend to reach their conclusion by arguing that the search for criteria is unreasonable rather than illogical. With his argument stemming from the first-person perspective Madell (*27) offers a different route to the conclusion that the self is unanalysable. Had he only delved a little more deeply into Strawson's argument, he would have found some support there for his thesis of the importance of the first-person perspective: Strawson argues that the concept of a person is a primitive one in our cultural system, so giving the basis for arguments suggesting that a first-person perspective is significant. One of the main tasks of this essay is to provide, with an extended Strawsonian argument, support for the twin theses of the significance of a first-person perspective and of an incompletely analysable (rather than unanalysable) self.

The significance of the inability to analyse the self does not lie in the uniqueness of such an inability; for there may be other objects which can be individuated yet cannot be completely analysed. The significance lies rather in

the uniqueness of the type of inability to give a complete analysis: this inability is *of necessity* found in *all* cultural systems in which the development of concepts is seen to occur. No cultural system can exist in which the concepts, by which one individuates individuals who sustain the cultural system, can be reduced completely to other concepts within the system. The concept of a person is necessarily a primitive concept.

In making this provision, a more extensive understanding of what a 'knowledgeable being' is will be developed. As has already been indicated, a 'knowledgeable being's' relationships with other such beings and with the structures which enable him to interact with these other beings, will be investigated. It will be assumed that any successful theory of Personal Identity will designate all 'knowledgeable beings' who are "good-enough individuator" as persons. Theories which do not do this will be seen to be incomplete in an important way.

THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

"The direct activities out of which thought grows are social acts" (*1)

*"In other words, man is not **also** a social being, but he is social in every respect of his being that is open to empirical investigation"* (*2)

"But because we have defined consciousness not as a static form but as a process involving interaction between individual and environment, as human relations have been transformed during the evolution of society, so human consciousness too has been transformed." (*3)

"...a creature cannot have thoughts unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another" (*4)

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to the understanding of the relationship between self and society. In Chapter 1 the subjective element in the *individuating* and the *individuated* self was emphasised. Attention will now be focussed more on the objective element. In Chapter 1, it was argued that if the concepts which enable us to communicate are to do the work required of them we must incorporate in our system of concepts two types of concept. The two types of concept refer to the two types of object (Type-1 and Type-2, Ch.1 p. 27-8) which need to be distinguished and individuated if a cultural system is to be able to sustain various activities. As well as communication, it was noted that processes such teaching, learning and evaluating an individual's competence to carry out these activities each would

disintegrate if individuals who sustained the cultural system were not 'unified' individuals (with second order monitoring capabilities) and did not distinguish between Type-1 and Type-2 objects.

In pursuing the main aim of this chapter the analysis will be pushed further. The focus will be on the nature of the structures which enable the occurrence of individuating processes represented by Model(A) and Model(B) (p. 27-28) and concept-developing and meaning-reaffirming process represented by Model(C) (p. 35). In any cultural system, these structures will be individuated as either Type-1 or Type-2 objects. Since one of the purposes of this study is to throw light on the basis upon which we develop our understanding of social phenomena, it seems natural to investigate the distinction between Type-1 and Type-2 objects more deeply.

Rather than do this directly, a different distinction will be specified. The distinction is underpinned by the Type-1/Type-2 differentiation, but is not embodied by it. The distinction which constitutes the focus of attention in this chapter is the one between 'natural kinds' and 'social kinds'. 'Social kinds' will be defined as objects whose operations are dependent upon the intentional operations of objects of Type-2, that is, on the operation of objects which can conceptualise and have causal powers whose use they can conceptualise. Obviously, objects of Type-2 will, by definition, be social kinds. It will be argued that objects of Type-1, or objects which do not conceptualise, can also be 'social kinds'. The existence of objects which do not conceptualise, yet whose operations are dependent upon objects which do, will be justified by establishing a mutual ontological dependence between these objects and 'conceptualising individuals' - all of which are Type-2 objects. An example of this mutual ontological dependence would be found in the relationship between a prison officer and the penal structure operating in a given social environment.

Social kinds will be placed into further subcategories: those which can

alter their own causal powers and conceptualise the alterations are distinguished from those which do not have this capability. Persons will be found in the former category. It will be found that different conceptualisations of what a person is have different effects on one's ability to sustain an adequate account of the notion of society. Different conceptualisations also have different constraining effects on possible conceptualisations of the relationships between persons. It will be seen that the rejection of the conditions for the formulation of a concept of a person which are set out here leads to inadequate conceptualisations of

(i) what society is and

(ii) the nature of the relationships between individuals (at least the relationships between those individuals who sustain the cultural environment in which understanding of relationships is sought).

By contrast, the acceptance of such a concept of a person will enable one to conceptualise two categories of relationships between persons which are central to the understanding of the development of concepts in any cultural environment. These are the relationships between persons which involve them in *interactions with* and those which involve them in *being with* (*5) other persons.

The deeper understanding of the basis on which concepts develop will, inter alia, permit one to find a solution to Hume's problem of a missing subject of experiences (*6), and thereby gain a deeper understanding of the basis upon which the concept of a person is developed.

Underlying the whole exercise is the same principle which both underpinned and resulted from the analysis in Chapter 1:

It is not the identity of the self which is a specific instance of general identity, but rather that general notions of identity rest upon a prior grasp of the notion of Personal Identity.

The second concern of the argument in this chapter will be the development, into the areas governing social change, of the ideas already outlined. An analogy with the natural sciences will be used. It will be suggested that, just as changes of state of natural kinds are only possible when there are alterations among balancing forces, so changes of state of social kinds are only possible when there are alterations among balancing social forces. The concept of force in nature is conceived as being interlinked with the concepts of space and distance so, it will be argued, a concept of a social force can be interlinked with concepts of social space.

Such an elementary particle sociology will involve an investigation into the relationships between the concept of a person, which will be given in schematic form, and the sources of our understanding of social change. It will be argued that a person conceived as an entirely objective entity, whether or not that objectivity is embedded in cultural relativism, will relegate social change to the realm of natural change. While this may be a welcome development for some, it has the unwelcome effect of dissolving the distinction between natural and social kinds, and so merging phenomena with thought and rendering the transfer of concepts through communication meaningless, eventually leading to the evaporation of all intentional action.

PART 2: FROM NATURAL KINDS TO SOCIAL KINDS

Natural Kinds

The development of any notion is dependent upon conceptualisations of other, related notions. The development of the notion of a social kind will rely heavily on an analysis of what it is to be a natural kind. A distinction will be drawn between natural and social kinds. In this particular case, the distinction drawn has to depend on the already extensively analysed (by other

writers) concept of a natural kind. It is with a rehearsal of the more familiar and accepted properties of natural kinds that the processes by which the distinction is drawn will begin. These properties will be asserted without offering any justification for their acceptability. The assertions will be made in the form of assumptions. Further, since the analysis of natural kinds is not the central concern of this essay, the water-tight validity of the assumptions is not central to the validity of the central argument in the essay.

Four assumptions regarding natural kinds will be made: *firstly*, it will be assumed that natural kind concepts make a conceptual link between questions of identity and the causal and dispositional properties of members of the natural kind (*7). *Secondly*, natural kinds are not nominal essences nor are captured by "law-cluster concepts" (*8). Arguments against such formulations of natural kind concepts are to be found in Roy Bhaskar's work (*9). *Thirdly*, it will be assumed that there is a distinction between natural kind concepts and mathematical and logical concepts, and this distinction is not restricted to the type of object the concepts designate (*10). *Fourthly*, it will be assumed that the formulation of natural kind concepts involves two interactive processes:

(a) processes involving interactions between identifier, usually termed person, and putative examples of the natural kind and

(b) the interactions between individuals which determine the development of, and the reaffirmation of the meaning of, natural kind concepts as they are conceptualised by the various interacting individuals.

Together (a) and (b) lead to the specification of the acceptable applications of a concept.

Outline Of The Path From Natural To Social Kinds

The path which will be followed in specifying what is meant by a social kind is determined by the similarities and differences which exist between natural and social objects. The similarities are found in the ascription, to

each type of object, of powers to affect its environment. The ascription of causal powers to an object is central to the concept-learning, concept-development and meaning-reaffirming processes in which individuals need to be capable to participate if they are to be able to communicate concepts. The differences between natural and social kinds are to be found in the relationship between the conceptualisation of the powers of the object and the exercise of those powers.

The development of those concepts which designate objects with powers to affect their environments is dependent upon the operations of both individuating processes and concept-developing processes. This will be the case whether the development occurs in the natural or the social sciences. In other words such developments are dependent upon the operations of processes represented by Models (A), (B) and (C) - (*p. 28, 29, & 36). The operations of these models involved assuming that the object being individuated had causal and dispositional properties which would be identified by interpreted experiences - categorised on (*p. 30) as the triples $(I_1/E_1, I_2/E_2, I_3/E_3)$. So the interpretation of experiences lies at the heart of the development of the conceptualisation of any object deemed to have causal influence on its environment. However, the interpretation of experiences does not necessarily lie at the heart of the operations of the objects which have been conceptualised.

The discussion in the preceding paragraph indicates that the fourth assumption regarding natural kinds (*p. 46) also applies to social kinds. The formulation of social kind concepts also involves interactions of the type described above. It was established in Chapter 1 that the acceptance of this fourth assumption involves further assumptions, these being the relatively enduring structured nature of both (i) the objects which are to be identified and (ii) the set of inter-relationships between individuals which enable them to sustain and develop concepts.

It has been argued elsewhere (*11) that the intelligibility of some of these inter-relationships (which involve the use of scientific training programmes and the accepted practices of the transfactual application of knowledge discovered in such programmes) justifies the claim that natural kinds operate independently of any conceptualisation of their operations. By contrast however, it would seem that there is a *prima facie* case for suggesting that any structure of the inter-relationships cannot itself operate independently of the conceptualisations of the individuals involved in the inter-relationships. These relationships, being between conceptualising individuals are, *ex-hypothesi*, ones involving conceptualisations.

It is, however, logically possible that a structure of relationships between Conceptualising Individuals (CIs) itself operates independently of any conceptualisations. Further, and independently of the possibility, the structure itself could generate changes in the conceptualisations of the CIs. The notion of such an independent structure would be consistent with the reification of society and with holistic explanations in the Social Sciences.

The rejection of this possibility will not be attempted by direct contradiction, it will be achieved obliquely. The existence of *objects* (within the structure of relationships between individuals) whose operations are not independent of conceptualisations will be postulated. The purpose is to justify the claim that such objects exist. The justification will be achieved by naming a price to be paid by anyone denying the claim (*12). The objects are to be characterised as 'social kinds' and it will be claimed that it is only an example, or an instance, of a social kind which has causal and dispositional properties. Neither the imprecisely conceptualised relationship between individuals nor the equally fuzzily conceived 'society', can reasonably have causal and dispositional properties ascribed to them. The price to be paid by one who makes such an ascription will be specified in Part 4 below.

Preparing for the Definition of a Social Kind

Before attempting a schematic definition of a social kind it is worth examining a few of the characteristics which will form part of that schema. A fruitful way of achieving this is to undertake a comparison with the natural kind schema already outlined. As has already been stated *one of the differences between natural kinds and social kinds is that the former, but not the latter, are conceived as operating independently of any conceptualisations of those operations.* The similarity lies in the requirement that both have causal and dispositional properties.

If social kinds are to be brought under concepts then these concepts must make conceptual links between questions of identity and the causal and dispositional properties of the members of the kind. The shared need, between social and natural kinds, to make this conceptual link justifies the claim that the second, third and fourth assumptions (*p. 46) made regarding the properties of natural kinds also apply to social kinds. The justification rests on the dependence of these three assumptions on the first assumption.

There will, however, be significant differences between some of the processes involved in the formulation, maintenance and development of social kind concepts and processes with similar functions involving natural kinds. With social kind objects these processes may themselves involve the use of the social kind object; so that the formulation, maintenance or development of a social kind concept could alter the social kind itself.

The constant use of financial institutions, and with that use the maintenance of the concepts which identify such institutions, may easily alter the confidence individuals have in a particular institution's operation and so alter its causal and dispositional properties. By contrast, it is assumed that no amount of use of the concept of an electron, or even use of an electron itself, will alter its causal and dispositional properties.

A further and equally sharp distinction exists. The conceptualisations of

some individuals may not only affect the operations of social kinds they might also affect their ontological status. The defeat of Italy in the Second World War led to the disintegration of the Fascist Party associated with the government. Few would admit to belonging to the party and those who previously had attempted to use its powers both as officials and as outsiders ceased to do so. In these circumstances a party which once had considerable causal and dispositional properties ceased to exist - it was more like the scattered parts of the remains of a burnt out motor vehicle than an unused stationary one which is only waiting for petrol and a driver in order to move.

Distinguishing Natural From Social Kinds: (1) (Conceptualisations)

It may be argued that the distinctions being drawn are not significant in that natural kinds can both change their causal and dispositional properties as well as cease to exist if their constituent parts change or disintegrate. Extinct animals, such as the mammoth or some micro-organisms which are no longer produced, might be examples analogous to the Italian Fascist Party. Further, it seems that the causal and dispositional powers of micro-organisms can change, and such organisms are thought to operate independently of any conceptualisations which we may have.

The significance of the distinctions does not lie in the nature of the operations of natural and social kinds. It lies in the procedures which control the formulation, maintenance and development of natural and social kind *concepts*. Since natural kinds are assumed to operate independently of any conceptualisations of their operations, that independence can be incorporated into the control procedures.

This does not imply that the independence from conceptualisations *must* be incorporated into the control procedures for the development of natural kind concepts; as Galileo found to his cost after his reply of "*e pur si muove*" (and

yet it moves) was rejected. At the time, control procedures for the development of concepts rested on consistency with church dogma which was not independent of conceptualisations - and church dogma did not allow for the possibility that the Earth might move. By contrast, in modern science the continued use of the same natural kind concept, encapsulated by the use of the term 'carbon', to describe both graphite and diamonds is justified by the continued similarity of the behaviour of the two substances in specified controlled conditions. The creation, by the scientists, of the controlled conditions involves assumptions about the independent operations of the dispositional properties of the substances.

Further complications exist. In the cases of social kind concepts the control procedures for the development of concepts often constitute some of the operational components of the social kind itself. The application of concepts such as 'bankrupt' and 'deviant' to an individual constitutes part of what it is to be a bankrupt or a deviant and involves the exercise of some of the causal and dispositional properties of the bankrupt and the deviant. Both a bankrupt and a deviant have causal and dispositional properties which depend upon the application of their concepts to the individuals termed bankrupt and deviant. These properties include the engendering of fear and mistrust by other individuals; and the properties would not exist if no-one were to use the concepts. Indeed if no-one were to use the concepts, all the causal and dispositional properties of bankrupts and deviants would disappear. Unless one claims, along with some behaviourists and all materialists, that interactions between individuals can be analysed, without remainder, with no reference to the conceptualisations of individuals, these examples justify not only the distinctions between natural and social kinds but also the claim that the distinctions are significant for the social analyst (*13).

Distinguishing Natural from Social Kinds: (II) (Explanations)

This discussion highlights a problem encountered by explanations, generated in Social Science, of the behaviour of social kinds. In contrast with explanations of the behaviour of natural kinds they seem encircled in a perennial relativism. As Andrew Weigert has put it *"Identities, like all socially constructed realities, are structured with internal logics of action, thought and feeling that direct behaviour, interpret experience and provide the only materials individuals have for making sense out of their lives"* (emphasis added) (*14). If Weigert is right and socially constructed realities, some of which are being categorised here as social kinds, are structured with their own internal logics of action, thought and feeling, then explanations of their behaviour would have to be culturally relative. More precisely, no individual could offer any explanation of the behaviour of a social kind except through the concepts which formed part of the operational matrix of the social kind: such an explanation would only make sense in the cultural environment in which the social kind operated. Indeed, since in Weigert's terms identities provide, as socially constructed realities, the only means individuals have of making sense of the world, it could be argued that natural kind concepts also restrict themselves to a particular cultural environment.

The cultural relativism would be reinforced if one were to situate persons among social kinds. The causal and dispositional properties of persons, *qua* social kinds, would be dependent upon the conceptualisations of individuals. They would be socially constructed realities, with internal logics of action, which directed behaviour and interpreted experience. Personal identity would be a non-transferable notion restricted to the cultural environment in which it was formed. Problems of translatability between cultures would, in such a scenario, become insoluble (*15). It would, *ex-hypothesi*, be impossible to convert someone to the beliefs of a faith of another culture not merely because it would involve the destruction of an identity in one culture with the simultaneous

creation of another in the second culture, but also because there would be no way of identifying or communicating with an individual in another culture who might be a candidate for conversion.

Two courses of action commend themselves to the social analyst at this point: either to accept relativism, work with it and put up with its limitations (*16) or to look for areas where it is possible to justify claims for a certain level of cultural independence so that some yardsticks may be found against which one can gauge the strength of any theory about the nature of a given social kind (*17). The course a philosopher might take would be to attempt to clarify the extent to which relativism has to operate - as well as the areas in which it cannot operate - specifying the reasons why relativism does not extend into these areas. The last course of action will be followed.

This course will start with a statement of a more formal, if schematic, definition of a social kind. Secondly, what will be termed 'social environment', 'cultural environment' and 'social space' will be specified. Thirdly, an argument which claims that the evaluations of theories of the behaviour of social kinds across the divisions of social environments must be possible. Finally, the proposition that cultural environments have sufficiently organic properties to permit the expansion of the boundaries within which cultural relativism operates will be ratified.

The argument supporting the possibility of evaluating theories across the boundaries of differing social environments will rest on the requirement that conceptualising individuals must commit themselves, to some degree, to the maintenance of the social kinds which operate in a given social environment (so it always remains possible for the individual to shift his commitment).

Both the maintenance of the commitment and the possibility of shifting that commitment must be present even if the reasons for the individual's commitment are different from any reasons given in an explanation of the behaviour of the social kinds. The garbage collector's commitment to sustaining the operations

of social kinds such as municipal authorities is not given for the same reason as the reason given in any explanation of the behaviour of the municipality. Also, any attempts to alter the individual's commitment must be based upon criteria which are common to the various social environments from and to which the commitment is taken away and given. The intelligibility of attempts to convert individuals to a given set of beliefs rests on the assumption that the commitment of the individuals' beliefs sustains some given social structure. (The relationship between an individual's commitment to sustaining the operations of social kinds and the development of the concept of what it is to be a person is investigated in detail in Chapter 4 below.)

The Social Kind Defined

The drawing of a distinction between natural and social kinds enables one to lead towards the specification of characteristics which 'persons' must have in any cultural environment. The conclusion to be drawn, from the discussion in which the distinction has been made, consists of a set of assertions about the nature of the relationships between individuals and social kinds.

If social kinds are to be capable of exercising their causal and dispositional powers then 'persons' cannot be adequately specified by using the concepts of a particular cultural environment in which they, as social kinds, operate (*18). A person cannot be a fully analysable entity: her scope cannot be restricted to a specifiable cultural environment without the payment of a penalty. The inadequacy of the specification of the person's causal and dispositional powers is the price paid for the attempt to restrict the scope of action of the person to a specifiable cultural environment. The inadequacy lies in the inability of the restricted person to sustain the operations of those social kinds which facilitate the development of concepts.

Indeed, the notion of a Conceptualising Individual, (defined below *p. 57), although necessarily incorporated into any notion of a person, is too narrow to

sustain the work required by individuals in maintaining the operations of social kinds; especially when these operations involve the alterations of the properties of other social kinds. In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the conceptualisation of a person as a CI, a more detailed examination of the properties ascribed to social kinds, and the objects which sustain the operations of social kinds, will need to be undertaken.

A reasonably formal definition of a social kind will now be constructed. The definition is a schematic one allowing for definitions of specific social kinds to incorporate in them those properties which are, in any given context, accidental and those which are essential.

A *social kind* is an object which has causal and dispositional properties which are manifest in alterations in the behaviour, perceptions and conceptualisations of some individuals. The exercise of these causal and dispositional properties is itself causally dependent upon the conceptualisations of some individuals. Further, the causal and dispositional properties are manifest in the alteration of the behaviour of some objects which do *not* have the ability to conceptualise.

...(D1) ♦

At the core of the definition one finds that alterations of conceptualisations of individuals are seen both as the causes and as the effects of the manifestation of causal and dispositional properties of the social kind. It makes the manifestation of such alterations an essential property of a social kind. It is worth noting that similar alterations would constitute an accidental property of a natural kind. Being schematic the definition will constrain rather than determine the conceptualisation of any particular social

♦NOTE: *It can be seen that the acceptability of this definition rests on the prior acceptance of the existence of Type-2 objects, that is of objects which can both conceptualise and act.*

kind. Within those constraints it will permit any conceptualisation to specify the limits of the object's dispositional properties.

The definition of 'Finland' will be couched in terms which specify the dispositional properties which manifest themselves in the production both of the distinctly Finnish music of Sibelius and of Finnish cooking. Further, an attempt to define a specific social kind such as 'the Snoopy Party' which consists of the Snoopy Fan Club and the British Labour Party might fail if it could be shown that it was not one object but two. In such a case it would not have properties appertaining to the Snoopy Party which were not identifiable as being properties of either of the distinct component parts. It would then turn into a nominal essence gaining its properties entirely from its name.

It should also be noted that the social kind has natural kind properties in that it affects the behaviour of some objects which do not have the ability to conceptualise. At minimum it will, in affecting the conceptualisations of individuals, affect the sense receptors of the individuals and the sense receptors will be partly made up of operational or active natural kind objects.

It can also be seen that what a Conceptualising Individual is thought to be will fall under the gathering sweep of the definition (D1) - If such an individual has, and exercises, the power to communicate concepts. The communication of concepts both causally affects, and is causally dependent upon, the conceptualisations of other individuals. A normal conversation involves at least two individuals affecting each other's perceptions and conceptualisations.

The speaker is both attempting to alter conceptualisations of the listener by the manipulation of both natural and social structures and being affected by the listener's responses. Both elements are needed in communication.

Conceptualising Individuals And Social Kinds

The definition of the social kind spawns the need for a definition of a conceptualising individual as a type of social kind but with an extra

characteristic.

A **Conceptualising Individual (CI)** is an instance of a type of social kind which **both** has the power to conceptualise the effects of the exercise of its own powers qua social kind **and** whose conceptualising capabilities can be triggered by the activities of social kinds whose operations the CI does not conceptualise as its own.

...(D2) ♦

The CI has characteristics similar to those which H. Blumer's exegesis (*19) of G. H. Mead ascribes to human beings: *"We are given, then, a picture of the human being as an organism which confronts its world with a mechanism for making indications to itself. This is the mechanism that is involved in interpreting the actions of others."* Definition (D2) goes a little further in suggesting that the CI has a mechanism for interpreting its own actions as well as those of others. It is easy to see that the existence of individuals who fall under (D2) is a condition for the possibility of the operation of, and so existence of, objects which fall under (D1). This is hardly a surprising conclusion! The existence of CIs is a necessary condition for the existence of social structures.

What is slightly more surprising is that the existence of social kinds, as defined in (D1), but not falling under the scope of (D2), and of a 'social space' in which they operate, are necessary conditions for the existence of CIs as defined in (D2). The existence of a 'social space' in which social kinds operate is also a necessary condition for the existence of CIs. These two necessary conditions rest on a requirement stemming from the need to facilitate

♦NOTE: Justification for specifying this sub-category of social kinds will be offered below, in Part 4, where the distinction between CIs and non-CI social kinds is vindicated.

the operations of CIs. These operations can only occur within a structure of inter-relationships between CIs which is recognised as a means of interaction and which differentiates the CIs from natural kinds. (This contention was substantiated in Chapter 1.)

If further, such a structure is to sustain the interactions between CIs which involve concept communication, then the structure needs to have the required causal and dispositional properties which demarcate it as a social kind. (The possibility that the structure itself is a CI has been canvassed by those who, like Berkeley, have postulated God as the facilitator of all interactions. But this involves a mere semantic difference, for access to God's conceptualisations is not available, so for all practical purposes Berkeley's structure is not a CI.) We are led to the conclusion that there is a mutual ontological dependence between the social kinds which are and those which are not CIs.

Evidence in support of this mutual ontological dependence is found in two well-known cases described by Harold Garfinkel (*20). The first is the 'counselling experiment' and the second is that of Agnes, born a physiologically normal male, who managed to grow up into a female indistinguishable from other females who do not possess a uterus. In the counselling experiment a group of individuals assumed, and seemed unable to rid themselves of the assumption, that their interactions with a so-called counsellor were structured. The experimentors had, however, ensured that the interactions were totally random and unstructured. In the second case Agnes as well as undergoing the appropriate externally induced physiological changes which were initiated prior to puberty, had both to learn at a conscious level what the social structures were that helped to define her as a woman and to manipulate those structures in order to facilitate the redefinition.

This example also lends credence to the validity of definition (D2) of a 'conceptualising individual' as something which is able to conceptualise the

effects of the exercise of his own powers since such conceptualisation is a precondition of the attempt to alter those powers. Other, if less striking, examples of the mutual ontological dependence of social kinds and CIs can be found in social psychology texts (*21).

Social Space: (1) Its Various Forms

If it can be shown that the analysis of what it is to be a person cannot be divorced from the analysis of the operations of social kinds, then the arguments set out below become relevant to the development of theories of Personal Identity. It is clear, however, that the context or setting in which a social kind's causal and dispositional properties are manifest is important to anyone wishing to offer explanations of its behaviour and/or alterations of its properties. Problems may arise if the setting in which the explanation of the behaviour and/or alteration of properties occurs, is the same as the one in which the interactions between the explanatory process and the social kind occurs. Interactions between the behaviour of the object being explained and the explanation itself can only be ruled out *a priori*, without the payment of a penalty, in the cases of explanations of the behaviour of natural kinds. Indeed the ruling out of the possibility of such interactions constitutes a criterion for the ascription of natural kind rather than social kind status to an object.

With these problems in mind two types of environment in which social kinds operate will now be defined: a '*social environment*' and a '*cultural environment*'. Both will be defined as covering areas of '*social space*' which will also be defined.

Social space consists of either 'interactive social space' or 'extended social space'.

- (1) **Interactive social space** is an area where interactions involving the alterations of conceptualisations of one or more individuals can be

detected. These interactions occur as a result of the activity of at least one other individual who has the ability to conceptualise the interaction.

- (II) **Extended social space** is also an area where interactions involving the alterations of conceptualisations of one or more individuals can be detected.

...(D3)

Alterations of conceptualisations can, in 'extended social space', occur also as a result of the operational influence of a social kind which *cannot* conceptualise the interaction. The alterations must occur among the individuals whose conceptualised behaviour forms part of the operational matrix of the social kind whose operational influence helps to specify the extended social space.

If an apple falls on Isaac Newton's head and he feels pain and becomes aware of the force of gravity, then an interaction has taken place which is not in social space. If there happened to be a couple of pranksters shaking the tree in order to cause Mr. Newton some discomfort then the interaction would be in social space despite the pranksters' possibly incorrect conceptualisation of the interaction.

The effected alterations of the recipient individual's conceptualisations need not be conceptualised accurately by the active initiator of those alterations; all that is necessary is that the initiator conceptualises the interaction in some form which could also be conceptualised by the recipient. If the pranksters had been instructed to cause Mr. Newton discomfort by a religious group with an anti-Unitarian policy then the interaction would be in extended social space. In practice, as in this last example, interactive and extended social spaces will often overlap, and the notion of interactive social space is mostly a useful analytic device which helps one understand the workings of component parts of social kinds.

The significance of drawing the distinction between interactive and extended social space will be demonstrated in Part 4 below.

A **social environment** is defined as consisting of the area covering the range of detectable influences in extended social space of a given set of social kinds, there being no subset of them whose range of influence does not overlap with the range of influence of at least one other kind in the set. ...**(D4)**

Two social kinds will have overlapping influence if each of their operations can interfere with the operation of the other. So the local ex-servicemen's club will have overlapping influence with the local school. They may make demands on some people which conflict with each other if they hold meetings at the same time or try to hold them in the same place. By contrast the local school in Mountainash may have no overlapping influence with the Communist Party in the Ukraine, so these two would not generate a social environment.

The reason behind the insistence for no breaks in influence lies in the requirements that any explanation of the behaviour of a social kind might have. Such explanations will concern themselves with the possible influence of the social kind and the influence of other social kinds.

A **cultural environment** is defined as an area in extended social space (with no discontinuities except those bridged by the operations of concept-developing and concept-reaffirming social kinds) which is specified by the range of detectable influences of the processes of communication of a given set of concepts. ...**(D5) ♦**

Social Space: (II) (Social And Cultural Environments Distinguished)

Both social and cultural environments have blurred boundaries. The blurred

boundaries stem from the variable conceptualisations individuals have of the same and similar concepts leading to variable influences of social kinds. The examples serve to illustrate the possibility that causal influence of social kinds can alter even while the causal influence is being exercised. The requirement which is placed on some individuals, such as children, to learn both the meanings of terms and behaviour patterns associated with them, involves a presupposition. This is the assumption that the influence of social kinds associated with the use of the terms does not extend to individuals in the same way prior to and after the individuals have undergone the learning process. Further, even when meanings have been learned, the differences in the conceptualisations of putatively the same concept by different individuals will lead to variations in the influence of the associated social kinds as well as to possible shifts in the operational matrices of the social kinds.

The influence of the Women's Institute in the UK has changed during the 1970s. Having started as an organization which reinforced the traditional notion of a woman principally as a home-maker and prime carer of children it changed as women, and men, changed their conception of what a woman is. While still being fairly traditional, by the 1980s, the Institute had ceased to exert pressure on women to fall into the traditional role.

The distinction between a social and a cultural environment has been drawn

◆NOTE: (i) A 'social environment' is the context in which a conceptualised social kind operates. A 'cultural environment' is the context in which the conceptualisation of the social kind will operate.

(ii) The influences of concept communication function through the operations of social kinds. Social kinds, because they have causal impact on conceptualisations, operate by means of concept communication. One can conclude that social environments will always be cultural environments, but the reverse is not the case.

in order to reflect

(i) the differences between the **operations** of a social kind and **explanations of those operations** and

(ii) the distinction between the social kind and the concept of the social kind.

The distinction between the two types of environment is highlighted by the fact that all cultural environments have a common characteristic (in addition to being specified by changes in conceptualisations) while social environments do not. Every cultural environment will cover an area of social space generated by the operations of at least one of the social kinds which facilitate the development of and/or reaffirmation of the meaning of concepts. The various uses of scientific concepts such as 'ion', 'charged particle' etc..., will incorporate the operations of those social mechanisms by which natural scientists reaffirm the validity of the use of concepts. By contrast social environments do not cluster around the space generated by the operations of a particular social kind. Just as the operations of a given set of social kinds may not generate a social environment, so might not the use of a given set of concepts.

Not every given set of concepts will generate a cultural environment. The use of some sets of concepts may produce discontinuities in the social spaces they generate. This will be the case unless one includes the process of examining the disparate concepts *itself* as the process which embodies the operation of a social kind whose influence overlaps those of the social kinds which would otherwise be seen as discontinuous. In such a case the discontinuity of the area in the social space of the putative cultural environment is avoided by the examination of the discontinuity!

So the conceptualisations of notions such as 'responsibilities' and 'rights' will affect the operations of the Scottish legal system, the Inner London Education Authority and Cornish tin mine companies. They will not,

however, affect the legal system of a Moslem country where the notion of 'nshallah' (it is the will of Allah) is prevalent, nor will they affect the Italian legal system where the marginally different notions of 'le responsibilita' and 'i diritti' will have some impact.

If the making of distinctions is to be fruitful in social science then the process of examining differing concepts cannot count as sufficient to permit any collection of concepts to generate a single cultural environment.♦

Social Space: (III) (The Importance of the Social/Cultural Environment Distinction)

The reason behind the attempt to distinguish a cultural from a social environment lies in the fact that every explanation of social phenomena is set in a cultural environment while it applies to objects which operate in a social environment.

The mutual ontological dependence which exist between conceptualising individuals and social kinds has led some thinkers in the hermeneutical tradition to conclude that the only way to understand the operations of social kinds is through using the concepts which form part of the operational matrices of the social kinds (*23). By this what is meant is the set of concepts which are involved in the conceptualisations of individuals which, as conceptualisations, contribute to the operations of the social kind in question.

On what has been said so far there is no warrant for such a conclusion. Indeed, if one were to attempt to understand and explain a social kind's

♦NOTE: It should be made clear that the conceptualisation of a concept alters if a different symbol is used to represent and communicate the concept. The conceptualisation of 'a right' is different from the conceptualisation of its equivalent in Italian, 'un diritto', pace the different pronunciations of the words in the different countries (*22).

operations from within its operational matrix it is possible that either the successful understanding, or even just the attempt, may irrevocably alter the mechanisms which controlled the operations. In such a scenario it would be logically impossible to explain the social kind's operations from within its operational matrix.

An attempt at understanding the mediæval church whose causal and dispositional powers were based on the acceptance of dogma could, if conducted entirely by an individual who operated in the social environment which it affected, disturb and irrevocably alter the range and manner of exercise of the powers. At such a point the understanding would become historical and would not be achieved using the concepts which were involved in the operations of the church. The cultural environment in which the explanation was offered would have changed.

By the same token it is not possible fully to understand the meaning of a concept if one ignores the contexts in which it is used. The operations of a social kind which are affected by conceptualisations of a given concept themselves have an impact on the meaning of that concept (*24). It is important, therefore, to be clear about the context in which the understanding of social kinds can be achieved. As has already been indicated this context will be a cultural environment since all possible uses of the concepts used in an explanation influence the efficacy of the explanatory process.

The operations of social kinds involve the understanding, however incomplete and inadequate, of some aspect(s) of their operations by the individuals whose conceptualisations affect those operations. One can conclude that the distinction between a cultural and a social environment is built into the conditions for the possibility of intentional social interactions; that is, of the operations of social kinds. Further, since conceptualising individuals themselves operate in social environments but conceptualise their own actions in cultural environments the notion of the individual or even of the self will be

understood partly in terms of its impact on the cultural/social environment distinction.

Social Space: (iv) (Background To (v): Social/Cultural Environments And The Self)

The argument being presented in the section on social space revolves around the need to understand and offer explanations of the behaviour of social kinds. In this context it is worth considering three general categories of explanation.

The *first* is that typical of the natural sciences where the explanation cannot itself affect the operations of the object whose behaviour is explained and there is a possibility of interfering with the operations in order to discover how they work.

The *second* applies to some natural sciences *de facto* and to many of the social sciences *de re*. In this category the explanation also cannot affect the operations of the object explained but here there is no possibility of interfering with the mechanisms which bring about changes in behaviour. In natural science the explanations offered in astronomy would fall under this category since there are no practical ways of interfering with the movements of planets, stars and galaxies. In social science, historical explanation and some forms of anthropology would fall under this category.

It is clear that historical explanations can neither affect the objects explained nor allow for the possibility of gaining access to the mechanisms which generate the changes in the objects. Similarly, if an explanation of the behaviour of a particular society's structures is sought with the proviso that the methods of gaining the explanation should not interfere with the operations of the mechanisms affecting the structures, then, *ex-hypothesi*, access to the mechanisms is not permitted. Such access would interfere with the operations since these operations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of the individuals who sustain the social structures. As was pointed out in the

example of the analysis of the mediæval church, the analysis would change the object being analysed.

The *third* category of explanation is one in which the explanatory process itself can, but need not, affect and change the operational processes of the object being explained. This category by definition allows for the interference with the operations of the object whose behaviour is being explained. It is in this third category that explanations of the behaviour of existing social kinds will be found.

Social Space: (v) (Social And Cultural Environments And The Self)

It is by examining the processes by which explanations are formed that some light will be thrown on the nature of the self and its relationships with the social and cultural environments in which it finds itself. In particular, one of the philosopher's tasks, or that of a social scientist wearing a philosopher's hat, is the analysis of the relationship between explanation and object explained. The argument so far has indicated that the social scientist should look in a cultural environment for explanations of the phenomena generated by social kinds which operate in a social environment contained in that cultural environment (the reason for this is that the explanation sought falls in category three). An examination of this third category of explanation is therefore likely to add to one's understanding of social phenomena.

It is, however, not just the social scientist who wishes to gain such understanding. An individual who interacts with social kinds, whether or not these social kinds are also conceptualising individuals (CIs), must have some understanding of their operations and have some means of gaining that understanding. It will be seen that the requirement that a CI should be able to gain an understanding of the operations of social kinds helps to render the concept of a CI inadequate to the task of learning how to describe individuals who, in an intentional way, interact with social kinds. The concept of the CI

remains adequate to the task of accounting for the formation and development of the 'social forces' which contribute to the construction and maintenance of the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds; the CI can operate adequately only in *static* cultural and social environments. It is inadequate to the task of sustaining changes of these aspects of social space.

The notion of a CI, when applied to an individual, is not up to the task of describing, let alone permitting the understanding of, the processes undergone by Agnes (*p. 58) in changing from a physiologically normal pre-adolescent boy into an adult woman. It is also not up to the tasks of explaining, justifying or refuting the generally held view that the same individual can operate as different social kinds usually, but not always, at different times. It seems reasonable to suggest that the same person can, at the same time, be a golf club official, a rabbi, a bankrupt and an international athlete, even though the combination is unlikely! It is also possible that the individual social kinds which constitute such a person do not generate a social environment if one considers them strictly as CIs; the social environments in which two of them operate might not overlap.

The concept of a CI has to be amended if it is to cope with the requirements, just outlined, which are normally placed on the concept of a person. These amendments will be carried out in Parts 3-7 where the impact on the formation of our understanding of social phenomena exerted by the relationship between individual and society is investigated. The route to be taken towards making the amendments will now be outlined.

Self And Society: An Outline Of The Arguments

The point has been reached when the various strands of the argument can be brought together so that some insight into the relationship between self and society can be gained. These insights should themselves throw light on the requirements placed upon the concept of self by the phenomenon of social change.

The bringing together will be done in four stages. In Part 3, prior to beginning the first stage, a formal schematic definition of a person will be given.

The first stage, developed in Part 4, will involve a re-examination of the concept of a social kind in the light of the introduction of the notion of a 'social force'. This will involve an analogy with the concept of a natural kind: both the constituent forces which help make up its internal structure and the external forces which interact with/on it in order to change its state will be compared with similar forces constituting and acting on social kinds.

The second stage, developed in Part 5, will develop the concept of a 'person' as a social kind whose internal structure consists of CIs bound together by social forces some of which are controlled by the person. The person is seen as having the power of conceptualising that control as well as conceptualising the operations of her constituent CIs. Some of these last operations themselves involve the conceptualisations of the constituent CIs own interactions as social kinds. Such a concept of a 'person' can underpin explanations of changes which occur in individuals such as religious conversions, ageing, and the adoption of different roles. It can also permit one adequately to account for the possibility of conscious interaction by a CI with another social kind which the unamended CI concept cannot do.

The argument in the third stage, developed in Part 6, will centre on the importance of possibility of the occurrence of changes in the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds. The acceptance of this possibility obliges one to place requirements on the nature of social environments. These requirements are: (I) There exist more than two 'persons' who help to sustain the social space specified by a social environment - the social space cannot be sustained by non-'person' CIs, even if they exist. (II) The 'persons' who help to sustain such a social environment can distinguish between a social environment in which their constituent CIs operate and the cultural environment

generated by the concepts used by those constituent CIs in their operations in the social environment (*25). (iii) Any conceptualisation of a given person encapsulates a concept which generates a distinct type of cultural environment. The cultural space covered by this distinct environment cannot be covered by any combination of cultural environments which is generated by a set of concepts which *excludes* the encapsulated concept of the person. The individuation of each person involves the use of a concept which generates a cultural environment which is unique to that person. In other words, objective definitions of persons cannot properly be developed.

The fourth stage, developed in Part 7, will consist of an examination of the relationship between the individual and society. This will begin with an attempt to give a broad definition of society. Society will be seen as a setting in which social kinds interact. A definition of society as the cultural environment generated by all the concepts known to or used by a given set of persons will be offered. The notion that society either is structured or is a structure will be rejected. Structure is to be found in the objects which operate in society; these objects are natural and social kinds and the 'person' is the fundamental social kind. This view of society will be seen both as the one which is adequate to sustain the development of concepts of both natural and social kinds and as being sufficiently organic to allow for the expansion, or more rarely contraction, of the cultural environment which specifies it. This will, *inter alia*, allow for the understanding of the workings of social kinds in one society by persons who previously operated in a separate one. It will also facilitate a deeper understanding of what it is to be a person: an understanding which accommodates the two different perspectives associated with relationships between individuals - these relationships being those of *interacting with* other persons and *being with* other persons (analysed in Part 6).

The chapter will conclude with some brief self-criticism. One of the possible objections to the arguments set out here is that they are circular:

they all seem to rest on each other. This will be rejected by showing that they all base themselves on the existence of conceptualised experience together with the possibility of its communication, which itself is a conceptualised experience. A circular argument cannot be refuted but goes nowhere, by contrast the argument here can be refuted but the penalty for accepting the refutation is seen to be the acceptance of conceptualised experience which cannot be purposeful.

PART 3: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL KINDS (Introducing 'persons')

Social Kinds And Natural Kinds: (I) (Their Causal And Dispositional Properties)

The definition (D1) (*p. 55) of a social kind intimated that it had causal and dispositional properties which were manifest in the alteration of the behaviour of those objects which do and those which do not have the power to conceptualise. In the cases of the objects which do have such power the alterations included alterations in conceptualised behaviour. This means that a social kind has the properties which are characteristic of natural kinds as well as those which demarcate it as a social kind. Social kinds as varied as armies and blood banks exhibit both aspects of their dispositional properties.

The mobilization of an army for manoeuvres may take place as a result of the whims of a political leader. However, the exercise of the army's dispositional properties in, say, requisitioning an island is achieved by affecting both the conceptualisations of individuals and the behaviour of natural kinds. The owner of the island will have to accept the requisition order which itself will be issued using some means of communication which involves the manipulation of a natural kind. The carrying out of the requisition order will also involve the manipulation of further natural kinds such as moving motor vehicles. Similarly a request for a rare blood group may

activate a search for a donor with resulting alterations both to natural kinds and to some individuals' conceptualisations and behaviour.

The centrality of the behaviour of natural kinds both in the operations of a social kind and in its interactions with other social kinds makes clear the moderating influence which natural kinds have on the operations of a social kind. It indicates that social kinds have component parts, some of which have natural kind characteristics.

A comparison with natural kinds can be fruitful here. Natural kinds have component parts which themselves are seen as natural kinds whose behaviour can also be investigated and described. The component parts are seen as interacting through the operations of natural forces. The concept of a force is also used to describe the interactions between natural kinds as well as between their component parts. A mountain may interact with the material on which it rests and change some of the carbon from a graphite structure to a diamond one. This may involve gravitational forces acting on all the mountain's constituent molecules while each of those molecules is affected by the intramolecular forces exerted by its neighbours.

There seems no logical reason preventing the process by which the constituent parts of natural kinds are themselves described as natural kinds from being a never ending one (*26). The possibility of the existence of such an infinite process would necessitate the absence of a fundamental natural kind which has only itself as a component part. However, while it may be the case that there are such 'ultimate' entities in nature it is impossible that the scientist could ever know that they were ultimate (*27).

Social Kinds And Natural Kinds: (II) (Their Component Parts)

The question of the existence and nature of component parts is different in the case of a social kind. The difference is found in the mutual ontological dependence between the social kinds which are, and those which are not, CIs.

This mutual dependence stems from the domain assumptions of all social scientific studies - since these must concern themselves with the behaviour of social kinds and contrast them with natural kinds. These domain assumptions will enable one to justify the claim that a subcategory of CIs contains ultimate entities - despite the fact that the assumptions also ensure that ultimate explanations of the behaviour of these entities is not possible. The subcategory will be defined as 'persons'.

A *person* is a Conceptualising Individual

- (i) who includes CIs as his component parts,
- (ii) who can conceptualise the fact that she has component parts,
- (iii) who can activate his own operational component parts, while conceptualising the activation,

(this ensures that he has a quality necessary for him to be competent to substitute for a Paradigm Individuator and operate Models (B) and (C) in Ch. 1)

- and (iv) whose conceptualising abilities are engaged by, and whose dispositional properties are activated by, the communication of concepts which specify a 'cultural environment' ... (D6) ♦

Social And Natural Kinds: (III) (Introducing The Notion Of 'Force')

The domain assumptions of both the social and natural sciences include the acceptance of the notion of a 'force', or an agency which brings about change. Both disciplines, and indeed any attempt at understanding natural and social phenomena, place a requirement on those who attempt them to discern two functions among forces. The first function manifests itself either as an alteration or as a prevention of an alteration of the behaviour of a social (or

♦NOTE : Built into the definition is the possibility that any 'person' can have the concept of her own identity as a social kind which interacts in social space with other similar social kinds.

natural) kind. The second function involves the sustaining of the relationships between component parts of a social (or natural) kind in order that it may retain and exercise its causal and dispositional properties. The two functions represent the external and internal operations of social (or natural) kinds.

The domain assumptions of both social and natural sciences involve the acceptance of concepts which help individuate instigators of change -these instigators are normally designated as 'forces'. There follows, in Part 4, an analysis of concepts of forces, contrasting their use in the two disciplines.

One of the main purposes behind the development of the analysis is to provide a justification for drawing distinctions between CIs and non-CI social kinds, between interactive and extended social space, and between two types of social force which reflect a similar distinction. In the sections which follow, it will be argued that these three sets of distinctions lie at the core of our understanding of social phenomena. Further, it will be argued that a necessary condition for sustaining the distinctions is the acceptance of a concept of a person such as that developed in Part 5.

PART 4: EXPLANATIONS AND SOCIAL KINDS

(natural and social forces)

Social Forces

Natural forces are considered, in general, by natural scientists as acting on natural kinds through the operations of external agents which bring about measurable changes in the natural kinds. 'Force' is the generic term used to symbolise the concept of that which affects change; it is not used to symbolise the same notion in every circumstance. Forces which move solid objects are conceptualised through or with the term 'newton', while forces which move electrons or which sustain nuclear chain reactions are conceptualised

differently. But in all varieties of the conceptualisation of the notion of a force in the natural sciences there is an assumption of externality of the force relative to the changes resultant from its application - *pace* the changes which may occur in an object which is activating the force. The assumption of the externality of the agency which brings about the changes in phenomena investigated by the natural scientist itself involves a dual assumption: that the environment or natural space in which the changes occur exists independently of each object which operates in it (*28).♦

The same externality of forces relative to the entities whose behaviour they affect does not apply to social kinds: the source of the difference with natural kinds is the dependence of social kinds on CIs for their operations. If one considers a social force to be that which brings about changes in objects which operate in social space then one can isolate two specific types of social force:

A primary social force

is that which brings about change in interactive social space ... (D7)

This may be anything which induces a CI to attempt to alter the conceptualisations of other CIs. It may range from (i) a particular imperative such as that inducing a priest to preach a sermon in order to continue to sustain his identity as a priest (*29), to (ii) a social obligation such as that inducing a society hostess to ask guests to sit in particular places at dinner

♦NOTE: *The externality of the agency of change is analytically incompatible with the notion that there is an internal relationship between the object and the environment in which the object operates. Given the externality of the agency of change, the conceptualisation of such an environment is logically prior to the conceptualisation of the object.*

in order to follow certain rules of social priority, to (iii) a mere whim such as that described by David Niven in his autobiography when, at the end of an address given by an army general, he was induced to respond to the request for any questions by asking for the time as he had a train to catch (*30), to (iv) the operations of a natural kind such as a volcanic eruption which might induce an individual to contact another and ask for assistance.

A derived social force

is that which brings about changes in extended social space.

...(D8)

The use of the terms 'primary' and 'derived', as contrasted with 'interactive' and 'extended', is deliberate. The operations of a social kind which cannot conceptualise its interactions with the CIs whose conceptualisations the social kind is altering, must themselves be dependent on the altering conceptualisations of some (other) CIs. These last alterations, being constituents of the operations of the social kind, can be considered to be more primitive social changes than those brought about by the operations. This does not imply that a reductionist analysis of social change is possible.

The terms are being used purely for taxonomical purposes. There is, at this stage, no assumption of logical priority between 'primary' and 'derived', although arguments will be produced to indicate that neither term has logical priority.

Social Forces: (ii) (The Primary/Derived Distinction Justified)

The question of the perceived externality of the agency of change is closely linked to certain distinctions which have been made above. The distinctions between a CI and a non-CI social kind, and between interactive and extended social space, and between a primary and a derived social force would all become trivial if the agency of social change were to be perceived as being

completely external. The externality of agencies of change which brought about alterations in the behaviour of CIs would lead to a conflation of explanations of the behaviour of individual and of social structures; one explanation would be reducible to the other. In order to demonstrate that social theorists have to account separately for the behaviour of persons, there is a need for the justification of the distinctions between CI and non-CI, interactive and extended social space and between primary and derived social forces. This demonstration is developed in this subsection.

Changes in extended social space result from the operational influence of those social kinds which cannot conceptualise their interactions with CIs. The social forces which bring about such changes must activate the social kind's causal and dispositional properties *without any mediating influence by the social kind*. A mediating influence would necessitate the conceptualisation by the social kind of the impact of the social force; and this is, ex-hypothesi, impossible.

It is, however, logically possible for a social kind to change from being a non-CI to CI and *vice versa* and for the properties of social kinds themselves to change. An example of such a possible change might be the sudden development of the ability by Nicolas Bourbaki to hold conversations as Nicolas Bourbaki independently of the individual French mathematicians who have represented 'Le Bourbaki'. The precise mechanisms generating these possible changes would be a matter for empirical investigation, but they would themselves be brought about by the operations of social forces and so occur in either interactive or extended social space.

It may also be argued that the position being adopted here is empty since there may, in practice, be no entities which operate in extended social space and that derived social forces are never manifest. The notion of a non-CI social kind which activated social forces in extended social space would be one which the methodological individualist would attempt to chop out with as sharp

an Occam's razor as could be found.

A contrasting objection might be brought by a theorist who claims that all social institutions can be brought under the scope of the definition of a person. Such a theorist might suggest that social institutions are in effect themselves Conceptualising Individuals on the grounds that they may form and implement policies.

Common to both these contrasting criticisms, if they are to eliminate the need for non-CI social kinds, must be the notion that those social structures, which enable interactions between CIs to occur, do not themselves have causal and dispositional properties. But this is a contradiction in terms: one cannot enable if one has no dispositional properties.

A milder form of the second criticism of the conceptions of extended social space and derived social forces might be brought by the theorist who only personifies social institutions rather than all social kinds. Such a criticism might concede that the social structures enabling interactions between CIs to occur are indeed non-CI social kinds while claiming that all other social kinds are CIs. This would vitiate the use of the notion of extended social space in social analysis and restrict all social theory to interactions between individuals (*31).

Two points can be made with respect to restricting all social theory to interactions between CIs. Firstly, it is logically possible for the causal and dispositional properties of a non-CI social kind to operate independently of those conceptualisations which identify the social kind as a social kind. There is no conceptual bar to the formation of a definition of a social kind which is not a CI and yet has and exercises causal and dispositional properties which are distinct from the properties of the CIs who sustain its operational matrix. Contradictions do not follow from the adoption of such definitions. This means that the question of whether to restrict all social theory to interactions between CIs is not one which can be settled *a priori*, it has to be weighed in

the light of experience, in the light of the fruitfulness or otherwise of the formulated social theories.

Secondly, the personification of social institutions involving suggestions that the Department of Health and Social Security and the United Nations Organization are both CIs requires such institutions not only to form concepts but also to conceptualise their interactions with 'other' CIs. It may be that some institutions do conceptualise their interactions with CIs, examples such as courts of law might be cited, but most of them do not. Their policy-making functions and their interactions with CIs are distinct, though related functions. The separation of functions prevents the social institution from conceptualising its interactions with CIs. As an individual I cannot be considered to be conceptualising my interactions with a CI if I am obliged to wait until a later date, which might be set independently of the occurrence of the interaction, in order to bring the interaction under a concept. If this is the only way in which I can bring the interaction under a concept then my interactions are themselves independent of my conceptualisations and as such are objectified. Such an objectification is consistent with a concept of a *conceptualised* individual but inconsistent with that of a *conceptualising* individual.

The argument in the last two paragraphs has supported the notion that non-CI social kinds exist and interact with each other and with CIs. This justifies the formation and use of the concepts of extended social space and derived social forces. It is then up to the social theorist to form hypotheses of how objects behave in extended social space and what the factors are which determine the use and operation of social forces. The social theorist's concern with the formation of laws which govern behaviour is itself subservient to the understanding of the operation of social forces. (*32)

The purpose of concentrating so much on the notion of force, or agency of change, is that it is a concept which is central to the understanding of any

process; and it is on the operations of processes that cultural systems are built. The individual who can substitute for a paradigm individuator can only do so if she can understand a process: that is, as long as she both can discover how to affect the experiences of others and can conceptualise the process of affecting experiences. Indeed, her own conception of herself as a being who interacts with others was seen in Chapter 1 to be dependent upon her interpretation of her experiences as an actor or agent. She does not, however, need to be able to understand all the workings of the processes by which she affects other individuals (any more than I need to be able to understand all the workings of a telephone in order to use one). The only other requirement placed on the communicating individual by argument in Chapter 1 was that he is able to conceptualise the existence of an agent of change, with the ability to form concepts, which is distinct from himself.

The Internal Structure Of A Non-CI Social Kind

The fact that the operations of non-CI social kinds are dependent upon the conceptualised actions of some CIs, leads to the conclusion that non-CI social kinds have operational component parts which are affected by the application of social forces. Since the conceptualisations of CIs are never entirely externally determined, explanations of the operations of a non-CI social kind must be given in terms of other entities not merely in an enabling capacity but in an activating one.

So when a riot breaks out in a small community such as a prison, it is certain that there has been a social force at work bringing about a change from a peaceful, if resentful, obedience. What is also being demonstrated by the riot is that, not only are there internal social forces operating within the social kind in question, but also that the individual CIs who react to and moderate those social forces were being acted upon by social forces prior to the riot.

In other words, in order for it to be possible for an individual to understand how social kinds work he must be able to conceptualise the operations of agencies of social change (social forces). And so he must be able to conceptualise at least some of the conceptualisations of the CIs who constitute the operational matrix of the social kind. This means that the individual must not only be able to understand certain concepts but also have some understanding of the possible causal interactions associated with the holding of those concepts by the CIs whose behaviour determines the operations of the social kind. This means that explanations of the behaviour of a social kind occur in the cultural environment generated by the concepts which help determine its operational matrix. It does not mean, however, that any CI which constitutes part of the operational component of a non-CI social kind needs to have any sort of concept of her operational function within the non-CI social kind.

The relationship between an individual and the cultural environment in which he gains understanding of the operations of social kinds forms part of Stage 2 of the current examination of the relationship between self and society.

PART 5: THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

Introduction

The second stage of the examination outlined at the end of Part 2 has been reached. The first stage prepared the ground in three ways. Firstly, a formal definition of a person was offered in Part 3 above. Secondly, justification for the uses of the notions of social space and social force was given. Thirdly, it was concluded that, while social kinds operate in social environments (defined in terms of the extent of their influence in social space) explanations of the behaviour of social kinds are developed in cultural environments (defined in terms of the extent of the influence of the use, in social space, of sets of

concepts). This last theme will be examined further in stage 2.

It will be argued that the ability to distinguish a cultural environment from a social one is a necessary condition for the possibility of learning concepts.

It will also be argued that, in order

(i) to sustain the operations of non-CI and CI social kinds and

(ii) to sustain cultural environments (in which it is possible to formulate and develop understanding of the operations),

a CI must have two capabilities:-

Firstly, she must be able to activate social forces and conceptualise the *effects* of that activation (incorporated in the definition of a CI). Secondly, she must also be able to conceptualise the activation (the extra ingredient incorporated into the definition of a person). Her fundamental role in sustaining cultural environments helps to explain why the concept of a person, rather than a CI, plays such a central role in a cultural system which allows for the formulation and development of concepts (*33).

A corollary of the argument which supports the centrality of the concept of a person can be expressed in the following proposition: If an individual has the ability to conceptualise both the process of activation of social forces and the effects of the activation then the individual must also have a concept of his own selfhood and have a concept of others as being similarly endowed with selfhood.

In essence what is being argued is that if one wishes to make the understanding of the operations of social kinds possible one has to sacrifice the possibility of establishing an objective concept of the self (*34). The concept of the self is irreducible to other concepts in *any* cultural environment. Further, the concept which individuates a specific person is similarly irreducible (*p. 96). The irreducibility rests on the possibility of gaining understanding of the operations of social kinds. The understanding of

the operations of social kinds is dependent upon, not only the possibility of self-conception by persons, but also on the possibility that the individual can operate a second order monitoring facility - both of which were seen in Chapter 1 to be necessary for the operations of processes involving concept communication.

Distinguishing Between Social And Cultural Environments

The distinction between a social and a cultural environment is central to the argument in Part 5.

The importance of the distinction lies in the use which has to be made of it by an individual. It is only in cultural environments that the social kinds which facilitate the development of social theories can operate (or indeed in which *any* understanding of social kinds can occur). The understanding of the operation of a social kind has to be seen as distinct from the operation of the social kind. The understanding is constrained within a cultural environment whereas the operation occurs in a social environment. This is what is meant by a social environment - the extent of the influence of the causal and dispositional properties of a social kind.

So if an individual wishes to operate the mechanisms of a social kind while being part of the operational matrix of the social kind, then that individual must be capable of distinguishing between social and cultural environments. The individual must be capable of distinguishing the *understanding* of the operations of the social kinds from the operations themselves.

This understanding is itself facilitated by the operations of some social kinds which are themselves conceptualised in cultural environments. The operations of these facilitating social kinds are dependent upon a bootstrapping (to borrow a term from computer jargon) process whereby the operators inside a

process have to manipulate and come to understand the very process of which they form integral parts. The bootstrapping requires the operators to possess a second order monitoring facility (*35).

One should not forget, however, that social theories are not only developed in formal settings by social scientists. They are also the sets of ideas, often contradictory, which individuals have about the workings and properties of social kinds with which they interact. In order to be able to interact with these social kinds they must be capable of gaining some understanding of some of their operations. The gaining of even this partial understanding of the operations of a social kind is only possible if the individual who is gaining that understanding can *both* have an awareness of the impact of the communication of the concepts which are appurtenant to the operation of the social kind *and* have an awareness of part of the actual operation of the social kind. In other words the learner must have a notion of what a cultural environment is and be able to distinguish it from a social environment. This means that the individual can distinguish between the meaning associated with a concept and the operations of social structures within which the concept is used. Any blurring of the distinction will impede the process of increasing an individual's understanding of the meaning of a concept.

Distinguishing A Person From A Conceptualising Individual

If it is only the learning process which justifies the specification of a cultural environment as a necessary condition enabling a CI to be 'socialised' into understanding and manipulating social kinds, then it seems reasonable to ask why one cannot stick to the definition of a CI (*p. 56) instead of accepting the need for the more extended definition of a person (D6), (*p. 73). Would not Occam's razor chop out definition (D6)?

The extra ingredient which (D6) adds to (D2) is that the person should not only be able to activate social forces but also conceptualise the activation.

The conceptualisation is only possible if the CI, turned person, has an awareness of the cultural environment in which the activation occurs and distinguishes it from the actual operation of the social kind - so distinguishes the social from the cultural environment.

The simple CI might only have the ability to conceptualise the effects of the social forces it activates. The CI could be, in Hume-like fashion, a passive reactor to stimuli in combination with an observer of the effects of its reactions. Such a being can help to sustain the existence of a social environment centered on the operations of a given social kind, but it cannot be cogniscent of its sustaining role. Cogniscence of such a role would necessitate a CI being able to conceptualise its *potential* activation of the social forces which were involved in the operation of the social kind.

It is the word 'potential' which is central to the argument. It precludes the possibility that the person-CI can know that both its activation of social forces and the conceptualisation of the activation must invariably be triggered by stimuli which are external to the person. Indeed, if a CI were to know, or think that it knew, that the activation of social forces by the operation of its own causal and dispositional properties were always triggered by exogenous agencies then it would be 'depersonalised' in the sense used by R. D. Laing (*36). Such a CI would not even be capable of fulfilling the requirements placed on individuals by the need to be able to communicate concepts (see Chapter 1).

The Distinction Between A Person's And A CI's Abilities To Conceptualise

It is possible to justify the contention that the conceptualising power which persons use to sustain social environments, and enables them to be cogniscent of that sustaining role, must extend to *all* the activities of persons which involve conceptualisations. This can be done by noting that one needs to allow for the possibilities

(a) of new individuals joining those who sustain the cultural environment and (b) of changes in the meanings of concepts.

Possibility (b) involves changes in cultural environments due to changes in the effects of the communication of concepts on the CIs whose behaviour sustains the social kinds which are operational in the cultural environments. The implications flowing from the acceptance of (b) will be analysed extensively in Part 6 below.

It is reasonably obvious that persons should be able to conceptualise their powers to activate social forces through communicating concepts if (a) is to be possible; but arguments supporting such an obvious contention are not easily constructed. The possibility of the acceptance of a new individual into the group which sustains the operations of a social kind involves at least one assumption by an analyst who is attempting to understand those operations. This assumption is that the existing members of the group (whose behaviour sustains the operations of the social kind) recognise that the potential to activate, and to conceptualise the activation of, social forces involved in the social kind's operations can extend to another individual who can thereby become a member of the group.

The sacrifice of this assumption carries with it the payment of a price: the certainty that the individual who attempts to understand the operations of a social kind can never become a member of the group which sustains the operations of that social kind. Alternatively, the sacrifice prevents an individual who forms part of the operational matrix of a social kind from understanding those operations. The first element of the price renders unintelligible training programmes which induce people into organisations. The alternative renders unintelligible all attempts to understand social changes; such attempts involve investigations into changes which occur in the very cultural environment in which the investigations are conceived as being intelligible.

If an individual becomes, say, a police officer then the existing police

officers and the public (all of whom sustain the causal and dispositional powers of the police force and sustain its cultural environment - centering on the communication of such concepts as law, arrest, prosecution, crime-prevention etc...) must be capable of being aware of their own functions in sustaining the causal and dispositional powers of the police force. This last necessity rests on the possibility that the new police officer is able to develop the causal and dispositional powers which he needs as a police officer in order that he can contribute to the sustaining of the operations of the police force. The intelligibility of the existence of training programmes for new recruits rests on the acceptance of the notion that the recruit can conceptualise his potential to activate the social forces involved in the operation of the police force. Further the possibility of associating meaning with the notion of a trainee police cadet rests on the ability of individuals, with whom such a trainee might interact, being able to conceptualise their own activation of social forces which are appurtenant to the operations of the police force.

The Implications Of A Person's Attempts To Understand The Environment In Which He/She Operates

Neither a social theorist's relationship with a social kind nor the motives behind the theorist's drive to understand the operations of the social kind necessarily affect the operations of the social kind. This is the case whether the theorist's motive is to interact with the social kind (as someone who uses the police force to attempt to recover stolen property), or whether it is to help to sustain its operations (as an officer might when attempting to come to terms with the police force's hierarchical structure), or whether it is merely to increase understanding of its operation (as a sociologist might - in order to find corroborative evidence for a theory).

This means that if an individual is to be able to understand the operations of the social kind in which he operates, then he must be able to distinguish a

social environment from a cultural environment: the social environment is the one specified by the operations of the social kind, and the cultural environment is the one generated by the use of the concepts whose communication affects the operations of the social kind. This ability involves the use, by the person, of a second order monitoring device by which the person can be aware of his impact on his environment.

It is also reasonably obvious that a person must possess the capability to conceptualise his activation of social forces if changes in the meanings of concepts are to be possible. Changes in the meanings of concepts must be accompanied by changes in the operations of some or other social kind. This will involve changes in the effects on some CIs of the communication of the concepts. Whatever the cause of the changes in these effects, for an individual to recognise that this involves a change in the operation of a social kind, and so a change in the activation of social forces, he must be capable of conceptualising the activation of the social forces. As has already been indicated, the individual does not have to understand all the mechanisms by which social forces operate - just as she does not need to be able to understand all the mechanisms by which natural forces operate in order to row a boat. Her understanding in both cases is sufficient if it is restricted to understanding how to operate the processes which control her interactions with the social and natural mechanisms.

Persons And Second Order Monitoring: A Corollary

As a corollary to the argument one can support the proposition that the agency of the individual does not fall under any automata theory. Given that an individual who helps to sustain the operations of a social kind is aware of its potential to activate those operations, it is self-contradictory to suggest that either "total internal" or "total external control" (*37) of the agency of the individual can ever be known.

This can be seen from the fact that the processes of gaining the knowledge themselves involve the operation of social kinds. And the individuals (who sustain the cultural environment in which the understanding of the operations of the social kinds is developed) must operate on the assumption that they have the potential both to activate the operations of these social kinds and to conceptualise the activation. So we have the situation that the claim to know that X is true, namely that some automata theory of the self is true, involves the very same individuals (who make the claim) simultaneously assuming that X is false.

The Argument In Part 5 Summarised and completed

So far, in Part 5, justifications for the acceptance of characteristics (i), (ii) and (iii) in the definition of a person (*p. 73) have been offered.

These justifications have hinged on the triple possibilities that

- (a) an individual CI can come to learn or become aware of the properties of social kinds,
- (b) the social kinds whose properties can be, even if imperfectly, conceptualised can undergo alterations of their properties and that these altered states can themselves be conceptualised, and
- (c) the group of individuals who sustain the operations of these social kinds and the cultural environments (in which an understanding of the operations is developed) can change both in number and in the properties which are characteristic of membership of the group.

The justification for the acceptance of characteristic (iv) (*p. 73) will be less direct. In order to justify the claim that a person must have conceptualising abilities and dispositional properties which are engaged by and activated by the communication of concepts which specify a cultural environment,

the need for internal consistency in the arguments which supported the acceptance of (i), (ii) and (iii) (*p. 73) will be invoked. In other words the acceptance of (iv) is dependent upon the prior acceptance of the validity of the **arguments** used in justifying the acceptance of (i), (ii) and (iii). This will mean that if one accepts (a), (b) and (c) in the previous paragraph then one must also accept that persons have characteristics (i) to (iv). One is obliged further to accept that persons must also be ultimate entities in the cultural environment in which (a), (b) and (c) can occur. So that, while there may be other sound reasons for accepting that persons have characteristics (i) to (iv), the acceptance of the possibilities (a), (b) and (c) both obliges one to accept, and gives one sufficient grounds for accepting, (i) to (iv).

The internal consistency of the arguments justifying (i) to (iii) centres on the fact that persons, being CIs, are also social kinds. Since they are social kinds each one of them will operate in a social environment specified by and specifying its possible area of operations. This social environment will be such that it is sustained by a group of persons which include the person whose social environment is being sustained.

The exclusion of the person from this group would involve a conceptualisation of a person which did not include characteristic (iii) - that a person can activate his own component parts - and would involve the possibility of a notion of a **totally** objective definition of the self (*38).

The acceptance of (i), (ii) and (iii) was based on the acceptance of the possibility (b) that social kinds' properties can change and that these changes can be conceptualised. Since persons are also social kinds it will also be possible for an individual person to change in the same manner as any other social kind. One is obliged, in order to retain consistency in the argument, to accept the possibility that each person who sustains the social environment in which the given changing individual operates can conceptualise the changes in the causal and dispositional properties of the changing individual. Since the

changing individual is himself a member of the group who sustain the social environment in which he operates, he will also be capable of conceptualising the changes in his own dispositional properties.

One can further argue that, since the learning processes undergone by a person change that person's causal and dispositional properties *qua* social kind, the appreciation by the person that she has learnt (and with this appreciation hangs the intelligibility of teaching) is only possible if the person has a conception of the cultural environment in which understanding of her causal and dispositional properties is developed. In other words a person must see herself as a social being if she is to understand that she can learn concepts. Any attempt to formulate a totally objective definition of the self, and convince some other individual of its acceptability, would therefore be a self-defeating task (*39).

The argument in the last paragraph supports contention (iv) that a person should be such that his conceptualising abilities may be engaged, and that his dispositional properties may be activated by, the communication of concepts which specify a cultural environment. And further that the person is a party to the specification of the social space which comprises the cultural environment.

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has shown what the conditions are for substantiating the claim that a person should have characteristics (i) to (iv) outlined in Part 2. This means that a person can be simultaneously a golf club official, a rabbi, a bankrupt and an international athlete. The same person may have embedded in her either several CIs, or indeed several persons (*40), each operating in her(/his?) own given social spaces. The actual relationship between a person and its component parts, be they CIs or further persons, is a subject for examination by social and medical scientists.

PART 6: CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL KINDS

(Including the boundaries within which understanding of persons can be obtained)

This, the third stage of the argument outlined at the end of Part 2, involves an examination of the three conditions under which changes in the causal and dispositional powers of social kinds can occur. The acceptability of the second of these conditions has already been established by the argument in Part 5 (Stage 2). Indeed, the interdependence of the arguments in Stages 2 and 3 can be seen from the requirement that one has to look into the conditions which enable changes in the properties of social kinds in general (Stage 3) if one is to understand the conditions which enable changes to occur in particular social kinds, namely persons (Stage 2).

The understanding of the conditions which enable changes to occur in persons was not fully reached in Stage 2. This means that the claim, that it is only the concept of a person rather than that of a CI which enables one to cope with the requirements of explaining "changes which occur in individuals such as religious conversions, ageing and the adoption of different roles", has not yet been fully justified. Stage 3 will provide this justification.

The provision of this justification will involve various processes, each of which flows from the analysis of the conditions which must hold in order for any social kind to change its properties. This analysis will begin with an examination of the conditions which have to hold if the social space generated by the operations of a social kind can change - for the social space generated by a social kind can only change if the properties of the social kind change (*41). It will be seen that the fulfilment of these conditions depends upon the presence of a minimum of three persons. The necessity for the presence of three persons stems from the requirement that concept-development in a cultural environment should be possible; and concept-development is itself necessitated by the possibility of changes occurring in the properties of social kinds.

Sustaining A Social Environment Through Changes In The Properties Of Social Kinds:

(1) (The Necessity For The Presence of Two Persons)

In Stage 2, the argument centered on the conditions which have to hold if claims that the properties of social kinds can change are to be substantiated. These conditions included the necessity that at least one person sustains both the social environment in which the social kind operates and the cultural environment in which understanding of those operations is obtained and developed.

The argument will now move one step further. This step involves a focus on the participants in changes in conceptualisations which lead to alterations in the properties of social kinds. The earlier steps involved a focus on a social theorist's attempt to understand the processes by which *others* altered their conceptualisations. This further step will begin with an argument which uses, as its starting point, the notion that it is possible to develop an understanding of changes in the operations of a social kind. If such understanding is to be possible then the cultural and social environments (generated by the operations of and an understanding of the social kind) are sustained by more than one person.

There are two requirements underpinning the question of the number of persons needed to sustain a social environment. One concerns the need to be able to sustain the operations of changing social kinds. The second involves giving support to the idea that an individual has to be inducted into helping to sustain a social environment - the individual does not automatically assume such sustaining roles. Meeting the terms of the first requirement will lead to a demonstration of the need for two individuals. Meeting the terms of the second will lead to the demonstration for the need to have more than two persons who sustain the operations of a changing social kind.

Both requirements rest upon the acceptability of the following condition:

When changes occur in the causal and dispositional powers of a social kind, there must be changes in the conceptualisations of some individuals which normally effect the functioning of the operations of the social kind ... (NC1)

Condition (NC1) is analytically true; the concept of a social kind includes the notion that the social kind's properties are determined by the conceptualisations of individuals. An example will illustrate the analytical nature of the relationship.

If the mediæval Inquisition had stopped instilling fear in people then there would have been, accompanying and causing this alteration, changes in the conceptualisations of individuals. These change would have been detectable either in the acceptance of what might happen as a result of the Inquisition's activities or in the reaction to the prospect of what might happen. The changes in conceptualisations form necessary conditions for the changes in the causal and dispositional powers of the Inquisition both to occur and to be understood to occur. However, if no one were to realise that the Inquisition had stopped instilling fear then, while (NC1) would still hold, it would lose its relevance.

The relevance of (NC1) is restricted to the constraints its acceptance imposes on any social theorist in the development of her theory.

The existence of an instantial occurrence of condition (NC1) also enables one to claim that the causal and dispositional powers of a social kind have altered. The importance of this claim and its converse (stated in the previous paragraph) lie not in their truth but in their relevance; it is only the ***awareness*** of the validity of claims made on the basis of accepting (NC1) which makes one's consideration of it significant.

The awareness that changes in the powers of a social kind (and with them alterations in the effects of some social forces) have occurred, involves two considerations: firstly, that the CIs who reproduce the behaviour involved in the exercise of the powers of the given social kind behave and react differently; and secondly, that the persons (who either activate or help sustain

the social forces operational in any of the cultural environments within which the social kind can be perceived to operate) also begin to behave differently.

The first of these considerations flows directly from the definition of a social kind. As such, it is of little consequence save to reinforce the fact that a change in the powers of a social kind is accompanied by a change in the meaning of at least one concept (even if this concept is only the one which is used to individuate the social kind itself).

The second consideration emanates from the argument, produced in Part 5, that individuals need to have the capability to conceptualise social forces and so conceptualise some of the conceptualisations of the CIs whose behaviour constituted the operational matrix of a social kind. This argument itself rested on the possibility that individuals should be able to learn what the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds might be. But in this case, as in the first consideration, there has been a change in the meaning of at least one concept utilised by the person who is attempting to understand the operations of the social kind. Such a change will involve a change in the cultural environment in which the understanding of the operations of the social kind is developed.

Since the alteration in meaning of a concept can only occur if the concept can be communicated (and only if a process such as that represented by Model(C) (*p. 36) is used), the possibility that a social kind can change its causal and dispositional powers carries with it the necessity that there are at least two persons who sustain the cultural environment in which understanding of the operations of the social kind is developed.

Further, since persons are themselves social kinds who operate in social environments which must overlap with the cultural environments in which explanations of their behaviour are developed, each person will also have his own social environment sustained by at least one other person. Aristotle's dictum that a person is a social animal is analytically, rather than

empirically, true.

One might still argue that it is possible that a social environment sustained by only one person might exist, but one does so by paying a price. The price involves sacrificing the possibility that anyone might gain any degree of understanding of the one person's causal and dispositional powers which were operational in that solipsistic social (sic) environment. This price would have to be paid even by the person whose causal and dispositional powers were under scrutiny. This conflicts with characteristic (iv), (D6), of persons which stated that persons should be capable of conceptualising their own activation of social forces. It would denude the individual's ability to conceptualise her own conceptualised interactions with her environment. The logical conclusion of paying the price would be the disintegration of all understanding of social phenomena and so even of attempting to pay the price itself: the ultimate in self-destructive social practice!

(II) (The Necessity for the Presence of More Than Two Persons)

The argument in the previous subsection rested on the supposition that changes in the properties of social kinds actually occur. The focus of attention will now veer towards a condition which has to be met if such changes are to occur. For such changes to occur, it must be possible for individuals (who sustain the operations of the changing social kind) to bring these changes under a set of concepts. The requirement that individuals should *be able to conceptualise* the changes in the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds takes the argument one step further. This further step leads to the substantiation of the claim that social kinds are sustained by more than two persons. A social group consisting solely of the self and the other (*42) cannot be known to survive changes in its properties; although it is logically possible for such changes to occur without being detected.

The argument in this subsection turns on the need for an individual to distinguish two of her functions when she is involved in a concept-developing

process such as Model(C). She must be able to distinguish her own participation in the concept-developing process from the possibility that *any* individual may participate in the process. The recognition of this possibility carries with it the requirement that the individual simultaneously perceives herself to be involved in a process with another individual while remaining distinct from that other individual.

In short, an individual needs to be able to draw a distinction between her participation with another individual in the concept-developing process and her interaction with that other individual. She has to be able to distinguish between being part of a process with another individual and being distinct from that other individual; she has to be able to distinguish *being with* from *interacting with* the other individual.

This is the sort of distinction of which many individuals are aware in many of their social interactions. It is the sort of distinction which a singer in a choir makes when being aware of being part of an ensemble creating music while he concentrates on the conductor's instructions. His relationship with the conductor, and indeed all the other members of the choir, is simultaneously one of involvement and interaction. He is aware of both *being with* and *interacting with* others. In most of their social interactions, however, individuals need not be consciously aware of their dual role of sustaining a social structure while interacting with other individuals. But if they cannot perform, and conceptualise, the dual role when involved in concept-developing processes, then such processes cannot function. The individuals involved in concept-developing processes must be aware that they are altering the meaning of a concept: the necessity is logical.

The need to accommodate social structures which permit the development of an individual's notion of self-identity also obliges one to accept that individuals should have the ability to distinguish the two roles (*43). The absence of an individual's ability to distinguish them would prevent that

individual from developing a notion of self-identity. An individual is required to possess such a notion if he is to be able to participate in concept-developing processes. These processes involve the individual taking on a role whose existence is determined by the acceptance of the concept-developing power of the processes; a role characterised in Chapter 1 as that of the Paradigm Individuator (page *28). Without a concept of his own identity, an individual cannot conceptualise himself as a substitute for a Paradigm Individuator.

The realisation by an individual of the possibility that she can substitute for a generalised participator in a process, provides the second hook on which to hang the argument in this section. The realisation involves her in accepting the possibility that individuals other than the ones involved in a given concept-developing process exist. This means she must have a concept of third-party observer status to the process, and realise that she can attain that third-party status. Without the existence of such third-party status, the notion of a generalised participator in the concept-developing processes would disintegrate, and such a disintegration would be accompanied by the disintegration of processes which involve the development of understanding of social phenomena. The disintegration of the *understanding* of social phenomena is itself accompanied by a disintegration of social phenomena and so of all social activity. No such relationship exists between the understanding of and the existence of natural, or non-social, activity.

This, and the previous subsection have lead to the conclusion that knowable changes in the properties of social kinds can only occur in cultural environments whose social space is sustained by the conceptualisations of more than two persons. This means that persons are ineliminably social beings. The social nature of a person's being is seen to rest on the person's ability to distinguish her own part in the continued operation of a social kind from her own conceptualised activity as a causal agent; the person has to be able to

monitor her own activities.

The Ineliminability of the Person

The role played by an individual's self-monitoring function in the development of concepts in general, places constraints on the possible conceptualisations of persons by other persons. These constraints involve the ineliminability of the concept of a person from any given explanation of the behaviour of any specific person.

This ineliminability contrasts with the eliminability of virtually any concept used in the explanation of natural phenomena. The elimination of a concept in natural science is usually achieved by altering the logical primacy of the concepts used in explanatory systems; a concept becomes eliminable usually by making some other concept ineliminable. In the social sciences such alterations have at least one significant barrier which they cannot cross; they cannot include the elimination of the person.

The argument in support of this proposition is brief. Its acceptability rests on the unacceptability of the consequences derived from the acceptance of a premise. It will be assumed that an explanation of the behaviour of a person is possible in a cultural environment generated by the use of a set of concepts which does not include a concept used to individuate the person whose behaviour is being explained.

Let us suppose, contrapositively, that it is possible to explain the behaviour of a person using concepts other than the one used to individuate the particular person whose behaviour is being explained. The use of these explanatory concepts would generate a cultural environment. Within this cultural environment the person would find that his power to activate social forces within that cultural environment would be pre-set. The person would not be able to alter his capability to conceptualise the activation of social forces. In other words, he would not be capable of learning new concepts since

such learning would alter his ability to affect social change in the cultural environment.

If the explanation of the person's behaviour is sought by the person himself, then a peculiar contradiction develops. The person would have no means of self-discovery, no means of knowing that he had learned. The development of any form of self-conception would disappear, and disappearance would be accompanied by the disappearance of all conceptualised discovery - since all conceptualised discovery depends upon the realisation by each individual of his own individuality.

The assumption that objective conceptualisations of persons (associated with the elimination of the concept of the self from explanations of the behaviour of the self) are possible, has led to an unacceptable conclusion. One can conclude that an objective description of a person is only possible if one assumes that no social kind, whose properties are sustained and conceptualised by the person, can change its properties. Further, in these circumstances the person would not be capable of learning or coming to understand that any social kinds can change their causal and dispositional properties.

However, while it is true that the conceptualised person is conceptualised in a given cultural environment, it is not the case that that person's own conceptualisations are restricted to that same cultural environment. There is no restriction which can be placed, *a priori*, on the cultural environments in which a person can operate. Cultural relativism is not obligatory.

The Possibility That Persons Who Help To Sustain One Cultural Environment Can Operate In Another Distinct Cultural Environment

The acceptance of such a possibility would preclude a vicious relativism, which prevented all cross-cultural communication, from establishing itself in any cultural environment in which changes in the dispositional properties of social kinds were possible.

The argument will, as in the previous sub-section be one from contradiction, but it will be presented in a more formal fashion.

Let us make the contrapositive assumptions (k), (l) and (m):

(k).....a person P is one of the persons who help to sustain the cultural environment CE₁ which is defined by the processes of communication associated with a given set of concepts C₁, C₂, C₃,..., C_n and the processes are facilitated by the operations of social kinds SK₁, SK₂, SK₃,..., SK_n

(where it is possible that SK_i = SK_j for some i < j - which means it is possible for a social kind SK_i to facilitate the communication of both C_i and C_j);

(l).....the dispositional properties of a specific social kind SK_r (0 < r < n+1) change creating social kind SK_r^A thereby changing concept C_r to C_r^A and altering cultural environment CE₁ to CE₁^A ;

(m).....it is impossible for P to conceptualise her interactions with any social kind which facilitates concept communication save with SK₁, SK₂, SK₃,..., SK_n.

If (k), (l) and (m) are true then conditions (u) and (v) must also be true, where (u) and (v) are:

(u).....P would not be able to interact as a person with SK_r^A ,
(this follows trivially from (m))

(v).....P would cease to sustain CE₁ as a person and would do so solely as a non-person C₁

(this also follows trivially from (m) - and it means that no person can sustain CE₁ since P is a generalised person, which in turn means that none

of the dispositional properties of $SK_1, SK_2, SK_3, \dots, SK_n$ can be known to change)

A contradiction has been obtained since (1) postulated a change in SK_r which in (v) is seen to be unknowable; an unknowable change is not a change. At least one of the premisses (k), (1) and (m) must be false. One can conclude that if a person sustains the operations of some social kinds which operate in a given cultural environment and the dispositional properties of one of those social kinds can change (without debarring the person from gaining understanding of the operations of the social kinds which changed the cultural environment) then it must be possible for the person to interact with social kinds which do *not* help to define the cultural environment.

The proviso which has to be made is that any 'external' social kinds which operate outside the cultural environment with which the person can interact must be capable of interacting with persons in a social space S in which the 'internal' social kinds can also operate. S would be a social space in which, for example, it might be possible to sustain translatability from one cultural environment to another.

The argument does not substantiate a claim that a person can interact with *any* social kind. Rather, it establishes that no bounds can be set, *on a priori grounds*, on the potential a person has for interacting with social kinds. This means that there are no *a priori* grounds for claiming that a person who operates in a particular cultural environment is, because of that operation, debarred from operating in another cultural environment. Correspondingly, there are no *a priori* grounds for sustaining a claim that definitions of the person must be culturally relative since there are no *a priori* grounds for fixing a definition of a person. The properties of a person can, like those of any other person, alter - a person's characteristics must, however, not conflict with those outlined above in the definition (D6).

It is worth emphasising that both the conclusion (that persons must have the ability to operate in more than one cultural environment) and the claim (that definitions of persons are not culturally relative, or formulated in a specific cultural environment) rest on two premisses: first, that individuals can alter their understanding of the operations of social kinds; and secondly, that it is possible for the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds to be known to change.

A cultural environment in which no alterations in the understanding of the operations of social kinds occurred, could be seen as either absolute or God-given or natural. Such a cultural environment would preclude the possibility of individuals who operate in it from gaining understanding of its operations. An approximation of such a fixed system might be the Hindu Dharma with its rigidly structured social institutions and traditional practices. These determine the individual's conceptualisations of all social interactions (*44).

PART 7: AN OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS IN PARTS 3 TO 6

Before moving on to the fourth stage of the argument in this chapter, it is worth bringing together the strands of the arguments presented in the first three stages. It has been argued that the concept of a social force as an agent bringing about changes in the behaviour of social kinds is central to the understanding of the operations of social kinds - with respect both to their internal operations and to their interactions with other social kinds. Further, it was argued that only a specific type of Conceptualising Individual could come to have some understanding of the social kind's operations. Such a CI would have to be able to conceptualise its power to activate the social forces which determined the operations of a social kind (*45); this CI could not be a non-

person C1.

The discussion in Parts 3 to 6 also points towards an analysis of social change as neither holistic nor individualistic. The pointers indicate that society should be conceived as something which can be detected in a collection of cultural environments which comprise perhaps one single large cultural environment. In particular, the argument in Part 6 demonstrated that if one is to view such an embracing cultural environment as closed or bounded, then one would sacrifice the possibility of gaining understanding of the operations of the social kinds which are functional in the cultural environment - providing one still retained the requirement that there was a need to account for changes in the properties of social kinds.

In the fourth stage these ideas are explored further. The exploration will involve an examination of the notion of society. It will be found that society is not an entity with causal powers and dispositional tendencies, but rather a collection of various entities which have causal power; the effects of the exercise of the causal power being detectable in a cultural environment. The purpose of undertaking the further examination is to deepen the understanding of the person/society relationship and so enrich the understanding of the basis on which the identity of the individual is built.

PART 8: TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIETY

Introduction

This part of the chapter will begin with a brief outline of some of the problems faced by those who attempt to offer explanations of dynamics of the society/person relationship. It will be intimated that many of the difficulties can be traced to a conception of society as an entity with dispositional tendencies and causal properties. This intimation will lead to the

identification of an analysis of the society/person relationship which exhibits fewer flaws than many an alternative. This is the analysis offered by Roy Bhaskar (*46). Bhaskar builds a model of the relationship with which he attempts to capture its essential features. It will be seen that the assimilation of the principles encapsulated in the Bhaskarian model still leave one with the problem of adequately accounting for changes in the properties of those social kinds which facilitate the development of explanations of changes in social kinds.

In dealing with this residual Bhaskarian problem, a similar model to his will be built. Like Bhaskar's model, its purpose will be to elucidate aspects of the relationship rather than explain the specific nature of a given society/person relationship. There is no intention that the remodelled structure should be reified. This alternative model will have the advantage of facilitating an adequate conception of the processes by which new individuals can be assimilated into a given cultural environment; a process which is problematic in the unreformed Bhaskarian model.

The problems faced by many theorists who attempt to offer explanations of the society/person relationship flow from the existence of the tension between two aspects of an individual's participation in social interactions. These two aspects reflect the individual's dual role in social interactions: the role associated with the sustaining of the social structure within which the interaction is occurring, and the role of a separate conscious individual who is participating in the interaction. These two roles are associated with the two forms of relationship between individuals which were examined in Part 6; namely the ones concerned with *being with others* as contrasted with *interacting with others*. The tension between the two roles is not only the source of the problems found in analysing the society/person relationship, it also, paradoxically, provides the means by which an adequate understanding of the problem can be reached.

The Person And Society: Some possibilities

The relationship between a person and society is neither "egocentric and contractual" nor "sociocentric and organic" (*47). The former would base itself on the complete autonomy of the individual and the latter on the primacy of power of the social group. The relationship is rather one in which a person, as a social kind, defines himself through the conceptualisations of his activation of social forces and is defined by others by means of concepts which attempt to encapsulate the person's power to activate such social forces.

It was established in Part 6 that the operation of a social force cannot be assigned to a solipsistic individual without facing unacceptable consequences. Changes in social space cannot be brought about without the occurrence of changes in the conceptualisations of at least three individuals. One can conclude that an analysis of the society/person relationship involving the autonomy of the individual and her subsequent contractual arrangements with other individuals becomes inadequate. Social contract theories have no basis on which to build; the operation of a social force destroys the concept of the pre-contractual individual. The exercise of an individual's powers, *qua* social kind, is in all circumstances enabled by the existence of other social kinds which operate in an extended social space. In other words the conceptualised actions of individuals can only occur in social space within the ambit of the operations of at least one non-CI social kind.


Similarly, the operation of a social force cannot be ascribed to a social kind without simultaneously ascribing at least part of that operation to a person. It was seen in Part 6 that certain penalties would have to be paid if individuals involved in the operations of social kinds could not simultaneously be consciously aware of their own causal efficacy within those operations. The existence of an instancial occurrence of an entirely sociocentric social force would necessitate the renunciation of the possibility of explaining changes in the powers of social kinds.

Further, the individualistic and sociocentric explanations of the operations of social kinds cannot be merged. Any attempt, such as that by Peter Berger (*48), to combine the two positions merely ends up by combining their faults - as is pointed out by Roy Bhaskar (*49).

Bhaskar's own solution, in which he constructs a transformational model of the society/person relationship (*50), also faces some problems. These result from his acceptance of one of the premisses which creates some of the problems which he criticises in others. This premise involves the assumption that society itself, rather than only social structures, has causal and dispositional properties.

The acceptance of this premise creates strains in the Bhaskarian analysis. Stress lines develop between, on the one hand, his attempt to ascribe to society powers of socialisation over individuals, and on the other, his classification of society as an "ensemble of structure, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform but which would not exist unless they (the individuals) did so" (see note (*50)). The source of the stress is the underanalysed dual role of a person outlined in the Introduction to Part 8 above. The dual role was concerned with a person's conceptualisation of himself as an individual social agent and as a sustainer/transformer of the powers and operations of the social kind.

The source of this strain cannot be eliminated. Persons must be able to gain some understanding of the operations of the social structures in which they operate; otherwise no social structure would survive the death of those who sustained its operations. The attempt to meet the requirement that individuals can gain some understanding of the operations of social structures will be seen to generate a need to modify the Bhaskarian analysis. In order to develop this modified analysis it will be helpful if Bhaskar's own analysis were outlined.



Bhaskar's diagram 2.6

There is little which is controversial in the relationship described in this diagram. Human agency is indeed constrained and enabled by the operations of social structures; perhaps Bhaskar might have added that the human agency had to be of the type which could, in principle, be conceptualised by the agent. These enabling and constraining structures exist only in virtue of interpreted human agency which itself can only function through the operations of social structures. This point lies at the core of the analysis in Chapter 1 above; although there the conceptualised and conceptualising nature of the begetter of the agency were emphasised.


The relationship described in Bhaskar's diagram 2.5 does, however, suffer from one inadequacy and a flaw. The inadequacy consists of the omission of a reference to natural structures which also have enabling effects on human agency. Bhaskar rectifies this in a more sophisticated model in which he uses a "social cube" (*52) in which both natural and social constraints on human agency are included. (The existence of the natural constraints on human agency were also identified in Chapter 1, Part 2, above and the extent of their influence on the powers of persons will be investigated in Chapter 3 below.) The flaw to be found in the model described by diagram 2.5 is the one identified above involving the assumption that society itself, rather than merely the structures which comprise society, has causal and dispositional properties. The removal of

the flaw will be carried out below in the next sub-section, when a re-formed TMSA will be developed.

Bhaskar goes on to give an indication of his conception of the reproduction/ transformation process. The details of the mechanisms he describes are not relevant to the argument in this essay. What is of concern here is the use which Bhaskar makes of it. He uses it to move from a fundamentally passive mode of human participation in the reproduction/transformation of social structures to an emancipatory active mode.

His TMSA encapsulates the passive mode by following through a cycle from reproduction/transformation through production and back to reproduction/transformation. The main argument being offered in this Part of this essay is that the move from the passive to the emancipatory active mode necessitates a conception of society which is different from the Bhaskarian conception.

The following diagram is a modified reproduction of Bhaskar's own which describes the cycle from reproduction/transformation through production and back to reproduction/transformation:



Knowledge in the human sciences, Bhaskar claims, promises an emancipatory effect. Bhaskar would naturally agree that the human sciences need to be located in a TMSA if such a model is to be of use to us in the emancipatory process. He would agree that 'Bootstrapping' processes exist which facilitate learners in the task of pulling themselves out of their own conditioning, and this necessitates the inclusion of the emancipatory process itself in the mechanism of the system which the emancipation enables one to supercede. The emancipatory process itself has to be located in the structure from which the emancipation emancipates us.

While Bhaskar's analysis involves the assumption that the emancipatory process is located within a TMSA, he does not seem to have analysed all the implications of the acceptance of his own TMSA. In particular he has omitted the analysis of the effect of the subjectivity of the self on the nature of the social environments which facilitate the learning processes needed for the occurrence of emancipation. It has been argued above that the facilitation of learning processes necessitates the development of a distinction between cultural and social environments.

A Re-formed Transformational Model Of Social Action

A re-formed TMSA which incorporates the insights of the person/social structure relationship established in this essay, enables one to locate the emancipatory human sciences within the transformational model of society. The acceptance of this re-formed model will involve one in facing fewer difficulties than are faced when one accepts the Bhaskarian TMSA. As Bhaskar has constructed the model there seems to be no room to expand the boundaries of society itself, since he has restricted the social area within which society is detected to a social rather than to a cultural environment. It has been argued above that the facilitation of learning processes necessitates the development of a distinction between cultural and social environments.

A re-formed model which gives insights into the person/society relationship should incorporate the points established in Chapter 1 and the earlier Parts of this chapter. It will not be difficult to incorporate these points as the concept of the society/person relationship which has underpinned the arguments in this essay has been a transformational one with many affinities with the Bhaskarian one. Like Bhaskar's model, the re-formed model serves heuristic purposes: it is not intended to replicate all possible social relations. The re-formed model is, like Bhaskar's, portrayed in diagrammatic form. The two-dimensional nature of the medium in which the diagram is presented prevents one from accurately reflecting the relationships between persons and natural kinds. Due account is taken of this deficiency when the detailed implications of the acceptance of the model are examined below.




Figure 5

(B) Within the category of social kinds no distinction has been made between persons and non-person social kinds. The distinction is, however, central to the argument which supports the acceptability of the model if the model is to be seen as reflecting the nature of the person/society relationship. This omission is remedied by offering the following 'detail' of the relationship between (A) and (B). Part of the operations of most social kinds will involve the social. The particular process outlined in the detail is socialisation. Socialisation is chosen firstly because it is a process without which all other social processes become asocial, and so would be reduced to natural processes. The second reason for choosing it is that the argument, developed in Chapter 4 below, shows that there are penalties to be paid by anyone attempting to claim that a social interaction can occur without some aspect of the interaction involving a process of socialisation. The third reason for using socialisation as an illustration of the relationship between social kinds and persons is that it shows clearly the kinetic and reciprocal nature of the interactions between persons and non-person social kinds. This more complex process is illustrated by Figure 7.

Detail of (A) & (B) in the context of socialisation processes: non-Person to Person

(A) **Social kinds** = (non-person: NP_1, NP_2, \dots, NP_m) & (Persons: P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n)

(B) **Human agency**




Figure 6

(B) Human agency is triggered, enabled and constrained by the behaviour of persons and non-person social kinds.

Person P_k has agency A_k .

Social kind NP_1 , operating through A_1, A_2, \dots , effects the socialisation of P_2 .


This illustrates the dependence of the operations of social kinds upon the human agency. Part of the operations of most social kinds will involve the socialisation of individuals but this has to be achieved by the operations of human agency so that socialisation processes become operations of social kinds on other social kinds through the use of human agency.

There are two aspects to the socialisation process. A non-person social kind such as a toddlers' play group may operate both by enabling a 'new' mum to chat about child care and by placing expectations on her (socialisation₁). The process then results in the new mum changing her behaviour patterns (socialisation₂). But when the person in charge of the toddlers uses peer group pressure to effect an acceptance by a child of certain norms of behaviour, the socialisation process is a little more complex. This more complex process is illustrated by Figure 7.

Detail of (A) & (B) in the context of socialisation processes: Person to Person

(A) **Social kinds** = (non-person: NP_1, NP_2, \dots, NP_n) & (Persons: P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n)

P_n



(B) **Human agency**

Figure 7

(B) - Human agency is triggered, enabled and constrained by the behaviour of persons and non-person social kinds.

Person P_k has agency A_k .

A person P_n affects the operation of NP_1 in order to achieve the socialisation of person P_2 .

These 'details' are simplistic in that they seem to ignore the possibility of either multiple processes occurring simultaneously or of a single process involving the operations of several social kinds. The simplification results from the constraints of the two-dimensional medium being used to illustrate the model.

The interpretation given in this model of the two stages of the socialisation process is similar to the interpretation given to any other social process. It is a causal process which alters the behaviour of a social kind. As such it can be carried out by any social kind, even by a person; but since it necessarily operates through interactions between individuals it must be carried out through the operation of at least one non-person social kind. This point was established by the argument in Chapter 1. This means that social processes must involve exchange interactions between conceptualising individuals and non-conceptualising social kinds. The process can either be consciously activated, as in the case of brainwashing. Alternatively, it could operate tacitly through the existing powers of non-person social kinds, as in the case of what is known as 'institutional' racism.

Interpretation Of The Re-Formed TMSA

The dual role of persons as social kinds and as interactive agents with other persons is exemplified in the model. It is at level (A) that persons exist as social kinds and as components of other social kinds. The sense a person has of *being with* other persons as component parts of social kinds is a

sense the person has of her existence at level (A), amongst other social kinds. The sense a person has that he is *interacting with* other persons finds its expression at level (B).

The only evidence a person has to validate the senses of being with and interacting with others is derived from the person's perceived interactions with others. These perceived interactions are, as was established in Chapter 1, enabled and constrained by the operations of both natural and social kinds. This means that the relationships between perceived interactions and the properties of natural and social kinds must lie at the centre of any analysis of the *perceived* properties of natural and social kinds. It should be noted that the analysis of perceived interactions has formed the pivot around which all the arguments in this essay have been developed.

It was also established in Chapter 1 that the distinction between a natural and a social kind is itself a product of conceptualisations. The distinction was encapsulated by the identification of the distinction between objects of Type-1 and of Type-2. Type-2 objects were prototypes of Conceptualising Individuals while Type-1 objects were prototypes of natural kinds. However Type-2 objects are Type-1 objects with extended powers. In other words persons, forming a subcategory of CIs, are also objects with the powers of natural kinds.

This means that the modified TMSA would have to loop back onto itself in order to show that there is an overlap between objects in (A) and in (D) (Figure 5). Further modifications to the model would have to be made in order to incorporate this feature. But this can be said of any representative model. If the representation were to capture exactly the essence of the thing it represented then it would *be* that thing.

As well as focussing on the dual role of persons, the modified TMSA also highlights the need to distinguish between natural and social kinds. The distinction underscores all the conceptualisations through which social kinds operate. It must also be inter-related to the concept of the self. In order to

fill what seems to be a gap in analysis, the relationship between natural and social kind concepts will be examined in Chapter 3.

It is in recognising and distinguishing the dual role of individuals - associated with being with and interacting with others - within the reproduction/ transformation of social structures, that the re-formed TMSA links Bhaskar's work with that carried out in this essay. The dual role was seen to involve the individual in the use of two types of second order monitoring devices. The individual has to be able to monitor his own conscious interactions with other individuals and interpret them as having some meaning. The individual also has to be able to monitor her own function as an agent who reproduces and transforms the social structures within which she is operating.

These were seen as conditions which had to hold if *any* learning, not just emancipatory learning, had to occur. It was acknowledged that the second order self-monitoring may be erroneous, the individual may be unaware of some aspects of his social activity. But it is logically impossible to sustain the transformation of the properties of a social structure while all individuals are unaware of all aspects of their activities in reproducing the social structures.

There are two differences between the Bhaskarian perspective and the one being proposed in this essay. The first is found in the ontological status given to persons. The second lies in the emphasis placed on the analysis of the enabling and constraining properties of natural kinds on human agency. Bhaskar does not give, as far as one can tell, individuals the status of social structures. This leads him to underemphasise the degree of influence which individuals have over all social kinds. In doing this he underemphasises their influence over themselves.

This is a pity as a TMSA can form a more direct route, than the one he chooses, towards the emancipatory process identified in his work. He does indicate that natural kinds have constraining and enabling effects on human agency. He does not, however, examine in the sort of detail found in this essay

the distinctions between natural and social kinds with respect to their differing influences on human agency and on the concept of Personal Identity; neither does he examine the enabling and constraining effects of natural kinds on the possible conceptualisations of what it is to be a person - these are examined in Chapter 3 below.

Society As An Ensemble Of Social Kinds, Practices And Conventions

The problems outlined in the last two subsections, together with the solutions may be summarised in the following questions and answers:- What is the relationship between society and persons? And what conceptualisations of society and persons could both sustain and determine such a relationship? It will be remembered that the problems stem from the dual role of individuals involved in social interactions: the role associated with sustaining the operations of the social kinds which facilitate the interactions and the role of interlocutor in the interaction.

The answers to these questions have drawn on Bhaskar's answers; *pace* the reservations expressed above. The strengths of the Bhaskarian explanatory model have been exploited and a re-formed model has been built. One of the strengths lies in Bhaskar's stated concept of what society is:

Society - is an ensemble of embedded structures, practices and conventions, to which have been added firstly

but society is not itself a structure.

and secondly

Persons - are social structures which are constituents of the ensemble.

If society is to be viewed as "an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce and transform" then it is not society

per se which is transformed but rather the structures, practices and conventions. The reproduction and/or transformation of society is only a derivative of the reproduction and/or transformation of its component parts.

If the ensemble has dispositional properties *qua* ensemble, then it will satisfy the definitional requirements of a social kind and have an associated social environment. As was argued in Part 6 above, there must be a social space beyond such a social environment if one is to allow for the possibility that persons can gain some understanding of the social kinds within whose social environment the persons find themselves. If the ensemble which constitutes society is seen as possessing socialising properties then that ensemble becomes a social kind with an associated social space. If one allows for the possibility that persons can learn something of the operations of the ensemble's dispositional properties, then the ensemble must be a proper subset of some greater ensemble. The Bhaskarian model has one structure too many.

And yet collections of social kinds do exist and we have concepts of the totality of the influence of the social kinds. In order to retain the concept of society as something which is not a structure with causal and dispositional properties, one has to restrict the ascription of processes such as socialisation to the operations of social kinds. Socialisation is now seen as a process whereby the dispositional properties of persons (expressed in their abilities to activate the operations of social kinds) are being altered by the very operations of the social kinds. Socialisation is a process effected by social kinds rather than by society.

The processes undergone by a schoolchild in learning facts and skills, including social skills, alter the dispositional properties of virtually all children who go to school. They learn how to activate social forces and they are conditioned into activating some social forces rather than others in given situations - socialisation processes are at work. Naturally, there may be other socialising effects on the children being brought about by the operations of

other social kinds. But to suggest that there is one all-embracing social kind which incorporates all social kinds is mistaken.

Two By-products Of Accepting The Person/Society Analysis In The TMSA

An interesting by-product of accepting one aspect of the above analysis (of the enablement and development of a person's powers to activate the operations of social kinds) is that the person, being a social kind, is capable of having a socialising effect on herself (*53) - providing she operates through some other social kind. She will, through the exercise of her own powers *qua* social kind, tend to reinforce her own dispositional tendencies. It may even be that the conservation of the person's sense of self-identity through his constant reinforcement of his dispositional tendencies, by their continued use, is an essential feature of the operation of any social structure - whether or not the social structure is itself a person. Such a question involves implications which provide an interesting area for further investigation.

A second by-product flows from the use of the re-formed TMSA. The model has implicitly pointed towards the importance of the enabling and constraining features of social and natural kinds. Since persons are social kinds which also possess some of the powers which natural kinds are perceived to possess, persons are also capable of enabling and constraining both social and natural processes.

Indeed, it is this capability which allows persons access to the processes which affect the agencies of both social and natural kinds. Without being aware that they have the ability to constrain and enable both social and natural processes, persons could not conceptualise themselves as either social or natural agents; they would, in such circumstances, be incapable of participating in concept-communication.

The analysis of the implications of the use of the enabling and constraining capabilities of persons has formed the basis of the bulk of Bhaskar's work. In this respect the work in this essay does not differ from

Bhaskar's.

PART 9: CONCLUSION

The main argument of this chapter has centered on the contention that any understanding of social interactions is possible only if one assumes three things: firstly, that social kinds exist; secondly, that the relationships between social kinds are not entirely specified by the interactions between social kinds, they are also affected by the sense of being a social kind which each 'person' possesses; and thirdly, that the 'persons' who gain the understanding of social interactions are themselves those social kinds whose conceptualised behaviour sustains, reproduces and can transform the properties of all social kinds.

The argument pivots on the possibility that understanding of social interactions can develop within cultural environments in which the social interactions occur. While this is the pivot, the foundation upon which the argument rests is different. The foundation consists of the acceptance of the possibility that persons can have an understanding of, and influence over, the operations of social kinds. The pivot and foundation necessitate a conception of an individual not only as conceptualised by others but also as conceptualising both others and his own activities in social interactions.

There are two major consequences of such a conception. Firstly, since all communicable experiences and conceptualisations take place as a result of the agency of natural and social kinds, the understanding of the stratification of both social and natural kinds must be gained indirectly through attempts to control and influence the enabling and constraining characteristics of the social and natural kinds. Secondly, the individual cannot isolate herself from either social or natural kinds - thereby making it impossible for her to

Interact with a material object and conceptualise the interaction without turning the material object into a social object.

This means that the distinction between a social and a natural kind is a conceptual one which rests on the practices of, and relationships between, the individuals of the particular cultural environment in which the distinction is conceptualised. But because the totality of an individual's conceptualised behaviour cannot be restricted to any cultural environment, the distinction is always corrigible. The penalty paid for restricting an individual's conceptualised behaviour was seen, in Part 6, to involve the impossibility that that individual can come to understand the operations of a changed social kind.

In our particular cultural environment the natural/social kind distinction rests on the intelligibility of the practices of groups of individuals. The intelligibility itself makes sense only if it is assumed (i) that all social kinds are reproduced and sustained in being by the actions of human agents and (ii) that natural kinds are reproduced and sustained in being by factors which are independent of those actions (*52).

A minor consequence of the conception of an individual as both conceptualised and conceptualising is that an objective definition of the self would negate the possibility of the self being able to learn how social kinds operate - see previous paragraph but one. Specifically the self cannot be identified with a material object for, if it were, it could not conceptualise a distinction between objects whose existence and operations were dependent upon its own conceptualisations and those which were independent of them. This does not mean that the individual self cannot be a material object, but rather that it can never be known by the individual that he is a material object. Conceptualisations carry with them the requirement that their own operations are not totally determined by the contexts or environments in which they are formed or developed.

PART 10: FOOTNOTE**Criticism Of The Arguments Presented In The Chapter**

It might be argued that the main points being made in this chapter rest on the acceptance of the definitions (D1) to (D8) which have variously been submitted for consideration. It could be thought that this leaves the arguments bereft of an anchor. They might be thought to be circular, to be dependent solely upon the consistency of the points made with the conceptualisation of the definitions (D1) to (D8).

The avoidance of circularity is achieved by considering the grounds for the acceptance of the definitions. These are accepted in order to render certain aspects of conceptualised experience intelligible, for without accepting them one is left with no intelligible account of the processes by which an individual can gain understanding of her social interactions. And this understanding is needed for the individual to be able to participate in the process (C) outlined, in Chapter 1 (*p. 36), whereby concepts are formed and developed. The ability to participate in such a process was seen to be a necessary condition for the ability of an individual to develop concepts and so to conceptualise not only its social interactions but also to formulate any concepts at all.

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE SELF

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

The principal aim of this chapter is to enhance our understanding of the relationship between an individual and his environment.

In Chapter 1 the foundations of the investigation leading to the development of such an understanding were laid. These were based on the requirement that cognitive interactions between individuals should be intelligible.

In Chapter 2 one aspect of the relationship was investigated. This concerned the relationship between individuals and those objects whose operational influences are, at least in part, determined by the conceptualisations of the individuals. These objects were characterised as 'social kinds'.

Social kinds were characterised as objects which operate in an environment itself characterised as 'social space'. A distinction was drawn between two types of sub-space: 'social environments' and 'cultural environments'. The former were defined as the areas in social space consisting of the extent of the influence of the operations of a specified set of social kinds. The latter were defined as the areas in social space consisting of the extent of the influence of operations involving the conceptualisations of a specified set of concepts. The analysis of the enabling and constraining properties of social kinds indicated that these operate in *social environments* but are utilised by individuals (in their cognitive interactions) in *cultural environments*.

The enabling and constraining properties of social kinds *vis-a-vis* the

behaviour of persons, themselves also seen as social kinds, were investigated in Chapter 2. The possible exercise of these properties, through the operation of social forces, was seen to impose restrictions on the possible conceptualisations of what it is to be a person in any given cultural environment. These restrictions were seen to flow from the need that individuals should be able simultaneously to operate social forces and to conceptualise those operations. The conscious operation by an individual of a social force was seen to necessitate her having a sense of 'being with' other individuals in sustaining social structures. The conceptualisation of the operation was seen to involve her in being capable of substituting for a 'paradigm individuator' and so also have a sense of 'interacting with' other individuals.

In Chapter 3 the focus of concern will shift to the enabling and constraining effects which the operations of natural forces have on the possible behaviour of persons. Since these effects must be conceptualised, if they are to be analysed, there develops a need to formulate a clear distinction between social and natural effects. But not only must the distinction be formulated, the grounds for claiming where the distinction lies have to be ascertained and validated.

The delineation, and justification of the delineation, of the distinction between natural and social kinds furnishes us with the main tasks to be carried out in this chapter. Apart from its importance to social and natural scientists, the delineation has a significant bearing on questions of Personal Identity, and so has an impact on the construction of theories of Personal Identity. The specific concept of Personal Identity developed in a particular cultural environment may affect the delineation between natural and social kinds. Conversely, and simultaneously, a particular delineation may constrain the development of the concept of Personal Identity in a given cultural environment.

The tasks of delineation will begin with an examination of the basis of claims regarding the nature and structure of the natural environment. Particular attention will be paid to the Kantian claim that the material environment is permanent in substance but variable in given experiences of it. It will be argued that, while Kant's claim is substantially correct, some of the details of his claims are not acceptable. Further, and somewhat paradoxically, it will be seen that Kant's argument can be applied to social space. A similar claim regarding the permanence of part of social space can be validated; one specific social environment is permanent in substance but variable in any given experience of it.

It will further be argued that, while the demarcation between social and material worlds cannot be rigidly set, there are objects which must be material, some which must be social and some whose status is contingent upon various cultural factors.

The Development Of The Arguments Summarised:

The Critiques Of (I) Kant And (II) Poincaré

In Part 2 of the chapter an investigation into the basis of claims about the ontological status of the objects which operate in physical or 'natural' space will be carried out. A link between the arguments concerning natural and social spaces will be forged. The investigation will draw on a restricted selection of some arguments developed by Kant (*1) and Poincaré (*2). Both these philosophers make claims about the nature of natural space which they justify by citing the sacrifices which have to be made if the claims are denied.

(I) The Critique Of Kant

In Kant's case the claim is that the content of natural space is permanent while its form may change. He points out that the sacrifice which has to be made if his claim is rejected is a denial of the possibility of the application of a *single system of time* by an individual to her experiences. The main

penalty incurred by one who attempts to operate in a non-singular system of time is the sacrifice of the possibility of distinguishing experiences from illusions. An adjunct to this sacrifice would be the impossibility of the formation of the concept of selfhood by the individual. Such an impossibility would prevent the individual from both substituting for a 'paradigm individuator' (Chapter 1, page 26) and involving himself in the meaning-affirming and concept-developing processes (C) (Chapter 1 *page 36). If this were to happen to all individuals, the cultural system in which they operated would collapse.

These arguments are closely tied to the distinctions made in Chapter 2 between two types of relationship: those in which individuals see themselves as *being with* others while together they sustain social structures, and those in which individuals *interact with* each other. Both 'being with' and 'interacting with' others involve the assumption that one is operating in a single system of time. This assumption is accompanied by another, v/z the permanent nature of the social environment generated by the operations of concept-developing and meaning-affirming social kinds. 'Interacting' with others involves the acceptance of either one of two possibilities: that changes may occur in either the behaviour or the causal properties of a social kind; or that the social environment generated by the social kind may cease to exist. It will be seen that the acceptance of these possibilities provides one with a criterion for distinguishing natural structures from social ones.

(II) The Critique Of Poincaré

The uses to which Poincaré's argument will be put are different. They are concerned more with the nature of conscious experience than with the nature of communicable conceptualisations. The purpose of undertaking a critique of some of the ideas developed by Poincaré is to prepare the ground for the analysis of conscious experience to be carried out in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3 the relationship between the conscious individual and the content of conscious

experience is examined; in Chapter 4 the relationship between the conscious individual and the projection of that content to other conscious individuals is examined.

Some of Poincaré's claims help one to focus on the nature of the impact which an individual has on her conscious experiences. In one of these he claims that the existence of solid objects in natural space (although he does not use this phrase) is a precondition of the possibility of development both of spatial concepts in general and of any given geometry. The geometry is seen to be applicable to the relationships between material objects. He combines this with a corollary: individuals must be able to interfere with the movements of the 'solid objects' if they are to be able to develop and apply the spatial concepts.

Within this analysis he points out that there is a difference between what he calls 'representative space' and conceptualised space. The former consists of the conglomerate of non-homogeneous signals received by the various senses. The latter consists of the ordered, homogeneous, three-dimensional space which individuals conceptualise as representing the natural environment in which they operate. If Poincaré is right then the conclusions he draws will have an impact on the conception an individual has of herself as an agent who is able to alter the sensations, and so the conceptualisations, of others.

The differences as well as the similarities between Poincaré's starting point and the one used here will be highlighted. The differences will be seen to revolve around the purposes behind the two enquiries. Poincaré's enquiry attempts to discover the means by which a concept of space might be developed and applied, and then to discover the epistemological consequences of the processes of development and application. The enquiry in this essay directs its attention both to the possible reasons for developing and applying concepts of space and to the consequences of making the reasons intelligible (*3).

The Aims Of Chapter 3

It has already been stated that the principal concern of this chapter is to use the conclusions drawn from the discussion outlined above in order to help determine the demarcation between natural and social spaces. It is within the bounds set by such a demarcation that any adequate understanding of the nature of Personal Identity has to develop. It will be established that the demarcation is not completely arbitrary since the price which is paid by any claim of its arbitrariness is the tacit acceptance of untenable notions both of selfhood and of social structures within and through which individuals interact.

Similarly, it will be argued that the demarcation between natural and social spaces is not entirely a matter of convention.♦

The subsidiary concern of the chapter is to show that, given the demarcation between the social and material worlds, there is a connectedness between them. It will be seen that this connectedness stems from the fact that both are conceptualised by individuals whose conceptions are temporal and who need to distinguish illusory from non-illusory experiences.

In pursuing the goals set by the main and subsidiary concerns, the argument will, *inter alia*, give further support to the claim made in Chapters 1 and 2 that individuals must have second order monitoring devices if they are to give meaning to their own sensations.

.....

♦NOTE : An argument which specifies the need for a demarcation between social and material interactions does not per se tell one anything either about the specific locus of the demarcation or about the precise form of those interactions, it merely tells us that the demarcation exists (*4). But in so indicating it also indicates that certain conceptions of Personal Identity, specifically those advocating the possibility of objective definitions of persons, are untenable.

PART 2: A CRITIQUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S THEORY OF OUTER SENSE**The Permanence Of Material Or Natural Space**

An outline of the Kantian argument will begin the analysis of the qualities which are exhibited by objects in natural space. It will also indicate how one can determine areas of certainty and doubt when one attempts to understand the properties of objects. The argument will also pinpoint the basis of both the certainty and the doubt.

In both the Refutation of Idealism and the First Analogy of Experience (*5), Kant argues that conscious experience gives sufficient grounds for establishing the claim that objects exist in space beyond the direct awareness of the phenomena found in conscious experience. Kant does not use the same terminology. He focusses rather on the temporality of experience and does not explain too clearly what he means by "*objects which exist outside me*".

While this lack of clarity may obscure the strength of Kant's argument, it does not weaken it; neither does it reduce its importance. One of the strengths of the Kantian argument lies in the characterisation of the self which is presupposed by the existence of a subject of experiences which occur in a *single system of time*.

If one reinterprets Kant's words as meaning that conscious experience enables one to establish the existence of objects in space *beyond the influence of the interpretation of the experience* then one is more likely both to make sense of his claim and to accept it. Conscious experience involves changes in state, and all changes involve the passage of time. The notion that either these changes in state, or the states themselves, have influence on each other is a prerequisite of the intelligibility of the conscious experience itself (the possibility that every component part of an experience might only be contingently connected to every other component part runs counter to the very notion of consciousness (*6)). In these circumstances it can be seen that it is

intelligible for a conscious being to ask whether there is anything which exists beyond the influence of those processes which constitute his own experiences. He can intelligibly ask whether anything exists beyond the phenomena of which he is directly aware.

Kant gives an unequivocally positive response to such a question. The basis of his answer is to be found in the concept of time which such a being must possess, even if the possession is tacit. More precisely his answer centres on the concept of the *history* of the objects which are conceptualised in conscious experience. He argues that conceptualising the history of an object involves one in conceptualising its changes of state. This latter process of conceptualisation he sees as only being possible against a background which is unchanging. But the central point of the argument is, as W.H. Walsh has put it, that it establishes *"what must be true of the experienced world if we are to make objective temporal judgements within a single system of time."* (*7) (Walsh's emphasis)

This central point hangs on the ability to distinguish the experience of an objective order from an illusion. The need for such a distinction stems from the requirement that one can conceptualise the history of objects. Illusion takes place entirely within the bounds of influence of the interpretations of experience and, as such, is a product of the operations of objects situated in social space. Experiences which consisted of nothing but illusions, which all occurred entirely within the scope of the influence of the interpretations of the experiences, would not permit judgements in a single time system to be made.

Each experience would have its own history, and this history would be separate from all other histories. Such a scenario would prevent the use of a concept from repeatedly performing its functions either as encapsulator of the understanding of a similar (or the same) event or as the referent of a similar (or the same) object. Indeed, the notion of similarity could not be incorporated into judgements at all.

If, therefore, we are to accept the possibility of the continuity of experiences then we must also accept that there must be an objective order – experiences of which are separable from illusions. Along with Kant we are bound to accept that the objective order, which is involved in facilitating judgements, can sustain change but neither annihilation nor creation; it is a permanent entity in which every existing thing both developed from something before it, and it will develop into something in the future. Phenomena which involve the experiences of annihilation and/or creation do not belong to an objective order. They are experiences whose mode of operation is subjectively determined, which belong to those modal aspects of experience which are determined by the operation of a faculty such as the imagination.

This exegesis of Kant's work owes much to W.H Walsh's observation, quoted above, that the condition on which Kant focusses is that individuals should be able to make *temporal judgements* in a single system of time. The exegesis begins to bring out the implicit social basis of the Kantian argument. It will be argued below (in the remainder of Part 2) that the possibility that social interactions should occur, generates the requirement that individuals must distinguish experiences of an objective order from illusions; a requirement which Kant conceived as being derived solely from an individual's isolated conscious experience of the material world. The additional social requirement enables one to extend the Kantian argument beyond the merely quantitative and into the normative areas of human activities.♦

Some Criticisms Of Kant's Arguments

Not all commentators accept the full force of Kant's arguments on these matters. Notably Jonathan Bennett (*8) argues that Kant's distinction between *a priori* concepts and *a priori* intuitions should really be translated into talk of descriptive expressions and proper names respectively. He goes on to argue that all the conceptual baggage carried by proper names prevents them from doing the

work Kant allocates to *a priori* intuitions. He seems to interpret the Kantian notion of an *a priori* intuition as a notion of something which encapsulates an experience rather than of something which encapsulates a possible appreciation of the basis of an experience. Bennett glides into a translation, from *a priori* intuition to proper name, by pointing out that proper names and Kantian *a priori* intuitions have one thing in common: namely that they both pick out singularities (*9). He uses this argument specifically against Kant's analysis of space rather than against Kant's analysis of time. It is not difficult to see that Bennett here commits the fallacy of the assertion of the consequent.

Bennett also cites Anthony Quinton's example which *prima facie* refutes the same Kantian arguments. Quinton's example is of an individual who has dreams which seem to operate in a different spatial context to the waking experiences of the same individual. Both Bennett and Quinton, however, accept arguments supporting the notion that time is singular, and yet fail to appreciate the integrated nature of the Kantian argument. Yet this integration lies at the heart of Kant's argument establishing the permanence of the material world and with it a single system of space. It is only in the context of an *a priori* intuition of a single system of time that Kant feels able to propound an argument supporting the notion of an *a priori* intuition of a singular material space.

◆NOTE : The distinction between objective and subjective orders is analytic, in the Kantian sense. The concepts 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' incorporate the notion that they are distinguished by the possibility that one and not the other constitutes the modes of operation in which the behaviour of objects can be affected by the conceptualisations of individuals. It is only with hindsight that one can tell that experiences have been illusory, and the criteria for making such judgements are based on the possibility that changes in understanding of one's environment can occur (see *p.143 f. below).

Kant's Argument Extended: An Outline

Kant points out that the existence of an intuition of a singular material space depends upon the possibility of a unified history of the individual's experiences (of that which is independent of the individual's imagination). A unified history of experiences is, as Kant correctly indicates, a precondition of the stretching over time of any experience – since atemporal experiences are not experiences.

The force of the Kantian argument stems from its lack of reliance on the content of conscious experience. Kant focusses instead on the *operations* involved in conceptualised experience. These operations are only possible if the events to which they refer occur in a single system of time and in an environment which is dimensional – but, contrary to Kant's argument, it is not necessarily three-dimensional (see Part 3 below). The perception of the dimensionality of the environment is necessarily linked both to the temporal nature of the experiences and to the temporal nature of the occurrences related to those experiences. The impossibility of conceptualising a dimensional environment without doing so in a single system of time is virtually self-evident: dimensionality is only conceptualised through conceptualising change, and changes are analytically (in the Kantian sense) temporal.

The Kantian enterprise can be extended to incorporate analyses of some other aspects of conscious experience. The requirements generated by the need to meet the condition that experiences occur in a single system of time also applies to cognitive interactions between individuals. The operations involved in the interactions require the existence of a permanent social space. This requirement needs to be met irrespective of the cognitive content of the experiences of the individuals involved in the interactions or of the causal impact of the on any given individual of such interactions. The requirement is the same as the one which stems from the need for experiences of individuals in the objective natural order to occur in a single system of time

The requirement in the two cases is identical: there is a requirement in both cases that the history of objects be conceptualised. In neither case does the conceptualised history have to be accurate; the arguments are independent of the content of conscious experience. In both cases one can draw the Kantian conclusion that the space which contains the objects (whose history is conceptualised) is permanent. The social space which sustains the social objects whose history is conceptualised, is the social environment generated by the operations of those social kinds which facilitate concept communication.

This notion will be developed and validated below in the next three subsections. It will be seen that just as material space is permanent so this social environment is permanent. In neither case is it being claimed that the space is bounded nor that its limits could be known. Indeed, the possibility that such spaces could expand is embedded in the conceptions individuals have of them; for without such a possibility the possibility of the expansion of our understanding would be bounded. Such a limit on knowledge could never be known to have been reached (see above - Chapter 2 Part 6).

The singularity of the social space referred to here is distinct from the singularity of material space as envisaged by Kant. Kant's singularity seemed to apply to the entirety or totality of physical space - perhaps consisting of the *union* of all spacially contiguous physical environments. The singular social space referred to above, and validated below, is rather the *intersection* of all social environments - that is, the social environment generated by the operations of the social kinds which facilitate concept communication.

Kant's Argument Extended

The rather Kantian argument which is being put together in this essay began in Chapter 1. The extra ingredient added there to the Kantian analysis was the introduction of a social dimension, and with it individuals as social beings. The possibility of the occurrence of intelligible cognitive interactions between

Individuals was seen to generate the need for the existence of the social dimension. It is by examining the criteria which have to be met in order to sustain the modes of operation of objects found in the social dimension that the argument will now proceed.

Kant's argument, which establishes the independence from any given experience of the material or natural world, rests upon the assumption that experiences occur in a single system of time. Similarly, in establishing the independence from any given experience of a particular set of social structures, the argument here depends upon the acceptance of a similar assumption of a single system of time.

The acceptance of a single system of time by the participants in the processes of concept communication is a precondition of the intelligibility of that process to the participants. Each participant has to assume that at least some of the elements involved in the communicative process operate independently of his interpretation of the process. This independence is inconsistent with the notion that experiences occur in a non-singular, non-permanent social environment.

The justification supporting the claim of inconsistency is closely similar to Kant's. Yet there is more to the argument here than one finds in Kant. The extra ingredient stems from the analysis of cognitive interactions as well as cognitive experiences. Each participant in such interactions must be in a position to be able to specify at least one of the objects which do, and some which do not, operate independently of his interpretative faculties. The absence of the possibility that one could exercise such an ability would render cognitive interactions between individuals unintelligible.

The price cited by Kant for the rejection of his conclusions is the disintegration of the coherent temporal experience. The price cited here for rejecting the conclusion, that a singular social environment exists, is the disintegration of cognitive interactions between individuals. It can be seen

that the two arguments are closely connected.

The connection does not stem from the similar format of the two arguments. It stems instead from a symbiotic relationship which exists between the experiences of individuals of the operations of natural kinds and the experiences of individuals of cognitive interactions with other individuals. Cognitive interactions form the basis for developing cognitive experiences of the operations of natural kinds; and cognitive interactions involve the manipulation of the operations of both natural and social kinds.

A participant in both types of cognitive interaction must assume that the properties of both natural and social kinds manifest themselves in a single system of time. The justification of the validity of this claim will be expounded in the next sub-section. It will be seen that the integrated nature of experience prevents individuals from making sharp distinctions between *all* natural and *all* social kinds; but that they must make such sharp distinctions between *all* natural and *some* social kinds. The circumstances in which such distinctions have to be sharply made are those in which a cultural environment's corpus of knowledge is manipulated with the expectation of changing it. The price paid for the negation of the possibility of sustaining such a sharp distinction is the negation of the possibility of having cognitive interactions which lead to alterations in knowledge; in other words the price paid is the negation of the possibility that social structures which facilitate the expansion of knowledge could be developed.

The need to make distinctions between some social and all natural kinds, married to the impossibility of drawing a sharp distinction between all social and natural kinds, leads to the generation of some paradoxes. It will be seen that these paradoxes centre on the simultaneously subjective and objective nature of an individual's cognitive interactions with other individuals. In Chapter 4 it will be seen that the existence of the paradoxes forms a necessary condition for the intelligibility of any communicable cognitive experience.

persons are essentially paradoxical beings. This essence springs from the nature of the cognitive interactions. Specifically it springs from the nature of those cognitive interactions, within which the concept of what a person is may be permitted to develop.

Implications Of The Extended Kantian Argument:

(1) Subjectivity And Objectivity

In extending the scope of Kant's argument beyond the realm of material interactions, one is able to avoid Kant's anthropocentric naturalism - a more detailed discussion of which is carried out in Part 3 below. There is a further benefit in taking Kant's enterprise further than he did; this involves overcoming one of the limitations which flows from the adoption of the Kantian anthropocentric perspective. The limitations prevent the formation of a workable distinction between the subjective and objective aspects of the modes of operation of individuals. In focussing exclusively on the operations of the perception of the material world, Kant was unlikely to come up with such a workable distinction.

The reasons behind this are reasonably straightforward. The experience by an individual of cognitive interactions between individuals, together with the appreciation of the possibility of further similar experiences, leads that individual to be able to distinguish her own subjective from her own objective modes of operation. Further, the assumption that she can make such distinctions forms the basis on which other individuals can determine the intelligibility of interacting on a cognitive level with her. If I cannot distinguish any of my own experiential modes as being subjective, then I cannot intelligibly participate in cognitive interactions with others. For similar reasons I must also assume that those with whom I am interacting can distinguish some of their own modes of operation as being subjective (this point will be developed further in Chapter 4). But the subjective modes of operation of others are not

subjective for me, and yet I have to distinguish them both from my own subjective modes of operation and from the modes of operation of objects to which I do not ascribe any subjective capabilities.

There are, then, three modes of operation for all individuals: the subjective mode, the inter-subjective or social mode, and the non-subjective or natural mode. Each mode involves the individual in some interactions with some object(s): the individual can interact reflexively with himself in utilising a self-monitoring mechanism, he can interact with social kinds (including other persons) utilising the mechanisms of social kinds, and he can interact with natural kinds utilising the mechanisms of natural kinds.

There are two possible consequences of denying that the distinctions a person makes between these modes of operation is significant. Both possibilities involve the payment of the same price. Either the person can only account for the operations of individuals in a world which is entirely material and objective, or she is restricted to operating in social structures where genuine novelty is impossible, where the development of knowledge cannot occur. Either alternative obliges one to collapse the conceptual operations of individuals into a single objective world. Distinctions within this single objective world between explanations of illusory and non-illusory processes could not be sustained: indeed the very notion of an explanation would itself become unintelligible.

The first step extending the Kantian argument into the domain of social interactions has been taken. The price to be paid for rejecting the possibility of sustaining a significant distinction between social and material domains has been set. However, the consequences which flow from this extension need to be fully explored before tackling any weaknesses which exist in Kant's arguments. These weaknesses will be identified in Part 3 below, where Kant's anthropocentric naturalism will be rejected.

The importance of rejecting his anthropocentric naturalism lies in the need

to establish the independence of conceptual processes from the content of consciousness. The independence will be seen to hold when the content of consciousness refers to processes which are deemed to be unaffected by conscious processes - that is to material processes. It will then be possible to extend the argument so that it becomes applicable when the content of consciousness refers to processes which are deemed to be affected by conscious processes - that is to social processes.

The rejection of Kant's anthropocentric naturalism rests on a prior acceptance of the existence of, and the distinction between, those social and material spaces which are linked to each other through their operation in a single system of time. That such a distinction must be made has already been established. The limitations which need to be imposed on the areas in which the distinction can be made will be investigated in the next sub-section.

(II) The Simultaneous Interdependence and Independence of Social and Material Spaces

Kant claims that an individual can have no coherent experiences as an individual without assuming that there is a permanent, singular world which is independent of the individual's interpretations of his sense experiences and against which he can contrast changing experiences. This claim is encapsulated by claim (Mat1):

The permanence and singular nature of the material environment take as their temporal and conceptual reference points the cognitive experience of an individual.

...(Mat1)

The extension of the Kantian claim being proposed and substantiated here is founded on the intelligibility of any concept communication which facilitates the development of an individual's understanding of her environment. Using Thomas Kuhn's terminology (*10) what is being claimed is that the

characteristics of those social structures where 'normal science' is practiced are such as to facilitate the development of 'revolutionary science' thereby possibly annihilating some of the social structures. This means that part of the social structure within which 'normal science' is practiced must be non-permanent and possibly non-singular.

It is possible now to summarise the essence of the claim being substantiated in Part 2 as follows. The same individual cannot experience the communication of concepts without also implicitly assuming two things: first, that communication processes occur in a non-permanent, non-singular cultural environment which is generated independently of any given process of communication; and secondly, that these same processes of communication occur in a permanent, singular social environment which is situated in the non-permanent cultural environment. This claim is encapsulated by one similar to (Mat1) v/z:

The permanence and singular nature of this social environment take as their temporal and conceptual reference points the cognitive interactions between individuals. ...(Soc1)

Having just indicated that social and material environments are independent, it will now be argued that, in certain specific circumstances, there must exist a strict delineation between these two environments. The specific circumstances will be seen to be the same as those to which reference is made in Chapter 2, Part 6, when arguing that society cannot operate in a closed social environment. These circumstances were seen there to centre on the possibility that knowledge and/or understanding of the operations of objects in social environments might change. As with previous arguments used in this essay the price to be paid for not accepting the argument can be cited: in this case the refusal to accept that there is a strict delineation (which is built upon the existence of individuals whose subjective activity sustains the existence of

the social environments) involves the restriction of causes of changes in the corpus of knowledge (which generates a cultural environment) to non-conscious mechanisms. Such a restriction would negate the intelligibility of the development of social structures whose purpose it is to change the current corpus of knowledge. The argument is, as before, Kantian in nature.

It has already been established that Kant's independent, permanent world of material objects and the social environment generated by the operations of social kinds which facilitate concept communication, must operate in a single system of time. The reason they must do so is that the operations of objects in both environments are constrained by the need to facilitate cognitive interactions between individuals. This means that the operations of objects in the social and material worlds must, when conceptualised and consciously manipulated by individuals, be interdependent.

It is, however, only when conscious attempts are made to expand the understanding of the operations of objects in either environment that the interdependence becomes important. If the only purpose underlying the participation by individuals in cognitive interactions with other individuals were merely to transfer the given corpus of understanding from individual to individual, then there would be no need to be aware of the distinction between social and natural structures. In these circumstances any change in the corpus of knowledge would not be seen as different in category from the detected changes in the properties of a natural kind. Such a scenario would be found in a cultural environment where there were no operational social kinds whose function it was to facilitate the alteration of the corpus of knowledge.

In such a cultural environment, any changes in the corpus of knowledge would have to be conceptualised as epiphenomena of nature. Indeed, in such cultural environments there would be no need to distinguish between social and natural processes. The importance of this consideration for the purposes of the argument here is that without such a distinction the question of the identity of

the individual is no more or less problematic than the identity of a natural kind. The set of properties which an individual might possess is specified at any point in time within the corpus of knowledge. Further, no individual could, by consciously using her causal powers to affect and effect changes in her social/natural environments, alter the set characteristics which might be possessed by any individual - she would have no power to contribute towards the redefinition of a person and no power to contribute to the definition of herself as an individual.

Where there is no possibility of a conscious, intentional alteration of the corpus of knowledge, both social and material environments will be seen as permanent. One can provide an argument supporting the acceptability of this claim by examining the relationship between the expansion of knowledge and the possible development of the notion of Personal Identity. The possibility of conscious, intentional alterations to the corpus of knowledge is closely interlinked with the necessity that individuals can contribute towards the redefinition of the person. Any alteration in the corpus of knowledge will alter the effect, in social space, of the use of certain concepts. This will alter the causal powers of the individuals who use the concepts and so alter the social environments specified by the possible operations of the individuals. This means that the conscious alteration of the corpus of knowledge by any individual will have the effect of redefining at least those individuals who accept the alterations which she has instigated. So where there is no possibility of conscious, intentional alterations in the corpus of knowledge, there is also no possibility of changes in the definition of a person - and *vice-versa*.

Natural And Social Kinds And The Modal Aspects Of Cognitive Experience

The symbiotic relationship between the concept of Personal Identity and the possible expansion of knowledge has been established. If the individual has the

power to alter the concepts whose use is invoked in any process which individuates him then the cultural environment in which he operates must contain mechanisms which facilitate the conscious alteration of the corpus of knowledge.

Conversely, the possibility that the corpus of knowledge can be altered can only be sustained if individuals have the power to redefine themselves.

The point at which an individual begins to contribute to the redefinition of a person is reached when criteria of intelligibility are brought into play. This can be seen to be the case when one considers the functions, in cognitive interactions, of criteria of intelligibility and of the uses of self-monitoring devices possessed by persons. Without the use of criteria of intelligibility, the monitoring by an individual of her own experiences itself becomes unintelligible; and this lack of intelligibility is accompanied by the lack of intelligibility of all concept communication. Without the use of the self-monitoring device the individual cannot substitute for a 'paradigm Individuator' and so cannot contribute towards the formation of any concept, let alone concepts of Personal Identity.

The converse of the claim made in the last paragraph has already been established. The point at which a cultural environment comes to contain social kinds which facilitate the alteration of the corpus of knowledge is reached when individuals have the power to alter the concept of a person. This power may be exercised only through the alteration of the corpus of knowledge. The actual exercise of the power does not have to occur in order for the corpus of knowledge to change. It is sufficient that the possibility of its exercise exists; for this possibility, along with a change in the corpus of knowledge, is accompanied by conceptualised changes in the concepts of the identity of some individuals. Neither does the exercise of the power itself have to be conceptualised, it can be exercised by an individual without his being aware of the exercise.

The reliance of this argument on the modal aspects of experience is

central. Modal aspects concern themselves with possible and necessary outcomes of conceptualised behaviour. As such they are concerned with the possible disappearance and/or annihilation of objects whose behaviour is being monitored. Without the possibility of the disappearance and/or annihilation of some objects, questions of possibility and necessity would be unintelligible. Since the annihilation of objects was established by Kant to be impossible in the world of material objects, its possibility must be restricted to the world of social objects. In other words the concept of a social object contains the notion that it is possible that the object may be annihilated. By contrast the concept of a material object excludes the notion that the object may be annihilated.

This means that the delineation of the boundary between social and material environments is closely related to the possession of self-monitoring mechanisms by conscious individuals. It is only through the use of self-monitoring mechanisms that modal aspects of experience are intelligible. So the possession of self-monitoring mechanisms by individuals provides one with both necessary and sufficient reasons for the establishment of a delineating boundary between material and social environments.

There is one exception. The self-monitoring aspects and intelligibility of experience involving cognitive interactions negate the possibility of the annihilation of one social kind: the social kind which facilitates cognitive interactions between individuals in cultural environments in which changes in the corpus of knowledge can be effected. In these cultural environments the mechanisms used to communicate concepts cannot be annihilated. In order to annihilate such a mechanism one would have to destroy all memories of its operations, in which case it would not be known that it had ever been in operation. This means that the annihilation of a social kind which facilitates concept communication cannot ever be known to have occurred.

Further, if a mechanism which, up to a particular point in time had not

been in use, were to come into use, then it has to be assumed that the mechanism was always available for use. The ontological distinction drawn between such mechanisms and other social kinds stems from the fact that the former's operations are content-free - their operations do not depend upon the conceptual content of any particular cognitive interaction. By contrast, the operations of all other social kinds are dependent upon the cognitive content of the social interactions which sustain their operations. Indeed, it is this cognitive content which gives these other social kinds their *modus operandi* - if one were to alter the cognitive content one could easily alter the social kind itself.

In the next sub-section the arguments which have been developed in Part 2 will be summarised. These have been concerned with the relationships between concepts of Personal Identity and the delineation of the boundary between material and social environments. The construction of the summary will lead to the identification of one remaining area of investigation: the interactions between individuals and their material environments. The need for such an investigation is derived from the apparent persuasiveness of Kant's arguments. It was argued above that problems arise if one accepts Kant's phenomenology, which is simultaneously naturalistic and anthropocentric. As such its acceptance may lead to the eventual fusion of social and material environments; leaving one with the task of having to meet the payment, identified above, of the price of the fusion. The refutation of Kant's anthropocentric naturalism is completed in Part 3 below.

Implications Of The Extended Kantian Argument: (III) A Summary

Kant's argument identifies a source of our understanding of the permanent nature of the material environment. *Inter alia*, it also implicitly identifies the source of our understanding of the nature of non-material environments. The source of this understanding has been explicitly identified in the last sub-section by employing an extended version of the Kantian argument. It was

identified as being the structure of the social kinds which facilitate those forms of concept communication which can lead to alterations in the corpus of knowledge encapsulated by a given cultural environment.

The examination has so far focussed on the importance of two pairs of related notions: permanence and non-permanence on one hand; objectivity and subjectivity on the other. Kant could not move beyond claiming that one can establish the permanence and euclidean structure of the material environment; he could not justify any claims about the operations of objects in that environment. Similarly, he could not move beyond claiming that there were both subjective and objective aspects of experience; he could not justify any claims about the nature of the referents of objective experience.

The argument in the previous sub-sections has permitted some of the moves which were out of reach for someone following a strictly Kantian line. These moves were seen to be based on the conditions which have to hold if social interactions which facilitate intentional changes in the corpus of knowledge are to be possible. The moves were seen, at root, to rely on the subjective nature of modal aspects of experience. These modal aspects were seen to underpin the possibility that knowledge could expand. They were also seen to form the basis of the justification for the delineation between social and natural kinds.

The argument was not, however, watertight. There remains a possibility that modal aspects of experience are not subjective. Indeed Kant saw these as objectively determined and forming the basis of synthetic a priori knowledge of the structure of the material environment. This possibility will now be rejected with the aid of an examination of Poincaré's arguments refuting the details of the Kantian claim that the material environment is three-dimensional and euclidean.

This examination will involve a two-pronged analysis of some of Poincaré's arguments, already alluded to above. The first analysis will highlight the fact that certain of his arguments rely on the interdependence of the material and

the social worlds for their acceptability. The reliance is not explicitly acknowledged by Poincaré. The second analysis will involve an examination of the content of one of Poincaré's arguments (*11). This argument gives an *a priori* justification of general claims about the *nature* of space - these give one access to some Kantian synthetic *a priori* concepts (but not those of an applied 3-D geometry which Kant himself suggested) as contrasted with the *a priori intuition* of space itself. This examination will lead to the identification of the subjective element present in experiences where *a priori intuitions* of either natural or social space are operational.

PART 3: THE IMPACT OF POINCARÉ ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF.

Two aspects of Poincaré's arguments are of significance to the formulation of a concept of Personal Identity. The first is the tacit assumption in the arguments that the individual has to do conceptual work on his sensual information in order to formulate spatial concepts. Since the formation of such concepts is not an epiphenomenon of nature, it will be argued that the subjectivity of the individual cannot be eliminated from the concept of a person without paying a price. The second significant aspect of Poincaré's arguments is the explicit reference made to the need for individuals to be active, self-evaluatory causal agents in the environment if they are to conceptualise that environment as dimensional. As in the case of the first aspect, the argument directs one's attention to the subjectivity of a person.

Both these aspects of Poincaré's arguments lie at the heart of the argument being developed in this essay. The first merely reiterates and modifies a similar position adopted by Kant. The second takes the Kantian position and extends it. The argument in this essay proposes a further extension to Poincaré's which permits a separate analysis of the social dimension of

perceived phenomena. This separate analysis may provide one with the basis from which it may be possible to discover a firmer basis for human value systems than those which have been proposed hitherto.

The Significance Of Poincaré's Theories Of Space, Displacement, Solidity And Action

The significance of those of Poincaré's theories which will be examined below are to be found in three areas. *Firstly*, he refutes the central arguments Kant used to support his claim that the knowledge that *Euclidean* geometry can be applied to our spatial environment is *synthetic a priori* knowledge. The refutation does not, however, invalidate the Kantian enterprise itself; on the contrary, Poincaré's own argument constitutes a variant of Kant's.

The claims he makes are such that Kant would classify as supporting the notion of *synthetic a priori* knowledge. In this case the knowledge concerns the structure of our natural environment. Poincaré claims that an individual's perceptions of the number of possible dimensions of 'motor space' is limited by the number of muscles the individual has (*12). He also claims that space must contain solid objects. The importance of this argument is not that it negates the possibility of *synthetic a priori* knowledge - for clearly it does not. It is rather that it refutes an argument of Kant's which claims that the environment is simultaneously naturalistic and anthropocentric.

The simultaneity of anthropocentricity and naturalism is built in by Kant when he makes the nature of the environment dependent upon the mechanisms of sense perception and independent of any interpretative process undertaken by 'sense perceivers'. If accepted, Kant's anthropocentric naturalism would give one access to certain knowledge that both we, as individuals, and the environment we perceive are the way we perceive ourselves and them to be. It would also provide us with the possibility of developing a sound justification for claiming that the conceptualisation of the individual could be reduced to

the conceptualisations of objects which did not themselves have the power to conceptualise.

The examination of Poincaré's arguments is not as out of place as might appear in an investigation into the basis on which theories of Personal Identity are built. Poincaré's arguments allow one to refute the intelligibility of determining objective conceptualisations of the processes of conceptualising the natural environment. If the conceptualisations of such processes do not permit one intelligibly to eliminate the individual, then the possibility of forming concepts of persons entirely in terms of non-person concepts disintegrates.

Secondly, Poincaré shows, in true Kantian fashion, that the development and application of geometrical concepts to space are only possible if (i) space contains 'solid' objects; (ii) individuals are able to activate some of those solids in order to alter either their (the solids') states or their relative positions (commonly we describe this by saying that they can move objects by moving their muscles); and (iii) individuals are able to *monitor* both these activations and the changes of state and/or relative position. (Poincaré does not discuss the significance of the individual's ability to monitor the activation of changes; such a discussion would not have contributed to the central concern of his argument.)

The importance of Poincaré's argument, as seen from the perspective adopted in this essay, is that it provides a social scientist with a starting point for establishing the demarcation between social and material environments. The individual cannot operate in an environment in which she cannot develop and apply spatial concepts. No possible changes in the perceptions, or interpretations of perceptions, of individuals can remove the need for solid objects and their spatial relations. The social scientist may, in these circumstances, justifiably begin by specifying as material (and so non-social) those environments in which the changes of position and/or shape of objects are detected.

Thirdly, Poincaré demonstrates that any processes of interpretation of (II) and (III) above are only contingently related to the activations and monitoring procedures referred to in (II) and (III). He demonstrates conclusively that it is possible to represent the sense data one is receiving as originating from a fairly wide variety of types of spatial environment. While the arguments he uses to achieve this are similar to the one referred to in the previous two paragraphs, they focus on different ends. For Poincaré the focus was the discovery of the basis of knowledge of the application of mathematical concept. In this essay, the focus shifts to the importance of the subjectivity of the individual, and with it the consequent doubt that an objective conceptualisation of the self is possible.

Debunking Kant's Anthropocentric Naturalism

The Kantian theory of *synthetic a priori* knowledge of the Euclidean nature of spatial relationships is both anthropocentric and naturalistic. In order to achieve his goals, Kant needs to show that the *mechanisms* of sense perceptions are such that the application of a geometry to space restricts that geometry to being Euclidean. This means that individuals cannot but conceptualise the environment as Euclidean, so the process of conceptualisation becomes an epiphenomenon of nature. It will not do for him to throw the necessity back onto the understanding for, in such a case, either the knowledge would be *analytic* rather than synthetic or the mode of operation of the understanding would itself be mechanistic.

Poincaré shows, in arguments reminiscent of Berkeley (*13), that the mechanisms of sense perception tend to push the individual away from, rather than towards, the application of strictly Euclidean geometrical concepts to space. In these arguments he points out that, not only do individuals normally experience 'visual' and 'tactile' space, but they also experience 'motor' space.

It is worthwhile briefly to examine the relationships between these three

spaces.

The three spaces are distinguished from each other by the sense organs which provide the signals which the individual assimilates into her experience of her spatial environment. 'Visual' space has its origins in the two-dimensional (as Poincaré conceives them to be - see note(*15)) signals received by the eye. 'Tactile' space has its origins in the signals received by the sense of touch. 'Motor' space is derived from the experiences of movements of the muscles. Poincaré argues that the three spaces are assimilated into a single 'representative space' by a series of processes which include experimentation and the association of ideas. An evaluation of his description of the assimilation is not necessary for the purposes of this chapter.

He goes on to indicate that, in developing and applying the notions of Euclidean geometry to space, individuals will develop and then use an isomorphism between 'representative' and Euclidean spaces. The isomorphism has some undertones of Kantian rationalism:-

*"Thus we do not represent to ourselves external bodies in geometrical space, but we reason about these bodies as if they were situated in geometrical space. When it is said, on the other hand, that we "localise" such an object in such a point of space, what does it mean? It simply means that we represent to ourselves the movements that must take place to reach that object. And it does not mean that to represent to ourselves these movements they must be projected into space, and the concept of space must therefore pre-exist. When I say that we represent to ourselves these movements, I only mean that we represent to ourselves the muscular sensations which accompany them, and which have no geometrical character, and which therefore in no way imply the pre-existence of the concept of space." (Poincaré's emphasis) (*14)*

Whether or not this rationalist analysis is rigorously correct is not significant for our purposes. What is important is the observation that

'representative space' is not Euclidean. Not every dimension in representative space is equivalent to every other one. According to Poincaré, the two dimensions of visual space are augmented to three by the assimilation of information from motor space; muscular movements are needed if one is to extend beyond the flatness of visual space (*15). Further, not every point in representative space is equivalent to every other; naturally, a neighbourhood of a point may alter in representative space if one moves ones visual perspective, but this does not alter the nature of the neighbourhood of the point in Euclidean space. Poincaré here demonstrates conclusively that the mechanisms of sense perception do not force an individual to apply a Euclidean concept to his spatial environment; the individual has to work against his sense information in order to apply Euclidean concepts to space.

This means that, in contradistinction to Kant, one can argue that Euclidean space is not forced on us. If we use Euclidean concepts it is because we have *interpreted* sense inputs as derived from a Euclidean environment.

A possibility that the application of Euclidean concepts to space may still be forced on us remains. It is still possible that our interpretative faculties are such that we can do nothing with representative space other than interpret it as having Euclidean origins. Poincaré shows this not to be the case. Very simply he demonstrates that representative space could be interpreted as originating from a non-Euclidean space if different signals were to be received *from the very same sense receptors* as we use at present (*16).

This, in conjunction with the previous argument, means that the application of Euclidean concepts to space must be contingent upon the nature of the environment and cannot be known *a priori*. Indeed, the argument demonstrates that the application of *any* specific type of dimensional spatial concept cannot be known *a priori*. All that one can know *a priori* is that space is dimensional.

The fact that it is known as being of a specific type of dimensionality consequently means that some conceptual work on raw sense data has to be carried

out by individuals when they conceptualise the environment as dimensional. Poincaré demonstrates that this conceptual work necessitates the use, by the individual, of a process by which she monitors her interactions with objects in the environment. The interpretation of the material environment as Euclidean (or as any other space) requires the use of a second order monitoring device by the interpreter.

The Significance of the Debunking of Kant's Anthropocentric Naturalism

For the purposes of this essay the significance of the debunking of Kant's theory of *synthetic a priori* knowledge of the application of Euclidean concepts to space lies in the implications it has on the nature of the individual who applies spatial concepts.

In contrast with the Kantian exposition, one can use Poincaré's results to argue that the link between on the one hand, the processes by which information about the world is gathered and on the other, the interpretation by the individual of the nature of that world, must be seen as a link whose parameters cannot be determined in advance of the operation of the interpretative faculties of individuals.

The core of the debunking process is found in Poincaré's examination of the means by which concepts of space - visual, tactile and motor - can be assimilated into a notion of *representative* space. This means that there is a conceptual leap undertaken by the individual in translating the information from the senses into a notion of natural space. The assimilation of sensory information is not an automatic process.

Poincaré argues convincingly that there are conditions which have to be satisfied if the process of assimilation of sensory information is to be facilitated. These conditions turn out *firstly* to be ones which the physical

environment, in which individuals operate, has to meet: it must contain solid objects.

Secondly, there are conditions which the individual himself has to satisfy: he

- (i) must be a consciously motor-active individual,
- (ii) must have the ability to displace and deform objects, and
- (iii) must have an ability to assimilate and interpret sets of experiences which is independent of the means by which any of those of his sensations (which help to formulate the experiences) are triggered?

It is important to note that it is the *independence* of the *ability* to assimilate and interpret information from the *means* by which the information is transmitted which enables individuals to intuit separate social and natural spaces. The means by which information is transmitted generates a set of phenomena which can be non-subjectively described; they can be adequately described without making any references to the individuals involved in the transmission of information. The abilities of cognitive individuals to assimilate and interpret the same information cannot be similarly non-subjectively redescribed.

The last sub-condition (iii) is the one which forms the cornerstone of the debunking process. It also combines with (i) and (ii) and the condition which space has to satisfy, to give one a firm foundation on which to support the proposition that one can establish a demarcation between the social and material worlds; a demarcation which still permits them to interact. In the hands of either idealists/rationalists such as Kant or idealists/materialists such as Hume, the demarcation becomes a fusion. The former reduce all known operations (whether or not these are affected by conceptualisations) to the operations of the individual's rational and imaginative faculties while the latter seem willing to reduce them to the operations of matter.

PART 4: SOCIAL AND NATURAL KINDS DIFFERENTIATED

In Part 4 the areas in which the boundaries between natural and social kinds is sharply delineated will be identified. The identification of these areas will, *inter alia*, identify the areas in which the delineation is either a matter of convention or is blurred. The examination of the delineation of the boundary will follow on from a resumé and a bringing together of the arguments developed in the earlier Parts of this chapter.

The arguments in Parts 2 and 3 above lead naturally to the acceptance of the claims (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) listed below. The acceptance of the claims helps one determine the possible boundaries between natural and social kinds:

(a) any object which is *seen* as either facilitating or constraining the process of concept communication but whose operations are seen as being independent of conceptualisations, must both be viewed as a natural kind and be differentiated from social kinds;

(b) any object which is seen as being independent of the factors which facilitate and/or constrain the process of concept communication, and whose operations are seen as occurring independently of the conceptualisations of individuals, may be *deemed* either a natural or a social kind;

(c) the structure of cultural environment cannot be sustained without the operations of some objects which are deemed to be natural kinds of the type falling under the scope of (a) - this means that it must be *possible* to make some distinctions between natural and social kinds (this claim was substantiated in Chapter 1);

(d) if an individual can operate in more than one distinct cultural environment then there must be at least one natural kind of the type referred to in (c) which facilitates concept communication in all those distinct environments - this means that a rigid cultural relativism, in which it is impossible for

cross-cultural communication to occur, is untenable; links must exist between all cultural environments.

(a) If an individual can operate in more than one distinct cultural environment then there must be a social kind facilitating concept communication which operates in those several cultural environments.♦

Examples of (a) and (b)

Objects which fall under the ambit of (a) would include any object which enables one

(i) to use one's touch, eyes, nose or eardrums to sense signals,

(ii) to transmit signals which are perceivable through the use of the visual, tactile, olfactory or auditory senses.

Examples of these objects would include: vocal cords, microphones, air particles, hearing aids (from ear trumpets to electronic ones), perfumes, hands... It is also not necessary that there exist any individuals who can articulate an explanation of how such objects facilitate concept communication; it is only necessary that the objects are perceived as facilitators.

Objects which fall under the ambit of (b) would include objects whose operations are seen as neutral with regard to the *process* of concept communication. These might be objects whose *modus operandi* could in actuality be either dependent or independent of the conceptualisations of individuals, but

♦NOTE : It is possible that one might be obliged to categorise an object referred to in (b) as a natural kind on grounds which are different from those outlined in (a). There may be valid grounds which are different from the facilitation of concept communication and yet which may permit one to substantiate claims that a given set of objects comprises of natural kinds. Among alternative grounds which have been cited are the possibility of sense-perception (Kant) and the intelligibility of certain scientific practices (Bhaskar) (*17).

they will not be *conceived* to be dependent.

This point is itself independent of whether it is possible to draw a distinction between what is conceptualised and what occurs independently of conceptualisations. This means that if individuals' conceptions change, then the ontological status of some objects could change from social to natural kinds and possibly also vice versa.

Examples of these might include:

(i) the Hindu Karma (*18) - a set of structures seen as specifying the status of individuals based on the individuals' past behaviour (including that of previous lives) and determining the fortune or ill-fortune which individuals encounter.

The operations of the Karma are regarded as neutral with respect to the process of concept communication per se as well as being independent of the conceptualisations of individuals. A Hindu would probably regard it as being an example of a natural kind with statements about its operations being viewed as referring to natural facts. A non-Hindu might, by contrast, view the Karma as a social structure dependent upon the conceptualisations of the individuals through whom it is seen partly to operate.

(ii) a 'black hole' - a postulated block of mass whose molecules are conceived as being so densely packed that its gravitational attractive forces are calculated as being sufficient to pull everything including electromagnetic radiation back into itself, so that not even energy escapes its gravity. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a black hole is an imaginary entity and, as such, is a social kind. Most modern physicists would probably regard it as a natural kind - although some physicists apparently (?) exist who are happy to regard all elementary particles as conceptual entities.

Claims (d) and (e) -

The cross-cultural nature of some natural and some social kinds

The argument supporting claim (d) will be set out in a fairly systematic,

mathematical style. It rests on the conditions which need to be met if one is to make judgements about the occurrences in one cultural environment while one is operating in another. This argument will be extended, without loss of generality, to apply to the particular social kind whose operations facilitate concept communication.

Claim (d) follows directly from the acceptance of a minor amendment to claim (a). One needs to couple claim (a) with the requirement that an individual, say I_1 , retains her identity as the same individual when operating in different cultural environments. The retention of the identity in two distinct cultural environments, say CE_1 and CE_2 , carries with it the requirement that the individual I_1 can be identified as the same individual in both environments. The fulfilment of this requirement carries with it a further requirement: this being that there must be at least **two** other individuals, say I_2 and I_3 , who can also operate in both environments (*19). This means that there must be a cultural environment, say CE_{2A} , which intersects both CE_1 and CE_2 .

This third environment will be the one generated by the use of the concept which identifies I_1 as I_1 in the differing social spaces. Cultural environment CE_{2A} will encompass the operation of at least one communication facilitating natural kind, say NK_1 , such as those referred to in (d). Since NK_1 facilitates concept communication in CE_{2A} it must also do so in both CE_1 and CE_2 .

By similar reasoning a natural kind NK_2 will facilitate concept communication in CE_2 and CE_3 and natural kind NK_j will do so in cultural environments CE_j and CE_{j+1} . So if an individual I_1 can operate in CE_1 , CE_2 , ..., and CE_n then there exist natural kinds NK_1 , NK_2 , ..., and NK_{n-1} which facilitate I_1 's concept communication in the cultural environments.

But the argument goes further: for, if one can claim that I_1 retains her identity in all the cultural environments then one has to assume that there is a cultural environment CE within which one identifies I_1 as operating in all these

other environments. Since, ex-hypothesi, the environment CE is the cultural environment which is partly specified by the concept which identifies I_1 as the same I_1 , it will consist (in part) of the intersection of all the environments such as CE_1 . This means that within the social space specified by CE there will operate a set of natural kinds which facilitate concept communication in all the cultural environments CE_1 , CE_2 , ..., and CE_n .

In essence this claim rests on the notion that an individual can only make sense of claims about more than one cultural environment by placing herself in a further cultural environment. This further cultural environment is the one which encompasses both the environment concerning which the individual is making the claim and the environment in which she is operating.

Only the negation of the *possibility* of making sense of claims about more than one cultural environment would allow one to refuse to accept the argument being developed here. The ability an individual has to move from operating in a given cultural environment, such as CE_1 , to operating in such an encompassing environment, such as CE, is the same one as that which enables her to operate the second order monitoring mechanism referred to in Chapter 1. She has to be aware of her own participation in the operations of the cultural environment from which she starts in order to appreciate the she can operate in the 'extended' cultural environment.

The argument can be amended so as to apply to social kinds. It can be repeated with the substitution of a particular social kind, say SK_1 , which facilitates concept communication in cultural environment CE_1 . Every step of the argument remains valid. The argument cannot, however, be extended to apply to any social kind which affects and is affected by the behaviour of I_1 ; such an extension would break down at the stage when it is asserted that: "This means that there must be a cultural environment, say CE_{2A} , which intersects both CE_1 and CE_2 ."

It is only the 'permanent' nature of the material environment which permits

one to claim the extension of the influence of operation of a natural kind across the boundaries between distinct cultural environments. The source of the permanence was seen earlier to be the requirement that it is possible to have non-illusory experiences in a single system of time. Similarly, the 'permanent' nature of the particular social environment which facilitates concept communication enables one to claim the extension of the influence of that particular social kind across the boundaries between cultural environments. It should be noted that both arguments have as a premise the continued retention of the identity of an individual through that individual's operations in the diverse cultural environments - and these operations must involve some concept communication (*20).

The argument which has just been developed determines limitations which have to be placed on any claims to cultural relativism. Relativistic claims may consist perhaps of the notion that it is *only* by operating within a given cultural environment that one can come to understand the operations of the social kinds in that environment. However, such claims have to take into account the implications of the retention of the identity of the individual who is attempting to understand the operations of the social kinds in various cultural environments.

If it is deemed impossible for an individual to retain her identity across the boundaries of different cultural environments then the relativist claim degenerates into a dogmatic assertion with no known method of refutation. By contrast, the argument being put forward here, while also being of an *a priori* nature, states the penalties which have to be paid for denying the conclusions drawn. The main penalty would be the negation of the possibility that the corpus of knowledge could expand.

The development of justification of the claim that this penalty has to be paid is reasonably straightforward: an expansion of the corpus of knowledge would necessitate the possibility that an individual could come to know that he

can operate in a cultural environment in which he previously had not been operating - which means that he must be aware that he is retaining his identity in both the original and the changed cultural environments.

The Delineation Of The Boundaries Between Natural And Social Kinds

The examples and discussion in Part 4 have indicated that there are areas where the boundaries between natural and social kinds are distinct and others where they are blurred. There is only one area where the boundary is sharp. This is the cultural environment in which the cognitive behaviour of individuals would be unintelligible without the assumption that the operations of some particular objects were independent of conceptualisations - the area in which these objects operate must be deemed to be permanent and such that it contains natural kinds. But even here, as is seen in the case of the Hindu Karma, there is the possibility that the boundaries might blur - if the perceived ontological status of a natural kind were to alter.

PART 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

The force motivating the development of the arguments in this chapter has been the drive to determine the areas where it is possible and where it is necessary to distinguish between social and natural structures. An increased understanding of the relationship between on the one hand any such possibilities and, on the other hand the concept of what constitutes Personal Identity, provided an underlying motivating force.

The arguments have been modelled on the structure of the Kantian transcendental arguments as developed in his *Transcendental Aesthetic* and his *Refutation of Idealism* (*21). While the Kantian enterprise itself was seen to

be sound, some of the details of Kant's own exposition were found to be flawed. Further, Kant's exposition is inadequate to the task of accounting for our understanding of what he calls 'things in themselves', things which appertain to the world he characterises as 'noumenal'.

The inadequacy of Kant's exposition was seen to stem from his omission of any analysis of cognitive interactions between individuals. Kant restricts himself to an analysis of the interactions between an individual and his natural environment. The extension of the Kantian enterprise which was developed in Part 2 fills the lacuna left by Kant. The extension was seen to involve a Kantian argument which examined the conditions which had to hold if cognitive interactions between individuals were to sustain changes on the corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment.

These conditions were met only if two categories of object operated in the given cultural environment: the first is the social environment which facilitates concept communication which enjoys similar 'permanent' status to the material environment in which the individuals operated; and the second is the social environment which is 'non-permanent' - that is, such that it could be annihilated and/or may have been created without being transformed from some other object. The permanent environments were conceived as operating independently of conceptualisations. As such they were seen to operate in an objectively defined environment. The non-permanent environments were seen as those generated by the operations of those social kinds whose behaviour could not be adequately conceptualised if it was assumed that the behaviour occurred entirely in objectively defined environments.

The notions of permanence and objectivity were seen to be closely related. The possibility of distinguishing them from the notions of non-permanence and subjectivity was seen to rest on the ineliminability of the self from descriptions of the operations of social kinds. In other words holistic explanations of the behaviour of social kinds have to pay a price: they negate

the possibility that individuals can become aware of changes in the corpus of knowledge which specifies the cultural environment in which they operate.

The flawed nature of one of the details of the Kantian argument was exposed in Part 3 where Poincaré's insights are invoked to demonstrate that Kant's anthropocentric naturalism is untenable: there must exist *both* subjective *and* objective domains in human cognitive experience - even if the experience involves only interactions with material objects in a material environment.

Poincaré's argument shows that there is always a gap between the 'representative environment' and the 'represented environment' (these are not terms used by Poincaré). Since the link between the former (conceptualised) environment and the latter (existent) environment involves the activity of the individual, there must be interpretative work done by the individual when she conceptualises her interactions with her material environment. The self-monitored subjectivity of the individual is ineliminable even in the analysis of the individual's experience of her material environment.

Two points should be noted about the use made of Poincaré's arguments. Firstly, he was not concerned with the relationships between individuals and their social environments. Further, his concern with the relationship between the individual and his material environment was driven by a desire to discover the basis for the acceptability of the application of geometrical concepts. Secondly, Poincaré's own arguments rest on a tacit assumption which is explicitly stated in this essay. This is the assumption that it is possible to alter the given corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment. The very notion that what he characterises as 'representative space' exists and is not necessarily the same as material space involves an assumption that it is possible to change 'representative space' - that is, it is possible to change some aspect of the corpus of knowledge. It is the acceptance of this assumption which underpins all the arguments developed in this essay.

Conclusion

The arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 have all supported the contention that the self is ineliminable from any concept of Personal Identity. This ineliminability stems from two sources each of which is dependent upon the possibility that changes in knowledge can consciously be effected. One source is found in the structure of social kinds which sustain cognitive interactions between individuals and the other is found in the form of the cognitive interactions themselves. Each of these places a requirement on the nature of the individual and his cognitive conscious experiences.

In Chapter 4 some of the implications of the conclusions reached in Chapters 1 to 3 will be explored. This will be achieved by examining the nature of conscious experience. The reason why conscious experience is examined is that it lies at the heart of the operations of social kinds and so of the concept of Personal Identity. It will be found that the intelligibility of processes involving cognitive interactions between individuals gives one a basis for making some universal claims about the nature of persons and, *inter alia*, about the nature of some human values.

CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

"Consciousness means many things, often simultaneously, often contradictory.

Thus it may mean a state different from being asleep or in a coma;...

Consciousness may have a Freudian meaning,... Finally there is a Marxist use of consciousness. The difference between these uses of the term is that whilst most of the earlier ones are essentially static definitions of consciousness as a 'state' of being, in the Marxist sense consciousness is a dynamic force which emerges in the interaction between the individual and his or her environment."

Steven Rose *The Conscious Brain* p.33

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be concerned with the construction of the final stage of the development of the foundation for a theory of personal identity; the development will be completed in Chapter 5 along with an evaluation of some theories of Personal Identity. This final stage will consist of an analysis of conscious experience. More specifically it will consist of an analysis of a particular aspect of experience: the emotional aspect (see Addendum 1 *p.203). The importance of the analysis lies not so much in either the conclusions drawn or its content: it lies rather in the power of the form of analysis used. It will be argued that a similar type of analysis can be used to extend one's understanding of other non-cognitive aspects of experience; and through that extension, to increase one's understanding of the nature of the self.

The particular function of the emotions in sustaining the self's concept of her own identity will be highlighted. Further, and reinforcing arguments in earlier chapters, it will be seen that the self's concept of her own identity performs a central role in the development and acceptance of any notion of

personal identity.

Some of the consequences which flow from the arguments set out in the previous chapters will be explored. The focus of attention will, as already indicated, be the emotional content of experience. This focus is not chosen with the intention of either expounding or developing any theory of the emotions or of the nature of emotional behaviour. Its aim is rather to offer insights into the ways in which the methods of analysis used in this essay, enable one to increase one's understanding of the normative and/or affective domains of human activities. More precisely, the aim is to increase the understanding of the relationship between

(a) the normative and/or affective aspects and

(b) the cognitive aspects of human conscious behaviour.

These insights will enable one to develop techniques for assessing the acceptability of personal identity theories.

A central feature of the method of analysis is the use which is made of empirical findings. It will be seen that the acceptability of the premisses used and the conclusions drawn is not directly dependent upon evidence drawn from experienced phenomena. The conclusions cannot be refuted by citing empirical evidence. This does not mean that the arguments are independent of any empirical findings - nor could they be, for their subject matter is itself conscious experience. They are anchored in experience though their reliance is on possible *interpretations* of experience. The claims in this chapter rest on the incoherence of interpretations of conscious experience which would flow from the denial of the claims. It is being suggested that the grounds for rejecting a given explanation of the behaviour of a specific social kind may be more subtle than mere inconsistency between the actual and expected outcomes of the behaviour of the social kind.

In this chapter the basis for explanations of the behaviour of a particular social kind, a 'person', is sought. The method of analysis outlined

here, rather than a social scientific investigation of the properties of persons, can yield results which enable one to reject some received explanations - see Addendum 2 *p. 204.

The choice of the emotional content of experience as a focus was, however, not arbitrary. There are two factors which make it more apt than, say, the aesthetic component or the moral aspects of conscious experience. Firstly, it will be seen that, along with the cognitive content, the emotional content forms an essential component part of conscious experience. The justification for this is based on the essentially evaluative nature of cognitive experiences.

It is not easy to see how the same can be said of a moral component or even an aesthetic component of experience - pace any arguments which might establish that every social interaction must have a moral aspect or that every conscious action by an individual must have an aesthetic aspect. Indeed, it is suggested here that the extension of the argument sustaining the notion that emotion is an essential component of experience might provide the basis for suggesting that experience is also essentially moral.

The second factor is related to the first. Given that conscious experience is essentially emotional, the analysis of it is more likely - than the analysis of something which is not essentially part of experience - to be a prime mover in the generation of further understanding of the human condition. At least the analysis is more likely to be more productive than an analysis of some other aspect of experience whose status is dependent upon the prior existence of an emotional/ evaluative aspect.

The starting point will be the acceptance of the arguments developed in the previous chapters. These indicated that 'social kinds' in general and 'persons' (*1) in particular should be seen as entities with powers to bring about detectable changes. The failure to view them as such entities was seen to carry with it certain unacceptable consequences (*2). It was also indicated that the fundamental distinction to be drawn between a 'person' and a non-person

social kind is that the former, but not the latter has the ability both to monitor the operations of his own powers and to alter those powers (*3). With this starting point the core of the argument in this chapter can be summarised as follows:

Each individual possesses a mechanism by use of which she is able to initiate and sustain conscious interactions with her social and natural environments. An impulsive force which drives her to use this mechanism is needed if she is to be capable of sustaining a sense of her own identity. In this context the use of the self-monitoring device can properly be said to involve the emotions. The existence, nature and operation of the mechanism can be used to support the claim that all cognitive experiences have both emotional and normative aspects. One can conclude directly that there is always a residual aspect of an individual's interactions with others which is subjective and unanalysable.

The existence and necessity of the operation of the self-monitoring mechanism in communicable experience was established in earlier chapters. There it was seen that conscious, communicable experience has to have cognitive content. The possession of a monitoring mechanism within conscious experience which interprets the experience was itself seen as a necessary condition for the experience to have cognitive content.

The process of developing the argument will draw upon arguments from various sources but it will be concerned principally with the work of two writers: R.G. Collingwood and Sir John Eccles (*4). Collingwood's own concern was with both the emotional and the aesthetic content of experience, while Eccles' main concern is the operation of the brain. For both writers the unity of conscious experience is of prime concern.

Collingwood's work will be used as a springboard from which to develop the analysis. The limitations of Collingwood's theory will be seen to stem from his acceptance of the Humean story of the atomistic event in conscious experience - the sense datum - as the fundamental unit which he sees as forming

the basic building block from which conscious experience is constructed.

Eccles, by contrast finds himself unable to accept the atomistic story, not on any abstract philosophical grounds, but because it would run counter to the evidence gathered from research into the information processing operations carried out by the brain. This does not mean that Eccles rejects any claim for the existence of an atomistic sensory impulse, but rather that he places it in a subordinate role in the process of the construction and maintenance of conscious experience. According to Eccles, a sensory input, which might be considered by us to be a sense datum devoid of cognitive interpretation given by the individual, is absorbed by an already formed cognitive 'picture' and processed to fit into, and amend, such a picture.

In this chapter the terms '*sense datum*' and '*simple impression*' will be used to refer to sensory impulses which have been interpreted using cognitive faculties by some conceptualising individual. The *sensory impulse* consists of the result of the operations of a natural kind even if that operation is triggered by the operation of a social kind. A sense datum consists of the results of the operations of a specific social kind, viz. a 'person'. This occurs when the person interprets some sensory impulses. So the sense datum is seen, *ab initio*, as a social product. It can, in principle, be conceptualised and the conceptualisation can be communicated.

Eccles' exposition of conscious experience is the one which has underpinned the arguments set out in the previous chapters. It will be contended that the acceptance of the exposition is also necessary if one is to sustain the notion that emotional experience is possible. Further, it will be argued that, once one has accepted the possibility of the occurrence of emotional experience in an individual, one has to accept that every experience of that individual has emotional content. This means that, not only are the experiences of individuals of necessity cognitive, they are also of necessity emotional. This necessity enables one to see more deeply into the concept of

the self which each individual carries into any form of conscious experience. It is this concept which has to carry the weight of being able to sustain the causal powers of persons in particular and of social kinds in general. And it is the principal aim of this chapter, and the essay as a whole, to throw light on the nature of the interdependence of this concept of self and the social structures in and through which the self operates.

Summary Of The Argument In Chapter 4

In outline the discussion in this chapter will take the following form: the analysis will begin, in Part 2, by debunking the theory of the sense datum. It will be argued, utilising conclusions reached in earlier chapters, that the isolated sense datum is a mythical object which cannot serve as the fundamental building block from which conscious experience can be built. The purpose is to establish that the relationships between components of experience and the objects to which they refer cannot all be external. This conclusion is similar to the one reached in Chapter 3 where it was established that the individual must make a unique contribution to his experiences of the material world.

The focus in Part 3 will be on the distinction between the content of consciousness, as something which is capable of being observed, and the modifications which the processes involved in consciousness make to that observable content. Part 3 supplies the substance of the philosophical argument of the chapter. Some of the factors which can help to bring about the modifications of experience will be highlighted. These factors will be seen to include the emotional aspects experienced as well as the cognitive ones. It will be argued that the application of value terms to the cognitive aspects of experience is a necessary condition for the possibility of the development of those cognitive aspects. It will also be argued that the application of value terms supplies the basis by which to justify claims about the existence of a degree of subjectivity in the interactions between persons.

In Part 4 there will be an examination of the modification of conscious experience brought about by the emotions. This will consist of a description and evaluation of general theories of the emotions and of Collingwood's particular theory of the 'emotional charge' on experience.

Part 5 will consist of a development and a modification of Collingwood's theory. This modification will be supported by arguments which themselves rest on a specific need. The need, stemming from an individual's ability to have communicable cognitive experiences, consists of the facilitation of two tasks: the first is the continuation by the individual to sustain her own sense of identity throughout her experiences. The continuation and outcome of the experiences will remain, to her, uncertain: *should the outcome and the continuation of an experience both be free from uncertainty then the individual's need to sustain her sense of identity vanishes*. The combination of the need to sustain a sense of identity and the uncertainty of outcome of experience, highlights the importance of the notion of *expectation* in experience.

The second task which needs to be facilitated, is the assessment and/or interpretation by the individual of any aspect of his experiences. It will be argued that any assessment and/or interpretation of an experience necessitates an evaluation of the degree to which an expectation has been fulfilled. The process of evaluation, in the context of the need the individual has to sustain his concept of self-identity, must be an emotional one.

In Part 6 the various strands of the arguments put forward in Parts 2 to 5 will be brought together, outlining the impact these will have on a theory of Personal Identity. The theory itself will be synthesised in the next chapter together with a critique of other theories.

PART 2: THE SENSE DATUM THEORY DEBUNKED

The debunking of the theory of the sense datum will achieve two purposes. Firstly, it will identify some of the problems faced by an atomistic or Humean (*5) analysis of the origins and development of our understanding of our material environment, of our social environment and of ourselves. These problems pivot around the atomist's attempt to show that knowledge is built by a process of connecting ideas all of which start out as isolated from each other.

It has already been seen below (Chapters 1, 2 & 3) that unrelated ideas cannot coexist readily with the possibility that knowledge can develop. It will be seen below that atomism is restricted to unconnected sensory impulses; it does not have application in the world of interpreted experience.

There is a distinction between that part of the content of conscious experience which involves relations with material entities and that part which centres on the modifications of experience brought about by the cognitive, emotional and aesthetic aspects of an individual's make-up. It is only when examining the relationship between conscious experience and those material objects whose behaviour can impinge upon experience, that it makes sense to talk about atomistic events in experience. But as soon as one talks about *understanding* any aspect of one's experience, the atomism of any component part of experience becomes untenable. The untenability does not stem from internal inconsistencies. Rather, it accompanies the requirement that conscious experience can be part of developments which involve changes in - usually seen as reflecting growth of - understanding.

There is a second, and for the purposes of this essay, more important reason for diminishing the influence of the notion of the sense datum. It is to provide a more solid basis than the atomist's one for developing a coherent theory of the nature of conscious experience. Lying at the heart of the non-atomistic theory is the distinction drawn between a sense datum and a

sensory impulse. The debunking process is designed to achieve a double result: the establishment of the impossibility of an atomistic sense datum in experience and the relegation of the scope of atomism to examinations of sensory impulses.

The Humean Simple Impression

The isolated sense datum which somehow impinges itself either on the mind of, or into, the consciousness of an individual was seen by Hume as the starting point of philosophical investigation (*6). He was not, however, so naive as to suggest that there was no input from the individual in the formulation of conscious experience. The individual has, according to Hume, the ability to reason, to discern difference and similarity and the ability to associate ideas.

And yet Hume considers that the initial material from which all experience is constructed is the 'simple impression'.

The problem with starting with a 'simple impression' and attempting to build 'complex impressions' from them is identified in Chapter 1 above. In order to recognise a simple impression as the same one which was perceived on a previous occasion, one does not merely need to be able to discern similarity and sameness, one has to be able to follow a process of identification. As was seen in each of the previous chapters, the ramifications of the requirement that one should be able to follow such a process (which is recognisably one which involves identification) are extensive. Not least of the ramifications is the necessity to accept the existence of social structures which both facilitate and constrain the process of identification.

This does not mean that the simple impression or pure sense datum does not exist. It is theoretically possible for sense data to exist in consciousness. Indeed, if conscious experience consists of discrete rather than continuous episodes, then the simple impression must exist.

The problem for an individual, however, is not the establishment of the theoretical possibility of the atomistic interpreted experience. The problem is

rather being able to experience the theoretically constructed atomistic experience. While it is theoretically possible that experiences consist of discrete rather than continuous episodes, they cannot be experienced as such. But as well as the practical impossibility of being consciously aware of breaks in consciousness, there are some unacceptable consequences which follow from the acceptance (even if only theoretical) of atomism in experience. The proponent of the theory that consciousness consists of collections of discrete sense data would be faced with the problem of establishing cognitive relationships between sense data - while retaining their separation from each other. The cognitive relationships would have to be externally imposed on the sense data in order to preserve their discrete natures.

It seems then, that in circumstances where experience is considered to consist of discrete sense data, the possible interpretations of experience by an individual would be bounded by externally imposed cognitive relationships. The ability to expand understanding beyond the constraints imposed by the social kinds which determine cognitive relationships between discrete experiences, would be denied to any given individual. In these circumstances no individual could consciously contribute to formation of new interpretations of experience. Knowledge would be bound within the walls of the existing cultural environment, and there would not even be the means for an individual from one cultural environment to interact with an individual from another cultural environment. Such cross-cultural interactions would involve both the individuals in attempts to escape from the prisons of their respective cultural environments.

This claim consists of a special instance of the general argument put forward in Chapter 2, Part 5. There it was argued that in no single cultural environment was it possible to conceptualise all the possible operations of a person. The penalty, to be borne by the assertion that such a conceptualisation is possible, was seen to be the negation of the possibility of the existence of a learning process. A previously unrelated sense datum (to the atomist

Indistinguishable in current experience from the sensory impulse) would, when interpreted by an individual, provide an individual with the occurrence of an expansion of perceived understanding beyond its current state. So the Humean theory cannot sustain the possibility of a learning process which extends knowledge beyond its current state, yet the theory involves the assumption that such a process is operational!

(see Addendum 3 *p. 205 for an argument supporting the notion that conscious experience does not consist of atomistic events.)

PART 3: MODIFICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

In Part 3 the focus of the argument will be on the distinction between the observable contents of conscious experience and the modifications of experience. The distinction is the one which might be considered to hold between, *on one hand either*

(a) the retinal images caused when an employee reads a dismissal notice,
or (b) the neurone movements occurring in the brain while the employee is reading the notice,

and, on the other hand

either (c) the conceptualisation of the message contained in the notice,

or (d) the fear associated with the expected outcome of the result of the implementation of the redundancy notice,

or (e) the feeling of nausea which always accompanies looking at the particular notice board on account of the dirty conditions under which it is maintained,

or (f) the appreciation that one is continually driving oneself to cope with the various instructions sent by management as well as having to cope with the physical requirements imposed on one by the operation of the

machinery in the factory.

The purpose of focussing on this distinction is twofold. Firstly, it provides one with strong arguments with which to oppose those who claim that it is possible to formulate objective definitions of persons. Secondly, it enables one to pinpoint those aspects of consciousness which are needed in order for an individual to sustain a sense of his own identity.

The discussion will begin by indicating how a Humean or atomistic account of experience is inadequate. It will be argued that the atomistic account of experience does not allow one to sustain a workable distinction between the normative and cognitive aspects of conscious experience. In consequence the atomist relegates explanations of all aspects of experience to the type of explanation which is appropriate in accounting for occurrences such as (a) and (b). At least, even if the atomist does not overtly do this, all atomistic explanations of occurrences of type (c) - (g) can be reduced, without remainder, to explanations of occurrences such as (a) and (b). This leads to the breakdown of the distinction between a natural and a social kind; a distinction which was identified and justified in Chapters 1, 2 & 3 on the basis of the penalty to be paid if the distinction was inadequately made.

The Identification Of The Inadequacy Of Atomistic Accounts Of Conscious Experience

An appreciation of the inadequacy of the atomistic account of conscious experience enables one to focus on those aspects of consciousness which lead one to develop a more coherent theory of the individual. The atomist's analysis would have us believe that all aspects of experience concern themselves with phenomena. Such a belief would lead to the conclusion that all modifications of experience are themselves phenomenal and so are brought about by factors which are observable. If all the causal factors were observable then all alterations

of experience would be exogenous to the experience - *pace* any feed-back mechanism in the experience which might trigger the operation of an observable cause.

This would mean that all relationships between different aspects of an individual's experience would be external relations (see Part 4 and Addenda - below). In particular, experiences of emotions (which are seen by the atomist as alterations from one conscious state to another) are brought about by some sensory stimuli which are in category indistinguishable from other sensory stimuli. Emotional aspects of experience are, in the atomist's story, phenomena of a different type from those of visual experience, but they are still seen as observable phenomena. Consistency would seem to require an atomist like Hume to argue that the aesthetic, as well as the emotional aspects of experience also consist of observable phenomena; but this will not be discussed here.

The atomist's view does not seem to allow for an important distinction to be drawn between the various aspects of conscious experience such as those identified in Chapter 1. It is a view which seems to suggest that all alterations in the content of consciousness must be empirically based; they must be, in principle, observable. This view is one which has been consistently opposed throughout this essay. Indeed, the argument developed in Chapter 3 indicates that part of the content of conscious experience which is directly affected by sensory inputs cannot itself be completely determined by sensory inputs. There must be something intrinsic to the experience which can affect the nature of its content. The justification of the claim asserting the existence of this intrinsic power will be based on the intelligibility of the 'Bedford question' specified below (*p. 179). Bedford's own analysis will be augmented by the extension of the scope of his question. *It is the extension of the scope of the Bedford question which sustains the main argument being developed in this chapter.*

The Power To Affect One's Own Conscious States And The Bedford Question

It is the intrinsic power to affect their own conscious state (and with this to affect its own powers to interact with its environment) which distinguishes individuals capable of *cognitive* consciousness from natural kinds.

The distinction lies not in the inability of all natural kinds to induce changes in their own structures and/or properties - for some natural kinds do seem to have such abilities - discussed in Chapter 2. The distinction lies rather in the power conscious beings have to alter understanding - and with it, to alter the very fabric of conscious experience itself. It gives individuals capable of cognitive consciousness a characteristic denied to natural kinds (*see Chapter 3, Part 4). The characteristic is not present in conscious beings, such as domestic pets, which are incapable of communicating conceptualised aspects of their conscious states.

This is the characteristic which prompted GE Moore (*7) to identify the "naturalistic fallacy". He criticises the theory that that 'good' can be equated with pleasure or any other naturally occurring phenomenon. His analysis has its roots in the distinction between natural phenomena (such as the movement of electromagnetic radiation which causes one to experience colours) and the content of consciousness when an individual refers to colours (*8). Similarly, the question Errol Bedford (*9) puts to the behaviourist (who equates emotions with associated behaviour patterns) rests on the same distinction.

Bedford asks whether given emotional behaviour is appropriate or reasonable.

The intelligibility of this as a question which does not have an automatic answer shows, as Bedford argues, that there is always a distinction between observable phenomena and emotional states. The latter, but not the former, can be intelligibly described as appropriate or reasonable.

Bedford's question is reminiscent of one asked by Thomas Reid. Reid

points out (*10) that moral approbation cannot be feeling alone since one can disagree with the former and "*give no offence to a reasonable man*", yet one cannot agree or disagree with feelings.

The Extension And The Scope Of The Bedford Question

Bedford's analysis has wider applications than the rejection of behaviourist accounts of the emotions. It does more than focus on the distinction between observable and non-observable aspects of consciousness. Appropriateness is an attribute which can only be applied to behaviour if there is a subjective element to the behaviour. Further, appropriateness is an attribute which is applied *of necessity* to the behaviour of other persons by any individual who is communicating with other persons. It follows immediately that the involvement in concept communication carries with it the assumption that there is an unanalysable subjective element in the behaviour of the participants in the process of concept communication (*11). Non-subjective responses cannot intelligibly be described as (in)appropriate or (un)reasonable.

It is worth noting that the existence of a subjective element in the behaviour of persons involved in concept communication is an assumption based on the intelligibility of an *interpretation* of the nature of the process of concept communication. A claim about ontological status is being based upon epistemological considerations. This means that the ontological claim holds only as long as the epistemological considerations hold. But conversely the denial of the ontological claim (that an unanalysable subjective element operates in all persons) carries with it a denial of the epistemological considerations (that the behaviour of persons can be interpreted as (in)appropriate).

There is a deeper consequence to the extension of the Bedford question. Reasonableness and appropriateness carry with them associations of interactions and of activity; they cannot be ascribed to the static aspects of objects such as to the beauty of a painting. It is this aspect of the extension of the

Bedford question which added a further dimension to the arguments in this chapter.

The central claim in this chapter does not merely involve the assertion that there is an unanalysable subjective element in the conscious state of a person. It is rather that this subjective element is neither blind nor chaotic, that it provides a driving force for the behaviour of the individual and that it provides the basis for the individual's sense of self-identity. The argument augments and extends the scope of Bedford's analysis. Bedford's analysis seems to leave the individual's subjectivity trapped in the world of consciousness. The Humean atomist might still hold on to the possibility of an objective analysis of all behaviour and omit the unobservable world of conceptualisations from all analyses of persons - since this unobservable world need not have any impact on the observable behaviour of any natural or social kind. In other words the distinction drawn between the cognitive and normative aspects of experience, while supported by argument, is only of use if it extends from the world of consciousness to the world of observable praxis.

The Power To Cope With One's Own Environment (Bedford Question (I))

The augmentation of Bedford's argument involves the extension of the ascription of features such as appropriateness to conscious interactions between a person and her environment. If a theory of Personal Identity is to say more than a Humean one which restricts all claims to the realm of the observable, then the theory has to extend subjectivity to the realm of the individual's interactions with her environment.

The discussion in Chapter 1 provides one with the basis of the extension of the Bedford analysis. There it was argued that, in order for an individual to be able to interact with others in processes where concepts were being communicated, he has to conform to the standards of a "good-enough Individuator". The individual has to be able to slot into a role of a communicator in which he has to be both a good-enough Identifier of the other

Individuals with whom he is communicating and a good-enough user of concepts. The process by which an individual can slot into the role of a "good-enough individuator" provides one with the two platforms on which to build the extension of Bedford's analysis.

These two platforms consist of:

- (i) *the uncertainty of the individual's performance as a good-enough individuator, and*
- (ii) *the assumption made by individuals that others with whom they might be communicating are driven to attempting to cope with the uncertainties surrounding their interactions with their social and natural environments.*

As was indicated in Chapter 1, the uncertain progress and outcome of any occurrence of concept communication stems from the requirement that such occurrences need to facilitate learning processes. The second platform is built on the first. The intelligibility of one's participation in an interaction involving concept communication can only be sustained if one assumes that the individuals with whom one is communicating are somehow driven to continue to participate in the interaction.

The Drive (Bedford Question (II))

In view of the inherent uncertainty of the progress and outcome of such interactions, one's continued participation in the interaction makes sense only if one assumes that the others involved were themselves attempting to make sense of the interaction. In other words one has to assume that others are driving themselves to cope with their social and natural environments. The dropping of this assumption would prevent one from making sense of one's own participation in concept communication.

Bedford's question can now be asked of an individual's conceptualised

interactions with other individuals. *Are an individual's interactions (in)appropriate, (un)reasonable or even (un)propitious?* The application of these characterisations to conceptualised interactions is similar to their application in the case of conscious states. The intelligibility of the application leads one to conclude that conceptualised interactions must be driven, in part, by non-objective elements. For if they were driven by objective elements then asking whether they were either (in)appropriate, (un)reasonable or (un)propitious would itself be a question which did not have an automatic answer.

One is also led to conclude that there is a subjective force which drives each individual to cope with his or her environment. And finally one can conclude, on the basis of an individual's participation in concept communication, that the subjective force does not operate in a random fashion. The random operation of the force driving an individual to cope with her or his environment, would run counter to the expectations of the participants in the process of concept communication, and so render unintelligible their participation in it (*12).

The two factors, (I) and (II) (*p. 182 above) will be referred to again in Part 5 below where the need for, and the means by which, an individual can sustain a sense of his own identity is examined.

The Power (Bedford Question (III))

The importance of the power a person has over the content of her conscious states lies in the emphasis which is placed by the Bedford question on the individual's ability to cope with (rather than automatically respond to) her environment. Automatic responses cannot be intelligibly described as (un)reasonable.

The power over the content of conscious states stems from an *interpreting* function of individuals: that they are attempting to *cope* with their environments. This is the same requirement, in a different guise, as the one

which underpinned the arguments in earlier chapters, especially in Chapter 3. That earlier requirement was that the individual should have, at his disposal, the means by which he can learn.

It is worth dwelling on the points raised in these last two sub-sections.

This will be done by putting them in a situation in which it is possible to draw a contrast between a person's subjective, self-altering, driving force (with which he attempts to cope with his environment) and the self-altering, self-regulating mechanisms which drive natural kinds.

The Contrast Between Self-regulating Natural Kinds And Persons

There are two features of persons and natural kinds which make the contrast significant. The belief that the two features are present is justified, not by observation, but by the price paid in rendering acceptable the processes undertaken to investigate the properties of persons and natural kinds.

One feature of natural kinds, not assumed to be a feature of persons, consists of the existence of a stable driving force which provides a key to the behaviour patterns of the natural kind. The properties of this stable driving force, once determined, should enable one to specify the natural kind's behaviour in any given 'closed' (*13) environment.

Protoplasm may move spontaneously and might alter its structure by absorbing other matter. But, those investigating its behaviour assume it does so because it is being driven by something with stable properties. At root the investigators are attempting to determine the structure of the stable driving force.

The price to be paid, by the sacrifice of the assumption that there is such an underlying something with stable properties, is the sacrifice of the intelligibility of methods of investigating the behaviour of natural kinds (*14). These methods do not include any concept communication with the natural kind. Neither could they; for concept communication would turn the natural kind

into a Conceptualising Individual (Ch. 2 *p. 57). And concept communication carries with it the permanent possibility of a different outcome from any previously attempted similar communication.

This permanent possibility for a different outcome stems from a specific aspect of concept communication. This is the interpretation and constant re-interpretation of sensory stimuli by the participants in the processes of concept communication. It was argued in Chapter 1, Part 4, that this is the feature of concept communication which is needed if it is to be capable of performing the functions required of it. The permanent possibility for a different outcome (from the one which occurs on any given occasion) must be dropped when one accepts a theory which assumes that objective definitions of the thing being investigated are possible. At minimum the acceptance of a theory of the 'objective' person will restrict one to operating within a bounded and fixed cultural environment.

The analysis of the first feature distinguishing natural kinds from persons has already included some aspects of the second feature. This second feature has already been discussed above. It is *the appreciation that one is continually driving oneself to cope with one's environment*. It makes the distinction, outlined at the beginning of Part 3 above, which is more than just a nominal one. The argument demonstrating why it is more than a nominal distinction has already been rehearsed above, but it is worthy of a summary. There is an assumption when attempting to understand persons that, when they are conscious, they are driving themselves to cope with their environment. Without this assumption, any attempt to communicate with other individuals would become unintelligible. If there were no such assumption, no-one attempting to understand the behaviour of individuals would think it *necessary*, rather than just expedient, to communicate with the individuals.

By contrast there is no such assumption in the case of natural kinds where it is not thought either necessary or expedient to communicate with them

In order to gain understanding of their properties. The distinction between the physical aspects of experience and the cognitive, emotional and aesthetic aspects would be vacuous if it were applied to natural kinds.

The Individual's Power To Affect Conscious Interactions With His Environment Is Not Necessarily Consciously Exercised

The importance of the conscious being's power to alter both the content of her own conscious states and the course of her interactions with her environment needs to be recognised. It provides one with a criterion for distinguishing potentially adequate from inherently inadequate theories of Personal Identity. This recognition does not, however, oblige one to adhere to the proposition that the power to alter one's own conscious states and one's conscious interactions with one's environment must itself be exercised consciously.

There are at least two types of manifestation of an individual's power to affect his own conscious states. One involves the alteration of what is the focus of attention; it often operates at a conscious level. This may be achieved in various ways: by the use of the imagination to focus attention on, say, this morning's breakfast; or by altering sensory inputs by, say, the movements of one's body. The second type of manifestation operates less often at a conscious level: its operations are usually thought of as occurring at a sub-conscious level. It involves the association of meaning, emotion and aesthetic sense with the symbolic forms held in consciousness.

The first of these two types of manifestation is associated with changes in the aspects of experience exemplified by (a) and (b) (*p. 176) above. The second is associated with changes exemplified by (c) - (f), also in (*p. 176). The atomist tends to conflate these two forms of alteration of the content of consciousness. The conflation allows for the possibility of a completely objective analysis of consciousness; but it does so at a price. The price was

seen in earlier chapters to be the sacrifice of the development of new meanings.

The argument in this chapter goes one step further and substantiates the claim that the price is even higher: *It also includes the sacrifice of the individual's sense of self-identity.*

Alterations In Conscious States May Have Many Causes

Part 4 will consist of an examination of a category of theories about emotional conscious states. It will be argued that the subjectivity identified in Part 3 is compatible with the development of some understanding of the nature of conscious states. Before proceeding to this one needs to emphasise that the individual's power to alter his own consciousness is not the *only* possible source of such alterations.

What is being claimed here as essential is that a person has an unanalysable capability to alter her own conscious states and her conscious interactions with her natural and social environments. It is also being claimed that this capability needs to be recognised in the formulation of any theory of Personal Identity if the application of the theory is not restricted to a single cultural environment.

The conscious exercise of the individual's ability to affect changes in his own conscious states may not even be an essential factor in the occurrence of such changes. It remains possible that alterations in conscious states may be brought about entirely by other causes. It is perfectly possible for sensory impulses to bring about changes in consciousness. It is also possible for such an externally induced change to be induced with no conscious contribution from the conscious being whose conscious state is being altered. Further, there are good reasons to suppose that it is possible to explain fully (or at least as

fully as can be achieved by explanations of natural phenomena) the changes brought about by these other non-conscious causes of changes in consciousness. However, these externally induced changes can modify aspects of consciousness such as (c), (d) and (e) (*p. 176) only if a contribution is made by an unobservable, unanalysable, subjective component of a person.

PART 4: THE EMOTIONS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

Part 4 will consist of a brief overview of some theories of the emotions.

The final theory on which it will focus will be RG Collingwood's. His theory will be seen to be the one which, more closely than any other, is consistent with an adequate account of persons. It does justice to the requirements set by the Bedford question. It also goes a long way towards dovetailing with the requirements (outlined in Chapter 1) set by the need to sustain concept communication. These requirements were seen to necessitate the operations of social structures, which were defined in Chapter 2 and characterised as 'social kinds'.

Behaviourist, Feeling, Psycho-Analytic And Cognitive Theories

Traditional theories of the emotions can be placed in four broad categories: behaviourist, feeling, psycho-analytic and cognitive (*15). The categories are not mutually exclusive: it is possible for a theory to comprise of a mixture of, say, a behaviourist and psycho-analytic theory. The discussion in this sub-section will be concerned with psycho-analytic and cognitive theories. The inadequacies of the behaviourist theories were identified in Part 3 with reference to the Bedford question. Thomas Reid's similar question points out the inadequacies of the feeling theory on similar grounds: both behaviour and feelings are in some sense primary existences and as such cannot properly be

qualified by normative judgements.

Psycho-Analytic Theories

The proponents of psycho-analytic theories attempt - presumably not consciously! - to avoid this difficulty by placing the origins of the emotions in the unconscious. Clearly, if occurrences in the unconscious are viewed as physical occurrences then the psycho-analytic theory becomes a behaviourist theory by another name. Psycho-analytic theorists tend to recoil from propounding entirely material explanations of conscious phenomena. Such theorists view emotional states as abnormal states.

The emotional state is viewed as an abnormal conscious state. Consciousness is seen as a stream which, when disrupted, produces emotions (*16). The emotional state, being caused by a mechanism over which an individual has influence, can thus be described as appropriate. The possibility of access to the mechanism so as to alter the possible future emotional states makes the ascription of normative terms to emotional states intelligible. The intelligibility of psycho-analytic practice is built on the possibility that the individual has access to the mechanisms which influence her own emotional states; so it is not surprising to find that psycho-analytic theories involve postulates of the existence of the mechanisms.

There is something appealing about the psycho-analytic theory. It accommodates the possibility that there is a subjective element in experience; indeed, it embraces such a possibility. It is also appealing to the builder of theories of human behaviour. It makes it possible for virtually any explanation of human behaviour to work; all one needs to do is to postulate a mechanism in the unconscious which generates emotions which cause the behaviour in question. But it leaves one dissatisfied. It involves an assumption, bordering on an axiom, that it is possible to have an emotion-free experience. The emotion-free experience is seen as the 'normal' one; and the notion of a 'normal' emotion is virtually excluded *ab initio*. It will be seen that the possibilities of

emotion-free experiences and of developing objective definitions of persons are closely interlinked. It will also be argued that the ascription of the term 'normal' to conscious states as a criterion to determining whether they are emotional is misguided.

Cognitive Theories

The cognitive theories of the emotions tend to emphasise the necessity of a cognitive element in emotional experience. This is a view which can accommodate the Bedford question. It also makes the study of the emotions possible if normative predicates are to be applied to them. The individual's own perception of her own emotions becomes a required consideration of any theory. Indeed, as RW Hepburn points out, one's understanding of one's emotions is needed if one is to be able to educate them:

"Tolstoy, one can say, is emotionally educative, in that the reader is much less likely to disavow the complexities of his own emotions and insincerely suppress them; ..." (*17)

It will be argued here that a mixture of a psycho-analytic and a cognitive theory of the emotions can do justice to at least one aspect of one's understanding of persons. It allows one to encompass the possibility that a person is able to interact with others while identifying herself as separate from others. This dual ability is needed if concept communication and all the social kinds which sustain it are to operate in a way in which it is possible to gain understanding of their operations. The mixture of the cognitive and psycho-analytic theories can be found in Collingwood's analysis of the emotions.

It is with an examination of his theory that a theory consistent with the arguments in Chapters 1 to 3 will be developed.

Collingwood's Theory Of The Emotions

Collingwood's theory of the emotions probably has more features in common with a combined psycho-analytic and cognitive theory than that of any other

philosopher. He builds this combination on a theory of the nature of the self. He sees the self as having (a) a superstructure related to his thinking nature, which consists of his conscious level of experience, and (b) a psychic level of experience, related to his sensuous and emotional nature. (Collingwood's use of the term 'psychic' is technical and he emphasises that he does not intend it to infer any aspect of what are termed para-normal phenomena.) Level (b) is seen as a basic level at which emotions unfettered by a thinking consciousness operate. Emotions operate at this level but only *"those which are the emotional charges on sensa."* (*18). These emotions are incapable of expression in language yet, when operating at level (b), they operate on a level which *"has ... the character of a foundation upon which the rational part of our nature is built"* (emphasis added).

So Collingwood's perspective involves a claim that the exercise and development of an individual's reason (and through that her understanding) is constructed upon a structure which forms the basis of emotional experience. The rational and emotional are inseparable.

According to Collingwood, level (a) - the superstructure - brings with it a different order of emotions: the emotions of consciousness. Level (b) provides the individual with the raw material of experience. When the individual brings thought to bear upon this raw material he operates at level (a) and provides form to the material. As Collingwood put it:

"Thus our experience of the world in space and time, ..., which means not the world external to ourselves (for we ourselves are part of it ...) but the world of things external to one another, ..., is an experience partly sensuous (strictly, sensuous-emotional) and partly intellectual; sense being concerned with the colours we see, the sounds we hear, and so forth; and thought, with the relations between these things." (*19)

It is at this point that we begin to see the atomistic basis of Collingwood's theory. He categorises as sensuous-emotional the part of

experience which is to be found at a deeper level than the intellectual part. In this deeper level he finds the colours we see, the sounds we hear, etc... which he describes as *sensa* (*20). At the deeper level, in contrast with the Humean theory, we do not find that an emotion is one among many possible primary components of experience. If, in Collingwood's theory, emotion were a primary component of experience, the theory would fail to cross the Bedford hurdle. We find rather that in the theory all emotions are categorised as charges on experience; they somehow modify the basic components of experience and give them some sort of charge.

This means that Collingwood has to have two types of emotion: one associated with the conscious level of experience and one associated with the psychic level. The former he categorises as "emotions of consciousness", and the latter as "psychical emotions". He distinguishes the two types of emotion through their expression.

"Physical expression is the only expression of which psychical emotions are capable...; but psychical emotions are not the only ones that can be physically expressed. These 'emotions of consciousness', unlike purely psychical emotions, admit of expression in language..." (*21)

The physical expressions of emotions at level (b) are bodily reactions such as the tensing of muscles when angry, the tingling of skin areas when excited etc... It seems that these physical expressions are indicators which enable an observer to claim that the feeling and its associated emotional charge exist in the individual. As soon as the individual brings the feeling into his consciousness, or absorbs it at a conscious level, he moves from level (b) to level (a) and the emotion develops into an emotion of consciousness. Collingwood encapsulates the contrast between the two types of emotion in the statement: *"Now, a psychical emotion is the emotional charge not on a sensum but on a mode of consciousness"* (*22).

There are, here, two separate notions associated with the two types of

emotion. The concern with them in this essay pivots on the move from an emotion which is purely sensuous to one which is capable of being expressed in language.

Making this move enables one to do two things. Firstly, it enables one to give further support to the claim that persons have a sense of their own identity which is unanalysable. Secondly it enables one to substantiate the claim that experience without an emotional component prevents an individual from having a sense of her own identity; and so prevents the development of social interaction.

The fact that emotions of consciousness admit to expression in language constitutes the first of the two notions; the second, that psychical emotions are charges on a mode of consciousness.

There is a relationship between these two notions - even though it is not explicitly stated by Collingwood. Collingwood defined the conscious level as that part of experience of which thought is possible; an emotional charge operating at this level must, by definition, be capable of expression in language - *pace* any argument which claims to establish that it is possible to think without being able to express the thought in language. Collingwood's emotion of consciousness is not only brought into consciousness but it is capable of being thought about. When a psychical emotion is brought into consciousness, it becomes an emotional charge on a mode of consciousness which is capable of expression in language - it becomes an emotion of consciousness. This emotional charge on a mode of consciousness is not available to those animals which are unable to formulate concepts; such sentient beings would only be capable of psychical emotions.

As will be seen below this restriction prevents an animal from formulating a concept of its own identity. This prevents it from becoming a 'person'.

It is likely that Collingwood would accept that the relationship between psychical emotions and emotions of consciousness is analytic; but it is not

something which concerned him. His main concern was with the development of a theory of aesthetics. His concerns with the nature of the individual and with the nature of the individual's experience were necessary for the proper development of his theory. These are also central to the concerns of this essay. The three notions of (i) an emotion of consciousness, (ii) a psychic emotion, and (iii) the expression in language of an emotion of consciousness, will form the hooks on which the argument presented in this chapter will hang.

This argument, whose main purpose is to contribute to the development of a theory of Personal Identity, is parasitic upon the acceptance of a particular description of experience. The description is taken directly from Collingwood. It incorporates his analysis which sees experience as constructed on two levels: one psychic and one conscious - a distinction which has its roots in Freud. The needs of the theory of personal identity are not dependent upon a detailed acceptance of Collingwood's description of the two levels; they are met equally by an acceptance that there are at least two levels of experience - one conscious and one non-conscious. A justification of the existence of these two levels is needed if a theory based on their existence is to be rigorously supported.

(In order to preserve the flow of the argument the justification is relegated to Addendum 4 of this chapter (*p. 207). It will be seen there that the justification of the existence of more than one level of experience is itself dependent upon the presence of expectation in experience.)

PART 5: COLLINGWOOD'S THEORY EXTENDED

"For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer whether he acts as a result of natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image. Hence it comes about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes

delight in doing; since everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows... Thus nothing acts unless by acting it makes patent its latent self."
(*23)

In this brief section the discussion will commute between two notions: the first consists of the requirement that consolous, cognitive experience is of necessity ambiguous to the experiencing individual; and the second consists of the requirement that an individual has a sense of her own identity. Both requirements were seen in earlier chapters to stem from the operational needs of those social structures which are able to sustain the intelligibility of both concept communication and learning processes. The warrant which will be invoked in order to commute between the two notions is the individual's *expectation* of the progress and outcome of any given cognitive experience. The question of ambiguity in experience will be approached by examining possible ambiguity-free experiences.

Ambiguity In Experience

The possibility of the elimination of ambiguity in experience is central to the conceptualisation of experience as constituted of atomistic sensa. The experience of a sensum needs to be free from ambiguity; this is a patch of blue, or this is the sound of an E sharp. There is no room for ambiguity in the perceiver's understanding that a patch of blue or an E sharp is being experienced; it either is or is not a patch of blue or an E sharp. Indeed, the very concept of an atomistic experience is analytically (in the Kantian sense) linked to the notion of exactness.

Hume's arguments reveal that the reverse relationship also holds: freedom from ambiguity in experience is only possible when the experience consists of atomistic sensa. The attempt to move from the realm of the atomistic sense

datum into the realms of chronological and complex experiences (constructed out of sense data), obliges one to confront a Humean argument; and point out the paradox embedded in it. Hume argues that the construction of ideas out of impressions necessarily allows doubt to enter into the understanding of the perception. What he omits to discuss is the atomistic sense datum on which the construction is based. The sense datum admits of no ambiguity and so of no doubt; it is based on the enticing possibility that one can be certain of at least some perceptions.

While the possibility of certainty is seductive - it has its modern roots in Descartes' "*clear and distinct ideas*" (*24) - its achievement would only be, at best, instantaneous. As soon as experience becomes temporal and part of the mechanics of a learning process, it becomes necessarily ambiguous. The ambiguity is a feature on which the intelligibility of the search for knowledge rests. The need to communicate, which is subordinate to the individual's drive to increase her understanding of her environment, is also intelligible only on the assumption that her present understanding possesses some element of ambiguity.

Ambiguity And Expectation

The ambiguity of experience means that the chronological progress of experience is constantly accompanied by expectations of the nature of that progress. These expectations must be either fulfilled or frustrated; so the fulfilment or frustration of the expectation accompanies all temporal experience. It is either the fulfilment or the frustration which produces a *modification of experience which can properly be described as emotional*.

Since all cognitive experience contains an element of ambiguity, all such experience must be accompanied by expectations and so must be emotional. These emotions can be described as relief or even elation, when the expectation is fulfilled, and shock or disappointment when it is not. In the quotation

cited at the beginning of Part 5, Dante is focussing on the elation associated with the fulfilment of expectation and the sharpened sense of self which accompanies such fulfilment.

It should be noted that *both* ends of the commuter line (referred to above p. 190) are governed by the drive the individual has to increase his understanding of his environment. The existence of a force driving the individual to increase his understanding of his environment, has underpinned the substantiation of the claim that experience is necessarily ambiguous. The operation of such a driving force is a precondition of the possibility of the operation of the processes which govern concept communication. Without an assumption of its operation, concept communication would become unintelligible to the participants in communication processes.

The fact that you continue to talk to me is only intelligible to both of us on the assumption that we are both continually driving ourselves to make sense of the signals which we are receiving. We each assume that our experiences are riddled with ambiguity; we also assume that the other is subject to some sort of endogenous drive which pushes the other towards keeping the conversation going.

Each one of the mechanisms which initiate, as well as sustain, concept communication can only operate if the individuals involved are driven (or drive themselves) to make sense of their environments. An individual's need to understand her own environment also indicates that the possession of a sense of her own identity is not fixed. Just as there is ambiguity in experience so there must be ambiguity in the individual's concept of self which forms the basis of the experience.

The Sense Of Self

The extension of Collingwood's theory being proposed here turns on the requirement that the individual has a sense of his own identity. To the extent that a heightened, or diminished, sense of self can be expressed in language,

the emotion which accompanies it will be an emotion of consciousness.

An employee who is paid by her employer by banker's order will expect to be able to cash cheques at her bank. The continuing ability to do so, together with, say, a conversation with a bank manager to arrange a loan, will heighten the individual's sense of self. It will sharpen her sense of being an employee related to an employer who pays her regularly. Her sense of self is one which carries with it the belief that she has, and can exercise, certain powers in the context of specific cultural environments.

Similarly, the refusal of the bank to honour a cheque may lead the individual to develop a weakened sense of self. The belief in the powers she has will have been found to have been incorrect. She may even begin to question her status as an employee or perhaps the status of her employer; in either case her sense of self will be diminished.

Such an emotion of consciousness will reinforce, or weaken, the individual's sense of self within the cultural environment in which the individual is already operating. By doing so it will strengthen, or weaken, the operational mechanisms of those social kinds whose scopes of operation (*25) define the cultural environment.

There is a possibility that an enhanced or diminished sense of self may not be capable of being expressed in language. This inability may stem from two sources: an inadequacy by the individual in the understanding of his own powers and status within a given cultural environment; and a limitation of the concepts which are used in a given cultural environment to account for the powers of the social kinds which operate within the cultural environment. In either case it is not possible for an individual to express a fulfilled expectation in language; he may either be unaware of the expectations which are inherent in his experiences or he might not have the conceptual ability to express them in language. The inability might stem either from his limited conceptual framework or from an inadequately developed set of concepts which form the basis for the

definition of the cultural environment in which he is operating.

Should an enhanced or diminished sense of self be incapable of being expressed in language, then the emotion associated with the enhancement or diminution will be a psychic emotion (as described by Collingwood). The consideration of psychic emotions is relevant to at least two areas of the human sciences: psycho-analysis and sociology. Many of the processes which psycho-analysts attempt to trigger involve the change of a psychic emotion into an emotion of consciousness. One method psycho-analysts use to deal with the sorts of problems which confront a patient is to help him turn psychic emotions into emotions of consciousness so that the patient can alter his sense of self. The alteration should, ideally, lead to fewer occurrences of unfulfilled expectations and so fewer occurrences of the diminution of the individual's sense of self. The psycho-analyst's treatment is not always successful. Sometimes this is because of the difficulties involved in turning psychic emotions into emotions of consciousness. The inability to turn a set of psychic emotions into emotions of consciousness might stem from the inadequacy of the conceptual system in which attempts are made to express the emotions in language. In this case a change in the cultural environment in which an individual operates is needed; concepts need to develop which will enable emotions to be expressed in language. The understanding of these developments lies in the province of the sociologist.

The changes which occurred in cultural environments as a result of the work of social scientists such as von Hartmann, Freud and Jung enabled the development of social kinds which facilitated the turning of some psychic emotions into emotions of consciousness. The fact that this facilitation occurred does not mean that expressions in language of the emotions of consciousness are exact. Indeed, the argument in this Chapter indicates that they cannot be exact; ambiguity is present even in the means of determining that ambiguity is present.

The Normative Aspects Of Experience And The Repercussions On The Nature Of Social Kinds

The ambiguity of experience has led to the identification of the parts played by expectation and the fulfilment or frustration of the expectation. The link between expectation and the fulfilment of the expectation is made by an evaluation. This involves two processes. Firstly, each experience is pregnant with expectation of the nature and progress of the experience. Secondly, every individual is constantly evaluating the progress of his experience in the light of the expectation.

It is this evaluation which produces the confirmation or refutation of the expectation. The evaluation is the process which governs the individual's enhanced or diminished sense of self. So it is an evaluation which is dependent upon the individual's existing concept of selfhood - a concept which carries with it all the beliefs the individual has regarding her powers viz a viz both social and natural kinds - and contributes to the maintenance or alteration of the concept of selfhood and its accompanying set of values. This means that the cognitive and normative aspects of experience are inextricably interlinked; the fact-value dichotomy cannot be applied in any given cognitive experience without rendering unintelligible some aspect of the experience.

The second consequence which flows from the analysis of ambiguity in experience is to be found in the nature of social kinds. The analysis leads one to conclude that the properties of social kinds must partly be in a state of flux. It must not be forgotten, however, that the properties of social kinds are of necessity partly stable. Persons could not interact with them on a conscious basis unless they possessed some degree of stability; this claim underpins the argument in Chapter 2. This degree of stability is, however, limited. It is affected by the ambiguous nature of the concepts of selfhood possessed by each individual whose behaviour sustains the operations of the social kind. The enhancement (or the diminution) of an individual's sense of

self and the accompanying alteration of her concept of selfhood, will have an effect on her contribution to the maintenance of the powers of a social kind, and thereby affect the properties of the social kind.

Since a person is a social kind, the partial instability of his powers, *qua* social kind, has two sources. The first is the ambiguity of his own experience and the accompanying partly unstable concept of selfhood. The second consists of the partial instability of other individuals' concepts of their own selfhoods. Both sources lead to the instability of the person's powers as exercised through the behaviour of those social kinds whose operations are sustained by him and other individuals.

The Need For Evidence

Should it be the case that individuals manage to communicate without satisfying the conditions outlined in Parts 2 - 5, some of the premisses of the arguments set out there will have to be shed. Of these, the principal one is the assertion that communication processes can be the proper subject matter of an investigation and that they can be understood by the individuals who use them. But if one were able to substantiate a claim that individuals manage to communicate without satisfying the conditions set out in Parts 2 - 5, one would *ipso facto* be asserting that communication processes were capable of being understood - since one would be making a claim about a communication process. So any attempt to refute the claims made in Parts 2-5 would be parasitic upon accepting the main premise from which the arguments flow. The premisses of the arguments are, in this sense, immune from the attacks from possible contrary evidence.

The same is not true of all the conclusions. The claim that experience is always accompanied by expectations of their outcomes is dependent upon particular requirements placed upon conscious experience. Principal among these requirements is one which stipulates that conscious individuals should possess

the properties of 'persons' outlined in Chapter 2 - the foremost of which is the ability of the person to monitor her own conscious activities. The other conclusions drawn are supported by similar arguments. So both premisses and conclusions gain acceptability independently of empirical evidence. They are accepted or rejected on the basis of one's willingness to sacrifice the possibility that one could attempt to understand certain specified human activities.

The arguments and conclusions drawn are independent of the need to be supported by empirical evidence. But the existence of any empirical applications of the theory developed from the arguments would render them more acceptable. They would not be left hanging in an abstract world like some abstruse theory in Topology. Such empirical application is found in brain physiology (*26).

PART 6: CONCLUSION

In this chapter the importance of the subjective aspect of the self has been established. This has been achieved by focussing on the *uncertainty* which must form part of each cognitive experience. The uncertainty forms part of cognitive experience in order to make room for the operations of learning processes. This means that the arguments in the chapter need not be accepted by someone who claims that there can be a specified limit to the possible number and interpretations of concepts. The unacceptable consequences which flow from such a claim were outlined in Part 3. There it was pointed out that cognitive interactions between individuals were only intelligible to the participants of the interactions if each assumed that the other was driven, or driving himself, to cope with his social and natural environment. The acceptance of the existence of such a driving force is itself only intelligible if it is assumed

that the individuals' understanding of their environments is always inadequate. Simply put, individuals do not understand everything and have a need to try to understand everything.

The rejection, in Part 2, of the atomistic analysis of conscious experience was justified by referring to the possibility of expanding understanding beyond the boundaries set by the existing cultural environments. The uncertainty of the nature of experience was seen in Part 3 to lead to the requirement that each conscious experience be evaluated by the experiencing individual. This evaluation necessitates the existence of subjective elements in all cognitive interactions between individuals. It was established that *a person has an unanalysable capability to alter his own conscious states and his conscious interactions with his natural and social environments.*

In Part 4 the ground for the final part of the argument was prepared. The nature of some emotional aspects of experience was examined. Since subjectivity is central to conscious experience and so to the formation of concepts, the way in which individuals react to their own experiences must also be central to the formation of concepts. The cognitive and emotional aspects of persons cannot be separated. These aspects were seen, in Part 5, to be linked together by the phenomenon of *expectation*, a phenomenon which is present in all cognitive experience.

In Part 5 the function of the phenomenon of expectation was investigated. It was established that it is present in all cognitive experience. This was achieved by an assessment of (i) the ambiguity which accompanies all those conscious experiences which have the potential to alter knowledge and (ii) the development of the individual's concept of, and sense of, her own selfhood. Both (i) and (ii) are notions which have been established as being central to discussions of Personal Identity in this and previous chapters.

The arguments in this chapter have determined the sacrifices which have to be made if one is to support the claim that an objective definition of the

self is possible. They have also established that there is an unbreakable connection between the affective and the cognitive domains of human activities. The conclusions drawn here will now be amalgamated with those of earlier chapters in order to tie together the strands of the theory towards which all the arguments have been leading.

Addendum 1 (from *p. 166) Other Areas Of Human Activity

There are two areas of human activity to which no allusions have been made: those areas concerned with meaning and those with value. Throughout this essay the references which have been made have been to an individual's interpretations of her experiences. These necessarily involve the ascription of meaning ; so any notion of conscious experience is seen here as analytically (in the Kantian sense) related to some conceptualisation of the ascription of meaning. There is, here, no intention to investigate the nature and influence of this analytic relationship.

Any notion of conscious experience includes in it the notion that the experiencing being is ascribing meaning to images and/or symbols which refer to objects which are distinct from the images/symbols. This, despite the fact that an individual is also capable of bringing into experience conceptualisations of the very images and symbols which form part of the experience.

Similarly, questions about the norms and values which govern conscious experience and which might be accepted, reformulated, modified or challenged by individuals will not be directly answered in this essay. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to show that the general methodological approach followed throughout the essay (and outlined in Chapter 3) is likely to produce some understanding of matters concerned with meaning and value which might otherwise not have been produced. It can readily be seen that the fact/value dichotomy (*27) cannot get off the ground if one accepts the rather Kantian methodology

adopted in this essay.

Addendum 2 (from *p. 168) The Restrictive Nature Of Philosophy Which Ignores The Analysis Of Social Phenomena

Some twentieth century strands of Anglo-Saxon Philosophical thought have tended to concentrate on the analysis of language and its use. The empirical hook on which such an approach hangs its credibility is the consistency of the analysed structure with observable phenomena - presumably the observable phenomena are described in terms used in the language which is being analysed. This approach might, however, not be sufficiently rigorous. A particular analysis of a given linguistic structure may be logically consistent with all observed examples of the use of the system but may render unintelligible a specific activity which does not directly involve the system's use.

For example, a less than adequate analysis of a primitive language might indicate that its use is restricted to the time when the language is being used; the language might function without linguistic distinctions between past present and future events. The observation of linguistic acts might not provide any counter-examples to the theory that the linguistic structure is restricted to what we describe as the present tense. However, the observed behaviour of a farmer who decides to protect the farm against a flood on being told that dark clouds are in the sky when the sky is patently clear, indicates that there is a mechanism within the social structure for distinguishing future from present events.

The inadequacy of the analysis of the primitive language would not be discovered if all empirical observations were restricted to occurrences of the use of language.

Addendum 3 (from *p. 175) Conscious Experiences And Atomism

If conscious experience is taken to consist of discrete episodes the

expansion of knowledge and/or understanding beyond its present bounds would necessitate the existence of a previously unrelated sense datum. A problem arises here about the nature of conscious experience in which it is possible to be consciously aware of two cognitively unrelated sets of sense data. In order to sustain the unity of conscious experience as well as the theory that experiences are only contingently linked to each other, the positivist must claim that sense data is cognitively unconnected save by the conceptual link formed by conscious experience. This indicates that the positivist's conception of experience must be such that the sensory impulses, but not the sense impressions - even the simple ones - must consist of discrete events. (The positivist will usually also make a similar claim about the nature of environment from which sensory impulses emanate; the implicit assumption being that discretely connected sensory impulses can only originate from discretely connected phenomena. This assumption is clearly not one which one is forced to accept.) So, if the positivist wishes to make sense of the individual's apparent ability to learn how to operate beyond his previously limited experience, then she must assume that there are cognitive connections, made by the individual, between all the simple impressions which are present in the individual's conscious experience. This means that the existence of the sense datum with all its relations being external relations is a myth.

One consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth is a realisation that the learning process cannot be one which is entirely externally induced. Since the learner has to formulate the cognitive link between even already interpreted sensory information, the teacher is restricted to providing the information and attempting to facilitate the formulation of the link.

A second consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth is the rejection of the insistence that all aspects of experience need themselves be sensory. Once one accepts that relations between 'impressions' can be internal relations one allows for the possibility that experiences can be qualified or

modified by, say, emotion or æsthetic sense or even by further cognitive interpretations. One does not have to be incarcerated in the Humean prison where all component parts of experiences are impressions. It is this consequence which provides the motivation behind the examination of the atomistic myth identified in this chapter.

A third consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth is the release from the positivist's inability to distinguish what Kuhn (*28) has termed 'normal' from what he termed 'revolutionary' science. A Kuhnian 'normal' science operates in a given 'cultural environment', while 'revolutionary' science breaks out and formulates a new cultural environment. For the positivist no changes in understanding can consist of 'normal' changes since all changes take one to new levels of understanding; as such they are indistinguishable from 'revolutionary' changes.

Addendum 4: (from *p. 193) Experience Constructed On More Than One Level: A Justification

The notion that mental experiences consist of more than what occurs at a conscious level was developed by Freud (*29). It was, however not a new notion in Freud's time so his contribution to knowledge in this area were developmental rather than innovatory. His principal contribution consists of the construction of two edifices. The first is a philosophical argument which substantiates the claim that there exists a structure in which non-conscious events occur which can properly be termed mental. The second is a comprehensive package consisting of

- (i) a theory which explains interactions between the conscious and non-conscious aspects of mental life together with
- (ii) a means of testing the theory and applying the results obtained from it.

The philosophical argument is a powerful one (*30). It supports the analysis which sees experience as consisting of actual and potential processes. This 'powers' or 'tendency' analysis of conscious experience plays a pivotal

role in the development of the arguments in Chapter 3 above. It is of direct relevance to the acceptability of those arguments. The importance of Freud's provision of a theory of the un- and pre-conscious is, by contrast, oblique. It is not the acceptability of his theory which is important: indeed, there is a strong debate among philosophers and psycho-analysts about its acceptability! What is important is that Freud established firstly that the construction of such theories is an intelligible activity, secondly that it was possible to find intelligible applications of the results of such a theory. He established the study of the mentally non-conscious as a branch of recognised science. He achieved this by demonstrating that the study of the mentally conscious is incoherent without an assumption that the mentally non-conscious can influence the mentally conscious.

A CRITIQUE OF THE DEBATE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of this chapter serve a dual function; they both introduce the arguments set out in this essay and provide a conclusion for them.

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter two tasks will be carried out. In the first of these, to be developed in Part 2, the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 will be brought together and synthesised into a coherent basis from which a theory of Personal Identity could be constructed. The acceptance of this basis will involve the reader in accepting a relocation of the current debate on Personal Identity. Within the scope of this relocation the second task will be carried out in Parts 3 and 4. In Part 3 the issues raised in Part 2 will be brought together to show how the concept of a person may be developed. This will lead, in Part 4, to a critique of some current and traditional theories.

Bringing together the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 will enable one to focus on the main principle which has underpinned those arguments. It is the acceptance of this principle which leads to the relocation of the debate on Personal Identity. The principle was not explicitly stated until Chapter 2, Part 1:

The identity of the self is not a specific instance of some general notion of identity, but general notions of identity rest upon an already existing grasp of the notion of Personal Identity. ...(P1)

It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay have themselves ratified the principle which underpins them. This means that any theory of Personal Identity is built on the somewhat paradoxical proposition that the

concept of identity is logically posterior to the concept of Personal Identity; in other words Personal Identity and non-person Identity are distinct types of concepts which need to be analysed differently.

It will be shown that the arguments in the previous four chapters have demonstrated that the paradox is unavoidable; indeed, one of the few certainties when dealing with questions of identity is that this particular paradox is unavoidable. The source of the paradox is found in the relationship which exists between individuals and social structures - the social structures being those which operate in the cultural environments within which concepts of identity are developed. It is this relationship which lies at the centre of the relocated debate on Personal Identity.

The paradoxical nature of the subject-matter is derived partly from the conceptual constraints imposed on it by the methods of analysis - methods which cannot but affect the content of the analysis. The methods of analysis are interlinked with the medium within which the analysis is developed. The medium within which any analysis is developed is language. By its nature language is one-dimensional. Sounds and/or words are used sequentially in analysis in order to encapsulate an idea. During any one utterance only a single element is captured so that the multi-faceted nature of the subject-matter may elude one because of the single-faceted, uni-dimensional nature of the means of analysis. The analysis is often forced to invite one to use some of one's own second-order interpretative faculties in order to achieve a multi-dimensional perspective of the subject-matter (see note (*1) of Ch. 1).

Analysis using language operates according to a model by which one starts with a proposition and moves logically onto further propositions. It therefore militates against the very notion that a principle can both ratify and underpin a set of ideas. This limitation of 'linear' analysis may also give an indication why some writers on philosophical issues, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, have taken to writing novels where each idea will contribute a brush stroke to a

large canvas - a canvas which cannot be seen by focusing either on single or on sequences of brush strokes. Such an approach indicates a desire to relocate the debates in which such philosophers are participating.

Accompanying the acceptance of the relocation of the debate on Personal Identity is an alteration in one's perspective of what constitutes a comprehensive theory of identity. The alteration in perspective arises from the acceptance of principle (P1).

Part 4 of this chapter will consist of a discussion showing how the understanding gained from adopting the perspective being advocated here can be used to form a critique of some of the current, and traditional, theories of Personal Identity. In criticising other theories the objective is not to denigrate them. The purpose is rather firstly to identify their strengths and weaknesses, and secondly to show how they might be amended in order to cope with the requirements which the discussion in this essay has exposed. The identification of their strengths and weaknesses will assist in the determination of the limits of the scope of application of such theories. The determination of these limits will also give an indication of the nature of the amendments which have to be made if the theories are to cope adequately with the requirements which flow from attempts to render certain social interactions such as concept-communication intelligible.

A comprehensive critique of all known theories will not be attempted. The focus will rather be on a few arguments which have particular characteristics and upon some arguments which represent certain traditions. While such a seemingly limited critique may seem restrictive, it has the merits of focusing on certain traits which are representative of particular breeds of Personal Identity theories. As such, the acceptance of the critique will enable one to apply the criticisms to all theories belonging to the given breed.

Breeds of theories may be classified under various headings. Classification

under the same heading may either be achieved through noting the adherence by the proponents of a given group of theories to a particular method of analysis or be achieved through the agreement of the conclusions which are drawn by the proponents of the theories.

The critique will start by showing that the genre of argument, in which thought experiments involving either identity fissions/fusions or brain/neurone transplants are invoked, all suffer from a common defect. This consists of the tacit acceptance of two assumptions: firstly, that individuals are being defined in a stable cultural environment where the meanings of concepts (and thereby the effects of the use of those concepts in given social environments) are fixed; secondly, that the individuals are being defined in an equally stable natural environment - an assumption which their very arguments often contradict! The use of this genre of argument does not seem to allow for the possibility that invoking the thought experiment may alter the parameters which determine the boundaries of the cultural and natural environments in which the investigation into Personal Identity is being carried out. By contrast, the strengths of such arguments may lie in their power to sharpen one's understanding of some concepts, including the concept of Personal Identity, in specified stable cultural environments (*1).

A detailed critique of Lucas' 'Gödel' argument will be developed - not entirely because of the contribution his argument may have made to the debate on the strengths of Personal Identity theories. The motive is rather to put a spotlight on the hook on which Lucas hangs his argument: the notion of self-reference. The focus in this chapter will be on the differences between two uses of self-referential functions: their use in arguments about the nature of abstract structures, and their use in the applications of processes which involve changes in conceptualisations.

Following this there will be an examination of one traditional theory of Personal Identity: the memory theory. This theory may be considered to be

representative of all those theories in which attempts are made to find the criteria of the identity of persons. The main weakness of such theories will be identified in the examination and the conclusions extended to other 'criteria' theories. It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay show that 'criteria' theories suffer from a weakness; a tendency to ossify concepts in any cultural environment, leading to the possible negation of the possibility that changes in the corpus of knowledge could be effected.

In the final sections of Part 4 two brief critiques will be carried out. In the first a set of theories which comprise variants of the main position being adopted in this essay will be examined. These theories all support the claim that the self is an unanalysable entity, or at least that there is an unanalysable aspect of the self. It will be seen that the arguments set out in this essay support the main tenets of the position supported by these theories. The arguments also identify significant areas of analysis which proponents of the theories have tended to ignore, leaving the theories liable to criticisms which they might otherwise rebut.

The second critique will involve an examination of the analytical approach which involves the use of possible worlds. The main proponent of this approach to analysing modal aspects of human activities has been Saul Kripke. It will be seen that the analysis in this essay falls under the umbrella of possible world analysis, while taking into account some criticisms which have been made of the 'possible world' approach (*2).

PART 2: A FOUNDATION FOR A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY (summarised)

The Contexts In Which Theories Of Personal Identity Arise

The investigation in this essay started with an examination of the contexts

in which questions of Personal Identity arise. The emphasis placed here on the relationship between the concept of a person and the contexts in which the concept is developed and used places this investigation outside the current mainstream debate.

The contexts in which the concept of a person is developed and used are those in which concept-communication occurs. Without the interactions involved in concept-communication there is no need for the question of the identity of individuals to concern any given individual. Further, any enquiry into the subject must occur in such a context. This means that, *ab initio*, there is an assumption in this essay of the irrelevance of any identity theory which can be formulated without an analysis of the interactions between individuals. Concepts of the identity of individuals developed in so-called private languages are excluded from this enquiry (see Chapter 2 note (*35)). No apology is made for this exclusion, nor should one be necessary, especially if one is attempting to communicate the results of one's enquiries to others.

The need to consider the context in which individuals interact does not stem solely from the intelligibility of communicating the results of one's own enquiries to others. The need stems also from the nature of the communicative processes themselves. These processes were seen, in Chapter 1, necessarily to incorporate operations involving individuation. The implications which flow from this necessity formed the cornerstone on which the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 were built.

The operations which involve individuation must be carried out by the participants in communicative processes. Each participant must also have some means by which to judge whether *all* the participants are employing individuating processes *adequately* - he must be capable of assessing whether any putative communicator is a *good-enough individuator* (see Ch. 1 note (*22) and *p. 36). The argument in Chapter 2 showed that the acquisition of the capability to assess putative communicators is itself only possible if an individual has the

opportunity of being a third party witness in a communicative process between other individuals - the individual must be capable of developing a notion of the *social* context in which she is operating. Binary interactions alone cannot form the basis of a changing cultural environment since binary interactions alone cannot sustain the assimilation of evaluative processes (*3). In other words an individual cannot become a member of the set of persons who sustain the social kinds which define a cultural environment solely by becoming involved in one to one interactions - he must have some notion of the general context in which interactions occur. If the individual is restricted to interacting on a one to one basis with a single other individual then the abilities of the individual, which enable him to become a social being, dissipate; and this dissipation is accompanied by the individual's inability to sustain a concept of his own identity.

The requirement that the individual should be able to assess the adequacy of participation in processes involving individuation means that *evaluative* procedures are built into the very fabric of interactions between cognitive individuals. They must consequently also be built into the processes whereby the notion of identity is used. The individual's subjectivity cannot be divorced from the operations of processes involving individuation. This means that the application of the concept of identity is not value-free. Further, the operation of an evaluative procedure carries with it the need for the existence of some other person/s who is/are not participating in the interactions between the two individuals. So the context in which an interaction occurs is, of necessity, always wider than the one in which the interaction itself can be perceived by its participants.

The Requirements Generated By The Studies Of The Contexts In Which Persons Operate

It becomes clear that the examination of processes involving individuation

generates a need for a close analysis of the nature of the contexts in which interactions between individuals occur. This does not vitiate the need for the analysis of other more commonly analysed aspects of the individual's behaviour and characteristics. On the contrary, the need for at least two other investigations is itself generated by the examination of the contexts in which individuals interact. The necessity for an examination of the role played by the *agency* of the individual is sharpened by the requirement that interactions involving processes of individuation are analysed. Further, the necessity for the examination of the role played by the *judgement* of the individual is more poignant in this relocated debate than in the traditional scenario.

In many of the traditional forms of analysis, the individual's agency, and the use of her judgement, are often treated as objective phenomena. Attempts are made to find criteria by which one might identify an individual as being the same individual who was identified on a previous occasion. Such an attempt must rely on the identification of aspects of the individual's behaviour to find the criteria. In this 'traditional' scenario, the role of the judgement of the analysed individual is relegated to that of a postulated, observable, causal factor which is thought to have a given effect on the behaviour of the individual. A similar, objectified, analysis of agency is offered.

There are four main reasons why, in the relocated debate on Personal Identity, there is a more poignant need to analyse the roles of the judgement and of the agency of an individual. The four reasons flow directly from the focus of the relocated debate; this focus being the interactions between individuals. These interactions can only operate with an acceptable degree of success if at least four needs are met: *firstly*, there is the need that interactions between individuals should occur in relatively stable environments (identified in Chapter 1 and analysed in Chapter 3); *secondly*, the need for evaluative procedures to be built into the fabric of interactions between individuals (identified in Chapter 1 and analysed partly in Chapter 2 and in

detail in Chapter 4); *thirdly*, the requirement that an individual should interpret the signals which represent concepts in the cognitive interactions between an individual and the objects he finds in his environments (identified in Chapter 1 and discussed throughout the essay); and *fourthly*, the requirement (specified in Chapter 4, Part 5, and also discussed throughout the essay) that a person needs to be able to form a sense of self if she is to be capable of interacting with others.

The process of meeting the requirements produced by the need to make interactions between individuals intelligible generated certain *a priori* requirements which any concept of a person has to satisfy. These processes started by identifying two distinct environments in which persons operate and by indicating the distinctions between the natures of the objects which operate in these environments. The process of meeting the four requirements also included the identification of some of the characteristics which persons and their environments have to possess if the two environments are to sustain intelligible, cognitive interactions between individuals.

The Social And Material Aspects Of The Context Distinguished

The argument in Chapter 1 showed that there were two aspects of the context in which communication occurs which have to be distinguished by communicating individuals. Each of these consists of structures which facilitate the processes of communication. The individual has to be able to differentiate between two types of object (and/or structure) which facilitate concept-communication. She has to be able to differentiate between objects and/or structures whose operations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of individuals and those whose operations are not. These structures were characterised as 'social' and 'natural' respectively.♦

♦ NOTE: The term 'natural' has only been used here because of its widespread

It was noted, also in Chapter 1, that an individual has to be capable of operating both sets of structures in order to participate intelligibly in concept-communication. Since the intelligible participation in concept-communication is a necessary condition for the proper ascription of the status of 'person' the relationships between, on one hand, individuals and, on the other hand, social and material objects (operating in contexts in which concept-communication occurs) have to be investigated in order to gain a reasonable understanding of the nature of the identity of persons.

The Social Aspects Of The Context And The Impact Of Changes In Knowledge

(1) Changes In The Social Context

The objects whose operations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of individuals were characterised in Chapter 2 as 'social kinds'. A detailed itemisation of the characteristics of social kinds was not offered; compiling such a taxonomy is seen as the task of the social scientist. Further, the scope of such a taxonomy would be restricted to the cultural environment in which it was formed. The philosopher's task is viewed as the specification of the *a priori* features of objects while giving an indication of the source of the *a priori* nature of the features. The characterisation of the 'social kind', found in Chapter 2, is the result of pursuing the philosopher's task. The ascription

♦ acceptance. Where possible preference is given to the term 'material' since this does not have as many value-loaded implications as does 'natural'; the latter term, if contradistinguished from 'social' tends to indicate that what is social is somehow not natural. The terms 'social kind' and 'natural kind' are used in two distinct ways throughout this essay; they are used either to refer to *types* of object which are either social or natural or to refer to examples of such objects. The context of each use of the respective term will suffice to indicate which use is intended.

of properties to a specific set of social kinds is the task of the social scientist. The characteristics of the social kind as specified in a philosophical enquiry need not be context-specific. In examining the contexts themselves in which social kinds operate a similarly logical, non-context-specific perspective is taken.

To this end a social kind is viewed as an object whose operations are dependent, in some way, upon the conceptualisation of at least one individual. The social kind must have some enduring properties; and the operations of the mechanisms which possess the enduring properties must be such that they can be consciously experienced (discussed also in Chapter 3). "Conceptualising individuals" are necessarily embraced by the notion of a social kind since the operations of a conceptualising individual are dependent at minimum upon the individual's own conceptualisations - and communicable conceptualisations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of individual.

The context in which a person operates needs to be seen as more than the 'social space' in which he finds himself; it consists of more than the locations in which conceptualisations of, and by, the individuals with whom he interacts can be altered. The context in which a person operates has to be examined also in terms of the operational parameters of those social kinds whose operational mechanisms the person helps to sustain.

The context in which a person operates could consist of, say, the cultural environment defined by the use of the French language. The fact that the individual also helps to sustain the operations of the French monetary system needs to be taken into account when considering the context in which the person operates. The person's own conceptualisations help to specify the boundaries of the cultural environment as well as helping to sustain the operational mechanisms of the French monetary system.

Both features of the context in which persons operate need to be considered when attempting to form a concept which can adequately be used to identify a

person. In other words the dual role of a person has to be considered; the role of the individual who interacts with others, by using concepts, in a given social environment and the role of the individual who sustains the social structures which help to specify the boundaries of the given social environment.

However, it is not the reciprocal relationship between the concept of a person and the structure of the person's environment alone which provides the basis for the justification for the claims made in this essay. This basis centres on the possibility that one can alter any individual's understanding of the operations of objects in general and of social objects in particular; in other words on the possibility that teaching and learning *about matters affecting cognitive interactions*, can occur. If such learning processes are to be permitted to operate then the boundaries of cultural environments cannot be fixed - for such learning alters the social behavioural properties of persons and so may alter the operations of the social kinds which that behaviour sustains. Two consequences were seen to flow from the relationship between the operation of learning processes and the nature of the boundaries of cultural environments. The first consequence was identified in Chapter 2 and the second in Chapter 4.

The first consequence concerns the possible natures of cultural environments. While some cultural environments may have properties which justify their being termed social kinds, not all cultural environments can be social kinds. In particular 'society' cannot be considered to be a social kind.

'Society' does not have properties, only the social kinds operating in society do; yet society can only be defined in terms of the scope of influence of a set of social kinds which operate through the use of a set of concepts by a given set of individuals. In other words society consists of a 'social environment' which is also a 'cultural environment' but it does not possess causal properties. ('Social' and 'cultural' environments were distinguished in Chapter 2 as being generated respectively by the operations of social kinds and by the

uses of a given set of concepts.)

The second consequence concerns the properties of social kinds in general, and persons in particular. The **absence** of mechanisms whose use promotes learning about the operations of social processes would have the effect of ossifying the properties of social kinds. It is an effect which would make the need for concept-communication redundant. The redundancy is consequential upon the intelligibility of concept-communication. The intelligibility depends upon the operation of a double driving force: one which pushes an individual to alter the conscious experiences of another individual; and one which pushes the individual to attempt to make sense of his environment. Each aspect of this dual driving force relies on the existence of the possibility that individuals can change their own understanding of their natural and social environments.

The alteration of conscious experiences of a person alter that individual's state of understanding of her environment and so alter her behavioural properties. This would at minimum alter the properties of one social kind. However, the alteration of the properties of a person may alter the properties of all those social kinds whose operations are partly sustained by the conceptualised behaviour of the person. So the absence of a learning process carries with it the consequence that no social kind's properties will alter - in other words that social change is impossible.

The converse of this claim is not necessarily true. The existence of learning processes does not guarantee social change. Learning processes may be structured so that the effect is to change individuals in the social group while leaving the structure of the group unaltered. The social group would operate in much the same way as does a beehive with ageing bees altering their functions and properties in order to restrain the balance between worker and non-worker bees.

(II) Changes In The Non-Social Context

Objects whose operations are conceptualised as independent of the

conceptualisations of individuals were characterised as 'natural kinds'. The conceptualisation of some objects whose operations are independent of conceptualisations was seen in Chapter 1 to sustain the intelligibility of concept-communication. The participants in concept-communication can only make sense of their interactions if they conceptualise their environments as being affected by the operations of both natural and social kinds.

There is, however, a paradox associated with the very notion of the natural kind. The process of encapsulating and retaining a concept in consciousness must affect consciousness. This means that the very process of bringing a natural kind concept into consciousness seems to have the effect of turning the natural kind into a social kind: the operations of the natural kind have indeed affected the conceptualisations of at least one individual.

This paradox is an unavoidable aspect of conceptualisation processes. It must always colour any claim regarding the independence of explanations of the behaviour of natural kinds. But it is a paradox which must be faced if sense is to be made of interactions between individuals - not least by the individuals themselves. This is achieved by amending the notion of a natural kind. The amendment involves restricting the independence of the operations of natural kinds to only one aspect of causal processes connected with conceptualisations: the operations of natural kinds may be interpreted as affecting but not being affected by the conceptualisations of individuals. So a natural kind concept will refer to an object whose behaviour is interpreted as remaining unaffected by the conceptualisations of any individual - yet whose behaviour is seen as affecting conceptualisations.

Objects, such as brain cells, whose operations facilitate conceptualisation present a problem. One might ask whether a neurone could properly be called a natural kind. If so, then can the brain be a natural kind? The specific answer to either of these questions is one which an investigation of their behaviour may reveal. However, the notion that *all* objects can be viewed as natural kinds

cannot be sustained without making the process of concept-communication senseless to the participants in the process.

Conceptualisations Of Agency And The Interpretations Of Environments

The operations of individuals in their social and material contexts cannot be examined adequately without an analysis of the role played by the agency of individuals. The reactions of an individual to the constraints imposed on her behaviour by the operations of other objects in her environment have to be examined if an adequate understanding of what it is to be a person is to be gained. These reactions result from a triple combination of factors: (I) the individual's interpretations of the sensory information which is affected by both the behaviour of social and material objects and the structures of the material and social environments; (II) the individual's perception of his power to affect changes in the behaviour of social and material objects; (III) the individual's motivation and/or reason for interacting with her environment.

(I) The Individual's Interpretations Of Sensory Information

The restrictions which are placed on an individual's possible *interpretations* of the environment are not as severe as is sometimes assumed. In neither the material nor the social environment is the individual constrained to only a single interpretation of experienced phenomena. Contrary to the claims of philosophers in the Kantian tradition, the possible interpretations of the nature of material environment are not restricted to those of Euclidian geometry. The structure of the material environment and the structure of the individual's sense perceptors do not combine to restrict the possible interpretations of the structure of material environment to that of a Euclidian three-dimensional world.

As is shown in Chapter 3 above, the liberating factor (underanalysed by Kant) is the conceptualised agency of the individual. It was argued there that, since they occur in temporal dimensions, agency and conceptualisations can

interplay with objects whose dimensionality is non-temporal to enable individuals to generate a virtually infinite set of possible interpretations of natural phenomena. This is not to say that any interpretation is possible from a given set of sensory stimuli which result from the behaviour of a given set of objects in a given environment. There may be only a restricted range of feasible interpretations of the given phenomena; but one cannot infer anything specific about the nature of either the individual or the environment by examining the restrictions imposed upon the interpretative faculties of individuals. Those interpretative faculties cannot be finitely constrained without the payment of a price. This payment involves the sacrifice of the intelligibility of attempting to alter the corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment.

The content of this large set of possible interpretations is, however, itself subject to some constraints. The constraints are imposed by at least two types of social kind: those which facilitate concept-communication and those which facilitate concept-development, or learning processes. The restriction of our interpretations of natural phenomena to three Euclidian dimensions is therefore at least in part social rather than, as Kant would have us believe, material. Social animals also have the power to alter their interpretations of natural phenomena. There is no reason to suppose that any interpretation, along with the one currently accepted of natural phenomena and/or processes, is also entirely constrained, in some Kantian fashion, by natural processes.

Individuals possess a similar type of constrained freedom to interpret the social environment. The dimensionality of the social environment is not, however, non-temporal. The boundaries of social space are specified by the possible extent of the cognitive experiences of individuals. Temporality is intrinsic to the fabric of social space. The dimensionality of social objects cannot be conceptualised as atemporal. Social objects cannot be static, unchanging objects; one cannot paint a still life of a social object. But just

as the individual's own temporal sense allows a large range of interpretations of natural phenomena, so that same individual temporal sense will permit the generation of a large range of interpretations of social phenomena.

The same constraints of communicability as applied in the interpretation of natural phenomena also apply in the case of the interpretation of social phenomena. It is the appreciation of the impact of these constraints which allows one to develop arguments which underpin claims about the relative stability of social and material structures.

The individual possesses an extended, yet constrained, freedom to interpret phenomena in her social environment. The extended freedom stems partly from the fact, established in Chapter 2, that an individual's conscious behaviour forms part of the very operational parameters of social kinds - including those social kinds which constrain possible interpretations of changes in the social environment. The extended freedom stems also in part from the link between the individual's conscious experiences and her behaviour. This link was demonstrated in Chapter 4 to be such that a person's conceptualisation was seen to have causal influence over the person's behaviour in a social environment.

This means that the individual's conceptualisation of his behaviour in part constrains the possible interpretations of his interactions with others. Taken in conjunction with the arguments in Chapter 4, one can conclude that the individual is not restricted (by factors which are seen as independent of her interpretations of her interactions with others) to a single interpretation of those interactions. This lack of restriction enables one to justify the claim that there is always an element of subjectivity in all interpretations of the social and material environments. The subjectivity of individuals was seen to extend beyond conceptualised interpretations and on to the self-monitoring agency of individuals.

(II) The Individual's Perception of His Power To Affect Social And Material Objects

The second aspect of an individual's interactions with his environment which is in need of examination is his conceptualised agency. The discussion in Chapter 1 identified the importance of *both* the interpretation of experience *and* the interpretation of the attempt to affect the environment. In Chapter 3 the examination of Poincaré's analysis of the development of, and application of concepts to, the material environment highlighted the importance of the self-monitored agency of the individual. This self-monitored agency was seen to be needed in order to sustain the development and application of spatial concepts.

The ability cognitively to manipulate the material environment was seen in Chapter 1 to be a necessary condition for the participation by individuals in cognitive interactions with other individuals. One can readily conclude that the individual needs to be able to manipulate, and consciously monitor her manipulation, of her material environment if she is to operate in a social environment. Individuals possess and need self-monitoring devices which monitor both their interpretations of sensory inputs and the exercise of their powers of interference in the material environment.

The argument relating the individual's self-monitoring of his manipulation of his social environment was somewhat different. This argument was based on the possibility that the individual could substitute for what was characterised in Chapter 1 (Part 4) as a 'Paradigm Individuator' in a given cultural environment. The ability to make such a substitution was seen to involve two assumptions: firstly that there are social kinds which can be manipulated, and secondly that the individual can recognise that they can be manipulated.

(III) The Individual's Motivation For Interacting With Her Environment

There is a third aspect of an individual's interactions with her environment which is in need of examination. This concerns what motivates her to interact with social and material objects. Inasmuch as an individual needs to have some understanding of the behaviour of the objects with which she

interacts, she also needs to bring under some form of conceptualisation the behaviour of the other individuals with whom she interacts - the need to operate the self-monitoring mechanism referred to above indicates a need also to bring under some form of conceptualisation her own behaviour.

Two features of these forms of conceptualisation were examined in Chapter 4. Both features were seen to be derived from the adoption, by an individual, of the role of 'Paradigm Individuator' (whose characteristics were identified in Chapter 1). The first feature was derived from the individual's conscious assumption of the active role of individuator in her cognitive interactions with others. The second feature was derived from her assumption that the individuals with whom she was interacting were assuming the same role.

It was seen in Chapter 4 that the intelligibility of the adoption of the role of Paradigm Individuator obliges a constructor of interpretations of social phenomena to accept at least three propositions - this obligation exists even if the adoption by the individual is not undertaken at a conscious level. The three propositions are concerned with the evaluative aspects of the nature of participants in cognitive interactions. The penalty paid for the negation of the validity of the propositions was seen to be the sacrifice of the intelligibility of the cognitive interaction itself.

In outline the three propositions were found to consist of the following: firstly, individuals with whom one interacts have a sense of their own selfhood which they are driven to project into their environments; secondly, individuals with whom one interacts are motivated to sustain the social structures which facilitate the interactions; and thirdly, individuals with whom one interacts are driven to attempt to come to understand the operations of the objects which are found in their social and material environments - and since individuals are themselves both social and natural objects they will attempt to understand their own operations. The intelligibility of an individual's continued participation in concept-communication would be sacrificed if one were to negate these

propositions. Further, an individual must, for the same reasons, impute the same characteristics to herself as she does to others.

In other words, individuals are essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially knowledge-seeking.

These features of cognitive interactions between individuals can lead to the identification of the sources of some of the value systems developed in various cultural environments. Indeed, since the characteristics are context- and content-independent, it may be that the value systems derived from their analysis have a degree of universal applicability.

The paradoxes built into the nature of cognitive interactions may also help to explain the often self-contradictory aspects of human behaviour. The value associated with protecting others and condemning actions which harm others can be seen to be consistent with sustaining the social structures which permit an individual to project his sense of selfhood into his environment. The same projecting force also leads to the possibility that (through inadequate understanding of the function of others in sustaining one's own ability to project one's sense of self) an individual may impose her own will on another, thereby restricting the possibilities for that other individual to project his sense of self.

It is this aspect of the interactions between individuals which underpins the importance of the first person perspective in the use of language (examined below in Part 5). But what is added here is the realisation that the first person perspective cannot operate unless there are also second and third person perspectives. It may also enable one to justify the proposition that human value systems must paradoxically be simultaneously self-focusing and other-focusing (*4)>

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PART 3: PERSONAL IDENTITY

In Part 3 the discussion will focus on the issues involved in the formation of the concept of a person. In Part 2 the underlabouring task for this discussion was carried out. Both the underlabouring and the discussion draw upon the arguments and characterisations which have been set out in Chapters 1 to 4 above.

Persons And Their Contexts

Given that the operations of social kinds in general (and persons in particular) affect, and are affected by, the environment in which they find themselves, the processes by which the concept of a person is developed must take these effects into account. The fact that persons are themselves social kinds makes the need more urgent.

Further, the processes by which concepts are developed must provide criteria, or at minimum some guiding principles, which enable one to individuate the conceptualised object. These criteria need to be such that an adequate attempt at individuation of the conceptualised object can be carried out. In order to carry out such individuation adequately the criteria should at minimum specify something about the possible behaviour of the objects in the environments in which the objects are likely to be located. In the case of a person this puts a double requirement on the conceptualisation. It means that the person has to be capable of being, as well as being individuated as, a *good-enough individuator* (Ch. 1 note (*22)). This means that the better the understanding of the relationship between a person and his environment the better will be the understanding of the nature of Personal Identity.

The relationship is such that it is impossible to sustain the claim that a concept of a person, devoid of subjectivity, can be developed without incurring significant penalties. It has been argued in earlier chapters that these

penalties include the absence of the possibility of the operation of learning processes as well as the lack of intelligibility of interactions which involve concept-communication.

Of central significance in the relationship between a person and his environment is the person's ability to affect that environment while perceiving (and conceptualising the perceptions of) those effects. His power to affect his environment is constrained in two ways: by the limitations of the individual's own conceptualisations of his causal powers and by the causal properties of the other objects in that environment.

This latter constraint is not unique to persons. The presence and properties of other objects restrict the scope of the causal powers of any object in a given environment. A person's actions in her environment are also made possible by the operations of these other objects - for without their presence she could not interact with any object whatsoever. This means that the concept of a person cannot properly be formulated without reference to the social *and* the material environments in which the person's powers are to be exercised. The person's behaviour is constrained and enabled by objects whose behaviour is dependent upon, and by objects whose behaviour is independent of, conceptualisations.

The Conceptualisation Of Material And Social Objects In Their Environments

The differences and similarities between the requirements placed on the conceptualisations of material objects and social objects is instructive to anyone wishing to understand the operations of processes by which conceptualisations of either type of object develop. Such understanding was seen in Chapter 1 to be a necessary factor in the operation by an individual of the processes by which the use of concepts in general is learned. As such, this factor forms a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an individual.

The differences stem from material and social objects' differing relationships with conceptualisations. The relationship between the properties of either material or social objects and the conceptualisations of individuals is analytic (in the Kantian sense). The respective independence and dependence - of the manifestation of the properties - on conceptualisations is incorporated in the concept of what it is to be either a material or a social object.

The similarities stem from the need for which either of the attempted formulations of concepts has to cater. This is the need to **account** for the object's relationships with its environment. The constraint the environment imposes on the conceptualisation of an object is clearly demonstrated in the natural sciences. The definition of an electron could not be expressed without at least an implicit reference to an electrostatic 'field' in which the electron's behaviour (and the impact of that behaviour on other objects) could be detected. A change in the conceptualisation of the notion of an electrostatic field would automatically call for a revision of the definition of the electron. Similarly a change in the conceptualisation of an electron would automatically call for a revision of the definition of an electrostatic field. A similar symbiotic relationship exists between the definition of social kinds and the definitions of the various environments in which the social kinds operate.

However, the symbiosis in the case of social kinds is complicated by the often unrecognised (*5) assumption that the structure of part of the environment in which the social kind operates is sustained by the cognitive conceptualisations of persons. The complication does not arise because of the fact that the relationship with the environment is symbiotic; otherwise it would have arisen with natural objects. It arises rather because the symbiotic relationship is not itself independent of the nature of the related objects - at least it is not, and cannot be, **perceived** as being independent.

The symbiosis between conceptualised object and the environment in which

the object operates stems from the conceptualisation of the object and environment. Social kinds are objects whose operations are, by definition, affected by conceptualisations. This means that the symbiosis is endogenous to the relationship between a social kind and its environment. The process by which the concept of a given social kind is generated may affect the social kind's own operational parameters. By contrast the formation of the concept of any specific natural kind is independent of the natural kind's operations - In these cases the symbiosis between the concept of the object and the conceptualisation of its environment is independent of the properties of the object.

The Uniqueness Of The Concept Of A Person

It is not difficult to see why the symbiosis, referred to above, presents its most acute problems in the case of the formation of the concept of a person.

A person's conceptualisation of her own selfhood affects the behaviour of the social kinds which operate in the same social space as she does. The concept of a person which is used in a given cultural environment must take this factor into account. It must allow for the person's first person perspective. Further, as the argument in Chapter 4 shows, this self-definition by a person helps to sustain the structure of the cultural environment in which the person is defined. So the concept of a person must also take into account the person's second and third person perspectives. This constraint is unique to the concept of a person.

The behaviour of persons in social environments must, therefore, include an element of self-reference. It must incorporate some factor which recognises the fact that a person's conscious behaviour partly sustains the possibility of its own progress through time. In other words, formation of the concept of a person must involve a recognition of the fact that a person's behavioural processes sustain the operations of social kinds which operate in the same social space as

the person. This means that any adequate concept of a person must incorporate an account of self-referential processes. This is a point which is explored in Part 4 below when discussing Lucas' G|del argument and elaborated when discussing the 'first person perspective' argument.

This need for the element of self-reference enables one to give support to the claim, (P1) above, which underpins the arguments set out in this essay. If (P1) were to be denied then the process involved in forming concepts would be independent of the social structures by means of which the conceptualisations of individuals are developed - which is patently self-contradictory.

A Model Within Which The Concept Of A Person May Be Developed

A model or conceptual structure has been built in this essay. It is an abstract structure waiting for some content so that it can properly be utilised.

As it stands the structure can only be used either in a negative or in a restricted fashion. It can be used to show that a given concept of a person is, on logical grounds, either unacceptable or that it has passed the first test of acceptability. Other more stringent tests would have to be passed if a given theory of Personal Identity were to become acceptable in a given cultural environment.

At the core of the model one finds the cognitive interaction between persons. This cognitive interaction is located simultaneously in a social and in a material environment. It is not logically possible for a person validly to conceptualise her own behaviour as occurring entirely in a material environment; conceptualisations must occur in a social environment.

Each of these two types of environment is respectively affected by the relationships between those objects which operate in the respective environment.

Since the operations of objects in social environments are dependent upon the conceptualisations of persons, a unique and symbiotic relationship develops between the concept of a person and the structure of the environment in which

the person encapsulated by that concept finds himself. The concept of a person, developed in any specific cultural environment, needs to take into account the unique nature of this relationship.

It remains possible that in any given cultural environment the word used to individuate persons may also individuate objects whose behaviour does not sustain the operations of social kinds – as was the case when Caligula declared his horse, Incitatus, to be a Consul of Rome. This possibility does not affect the arguments put forward in this essay. It will only be when one attempts to understand the nature of individuals capable of cognitive interactions with other individuals that one also feels the need to restrict the scope of the word 'person' (or its equivalent) to individuals with the characteristics outlined above.

Towards A Critique Of Theories Of Personal Identity

The function of the model which has just been described is to provide a basis from which one may assess the acceptability, not only of a theory of Personal Identity, but also of any given social theory. The assessment of a social theory would be limited to discussions of the coherence of the theory's assumptions with the points made so far in this essay. The basis of the assessment is a logical rather than empirical one. There is no pretence towards formulating a specific description of what it is to be a person. Neither is there any attempt to provide evidence to support a particular exposition of what it is to be a person in a particular cultural environment.

The conclusions which have been reached are that a theory of Personal Identity must incorporate the following points – with associated penalties if it fails to do so:

Firstly, the identity of objects in general must be made logically anterior to the identity of persons. This is the principle underpinning the fulfilment of the remaining points so the failure to adhere to its requirements carries

with it the penalties associated with the failure to meet the requirements of all the other points.

Secondly, the theory of Personal Identity must incorporate a recognition of the non-analysable, subjective aspect of a person. The attempt to develop a theory in which persons are comprehensively and objectively defined in terms which refer entirely to the environments in which persons operate has to make significant sacrifices (see Chapter 4 above). The two main sacrifices centre on a person's participation in cognitive interactions with other persons. The first of these is the relegation to insignificance of the function of expectation in all conscious experience, but particularly in concept-communication. The second is a similar relegation, to insignificance, of the function of judgement in the conscious interactions of persons with the natural and social objects. Both these two relegations have the effect of rendering unintelligible a person's participation in cognitive interactions with other persons. This lack of intelligibility stems from a person's abandonment of her sense of self - an abandonment which accompanies the relegation of her judgement and her expectation of the progress of events to insignificance.

One of the most common indications of the failure to meet this second requirement is a desire to establish the possibility of the cross-cultural objective fact or proposition. This desire is often blind to the consequences of the operations of the relationship between the conceptualisations of individuals and the social structures through which putatively objective facts are developed.

Thirdly, within the theory of Personal Identity, a distinction has to be drawn between those objects which can and those objects which cannot formulate and communicate concepts - between 'Conceptualising Individuals' and other objects. The conflation of these two objects into a single category also renders unintelligible concept-communication (see Chapter 1). The corollaries of the fulfilment of this requirement are the recognition that there is a

distinction between natural and social environments and that persons must operate in both environments.

Fourthly, a further distinction has to be drawn. The distinction has to be drawn between those objects whose operations are independent of the formulation of concepts and those objects whose operations would cease or change if concept formulation, and use, were to cease or change. The distinction is the one between natural kinds and social kinds (which operate in natural and social environments respectively). Failure to fulfil this requirement would result in the failure to fulfil the third requirement above with payment of the corresponding penalty.

Fifthly, as a corollary of the fulfilment of the third requirement, a theory of Personal Identity needs to incorporate a recognition that there is a distinction between natural and social environments and that persons must operate in both environments. Coupled with the symbiotic relationship between the conceptualisation of an object and the environment in which the object operates, the fulfilment of this fifth requirement leads to the recognition of the unique relationship which exists between the concept of a person and the person's abilities to formulate and use concepts.

Sixthly, there must be a recognition, either implicit in or explicitly expressed in the theory, of the need for the existence of at least three persons whose conceptualised behaviour sustains the operations of social kinds. The binary interaction between two individuals is insufficient to sustain the operations of those social kinds which facilitate processes of individuation. This means that the abandonment of this requirement carries with it the sacrifice of the possibility of the operation of a process of individuation which is capable of sustaining the identification of the same person during different interactions with another person.

Finally, there must be a recognition by the person who develops a theory of Personal Identity that the stability of the cultural environment in which the

theory is constructed is guaranteed only if no learning processes occur within the cultural environment. The operational parameters of those social kinds which are to be found in the cultural environment are likely to change if conceptualisations change. This means that the constructor of a theory has to be aware of two dangers. The first is that the absorption of the theory may itself alter the cultural environment in which the theory claims application thereby either negating or amending the applicability of the theory. The second danger concerns the assumptions and claims made within the theory itself. The assumptions and claims may involve the alteration of the conceptualisations of some persons thereby altering the symbiotic relationship between defined object and its environment. This may lead to the self-destruction of such a theory.

The degrees to which a theory of Personal Identity meets these seven requirements can be used as a grid against which to assess the theory's acceptability. In the assessments which follow in Part 4 constant reference will be made to this grid.

◆NOTE: DC. *At this point the reader should refer back to the Preface. Parts 1, 2 and 3 of this chapter have served simultaneously as an introduction to the essay and as a summary of the arguments developed in it.*

PART 4: A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Introduction

As was stated in Part 1 of this chapter, there is no intention to offer a comprehensive critique of all the variants of all the theories of Personal Identity. The intention, rather, is to identify the ways in which the failure of a theory to meet the seven requirements set out at the end of Part 3 weakens the claims of the given theory.

The discussion will start with an examination of the use of a particular technique in the development of some theories of Personal Identity. The technique involves the use of thought experiments in which the respecification of the relationship between an individual and his environment is postulated. The examination will be followed by a brief criticism of a specific argument in which an attempt is made to counter the claims of materialist theories. In the third element of the discussion in this part of the chapter there will be an examination of one of the theories which attempt to offer criteria of Personal Identity. The theory to be examined is the memory theory of Personal Identity. An attempt will be made to generalise the discussion to embrace all theories which attempt to discover criteria of Identity. Fourthly, there will be an examination of an argument which supports the general position adopted in this essay.

This general position is incorporated in the second requirement of a theory of Personal Identity as outlined at the end of Part 3. This requirement stipulated that a Personal Identity theory should incorporate a recognition of the non-analysable, subjective aspects of a person.

The chapter will finish with an examination of a type of analysis not covered in the first four discussions. This is the possible world analysis undertaken by Saul Kripke. The examination will *inter alia* also indicate that the discussion in this essay consists of a minor critique of Kripke's own views regarding the general question of Identity.

Thought Experiments And Theories Of Identity

There has been a tendency in recent years to invoke startling thought experiments as evidence which purports to justify certain claims about the nature of individuals. Some of these merely attempt to construct a possible world within which individuals operate, the purpose being to discover those features of individuals and their environments which are necessary for

facilitating certain tasks. Most notable in this category is Peter Strawson who constructed theoretical models of a world in which only sounds could be experienced (*6). Such a thought experiment may indeed give insights into features of individuals and their environments which are necessary for particular tasks to be possible. It may enable one to determine characteristics which are necessary for the performance of specified tasks; in which case not only is the *a priori* nature of the necessary characteristic known, the source of the *a priori* nature is also known. However, the applicability of many other thought experiments is riddled with difficulties which have not been faced by those who invoke their use.

The thought experiments which have dominated much of English language Philosophy of Mind have fallen into a rather different category from Strawson's. Typical of these are the thought experiments constructed by writers such as Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit (*7). These writers have tended to assume the presence of existing stable social structures and relationships. Within the contexts of these structures changes in the relationships between individuals and either their social or their natural environment have been postulated. On the basis of *postulated* outcomes of these *postulated* changes attempts have been made to draw conclusions about the nature of Personal Identity which existed prior to the postulated changes.

The difference between the acceptability of the Strawsonian and the Williams/ Parfit experiments has its roots in the objectives which each of the respective theorists had in mind. The Strawsonian objective is a logical one: his intention was to say something about the relationships between concepts and the conceptual scheme in which the concepts are developed and used. The Williams/Parfit objective is to determine something specific about the nature of the self. Williams wishes to argue that the self is defined in terms of some bodily criterion, while Parfit argues that the self is objectively defined in terms of psychological continuity; each aims to establish some form of

reductionism of the self.

An examination of two of Parfit's thought experiments will demonstrate the dangers of constructing such experiments. It will also demonstrate the way in which a thought experiment involves a presupposition of the conclusions which it invites one to reach. Where the conclusion is a logical one the circularity is harmless; indeed, it helps to clarify relationships between concepts, a purpose for which the thought experiment was constructed. By contrast, where the conclusion makes a claim about the nature of the empirical world the circularity is not harmless: it will be seen that the theory supported by the experiment cannot be refuted - the results of the experiment are embedded in the assumptions of the theory.

Two Thought Experiments Described

Parfit has two distinct purposes in mind in constructing his two experiments. The first experiment is designed to demonstrate the indeterminate nature of the self while the second is designed to support the conclusions of the first by showing that Personal Identity, as it is commonly conceived to be, is not what really matters. In the first experiment he postulates a gradual change in body cells from a current Parfit to a configuration of Greta Garbo at the age of 30 (*8). In the second, he postulates the transplant of two halves of the brain of an individual whose body is no longer functioning into the heads of his two identical triplets who have both suffered brain death but have sound bodies. One half of the original brain goes into one triplet while the remainder goes into the other (*9). The first experiment is the crucial one as it is the one in which the indeterminate nature of the self is discussed, the second involves an attempt to add psychological acceptability to what would otherwise be a difficult theory to accept.

The First Experiment

Here Parfit asks us to suppose that some scientists had made a complete record of all the cell types and configurations of Greta Garbo when she was 30 years old. This means that with the appropriate technology they could recreate her from scratch with their recorded blueprint. It would also mean that they could, by a series of operations, do a gradual switch from Parfit to Garbo. Each operation would involve the substitution of some Garbo cells for some Parfit cells. After the last operation we would be presented with a person who was completely Garbo, with no Parfit component, yet we started with a complete Parfit with no Garbo component.

Parfit bases this experiment on the example of the Ship of Theseus quoted by David Wiggins (*10) who culled it from Thomas Hobbes. Theseus' ship is changed plank by plank so that eventually all the planks have been replaced. In Parfit's example, however, the final object does not have the same properties as the original yet it retains characteristics which make it of the same type: it is still a person. Taking the changes in the ship to be analogous to Parfit's experiment we would be gradually changing a sloop into a cutter or a brigantine into a brig, retaining the ship but altering its properties as a ship. The changes would involve a move along a spectrum from object A to object B where it is never clear during the intermediate stages whether we had object A or B.

Similarly, during and in between the cell transplant operations, it would never be clear whether the individual was either Parfit or Garbo. Parfit suggests that if the total switch were to involve, say, 100 operations then, after 42 operations there would be an individual with part of Parfit's memory and part of Garbo's. The smaller the number of operations which have been carried out the greater the preponderance of Parfit. The greater the number of operations the greater the preponderance of Garbo. There would, therefore, be a spectrum stretching from Parfit at one end to Garbo at the other. The existence of such a spectrum would preclude the possibility of a determinate self. Parfit

can see no alternative to the scenario he is painting (*11): *"If we could carry out these operations, the results would be what I have described."*

But would they? The world of no alternatives, while easy for some politicians to find, is a difficult one to locate when dealing with the outcomes of experiments. In this case we can show that if there is no alternative then Parfit has presupposed the result for which he is arguing. If we return for a moment to Theseus' ship we can there justifiably assume that any plank which is replaced in the first operation will not change its characteristics or function purely because on subsequent operations other planks are replaced. Neither will the replacement of a plank alter the structural relationships between the other planks. The replacement of a plank which supports the main mast cannot cause a plank supporting the steps to the bridge to age and wither or even to become stronger; neither can it alter the inter-relationship of tensile stresses and strains between the planks. *Ex-hypothesi* these planks are performing the same tasks as the ones they replace. If we take the modified analogy of change in ship from brigantine to brig then some planks may be replaced by beams and vice versa but it cannot be claimed that a plank, say No. 57, can change the properties of an existing plank, say No. 138, merely by being placed somewhere else on the ship. The properties of No. 138 remain the same whether or not No. 57 has been replaced. Even if the new No. 57 is different from the old one (in order, say, to accommodate the square rigging required in the brig) the spectrum thesis assumes that at the end of all the changes plank No. 138 will not have altered its properties so it should perform precisely, and only, the function for which it was designed in the ship.

Parfit assumes that in a similar way a Garbo cell, say No. 193, which has replaced a Parfit cell during operation 28 has to be unaffected by the continued presence of Parfit cells which are not replaced until operation 73. Now if cell No. 193 helps to control memory or even emotional stability it is reasonable to assume that it will be affected by the presence of Parfit memory cells. The

presence of the Parfit cells could alter either Garbo's memory or her emotional stability. The supposition that Garbo cell No. 193 will have the same properties at the end of all the operations as it had before and during operation 28 presupposes that these properties are dependent solely upon the external relations which hold at the time of operation 28. In other words there is a presupposition that Garbo cells will not change their properties because of their experiences in encountering Parfit cells. But this is the very point at issue, it is the one which the argument is attempting to establish.

For the results to be as Parfit has described them we have to make one of two assumptions. We have to assume either that the component parts of the body are passive recipients of external stimuli and whose properties cannot change or that at each operation the previously implanted cells are reprogrammed. The first alternative presupposes his result while the second destroys his spectrum thesis. Each alternative leaves us where we started with no reason for accepting either of his claims about the nature of Personal Identity - the claim that the self can be objectively defined (presumably across all cultural environments) and the claim that the identity of the self is indeterminate (presumably in any given cultural environment, but at least in the one in which Garbo and Parfit find themselves).

The Second Experiment

Parfit's second thought experiment will now be examined. Its purpose is to do more than break down the psychological barriers which make us resist his thesis that the self can be objectively defined. For the purposes of ensuring the acceptability of the argument in this essay such an examination is important. If the success of the outcome of the thought experiment were to be confirmed one would be obliged to accept Parfit's reductionism.

In the second experiment (*12) Parfit postulates the division of a single self into two separate selves. The separation he suggests is of a single brain

one half of which is transplanted into an identical triplet while the other half transplants into a second triplet. He then asks, which, if either, of the two new persons is the original one.

Parfit presents us with four possibilities. The first that the person does not survive, the second that one specific half survives as the person, the third that the other half does and the fourth that both halves do. He does not even consider the possibility that the triplets may survive or that a new person is born.

He dismisses the first of his possibilities by pointing out that there are examples of individuals who have survived without one half of their brains. How, he asks, could a double success be a failure? The second and the third possibilities he dismisses by stating that *"each half of the brain is exactly similar, and so, to start with is each resulting person"* (*13). In making this claim he has, on the previous page already asserted that *"the division of a person's consciousness into two separate streams - is a feature that has actually happened"*. This leaves him with the fourth possibility namely that the individual survives as both new selves.

He concedes that this would involve a distortion of our everyday concept of a person. It would show us that our identity is not what matters to us since it could branch. What really matters is psychological continuity with a causal connection holding the two together. The justification for this claim centres on the rationality of one's concern for one's future which rests on the assumption that this kind of continuity holds.

The various strands of Parfit's second argument make it, at first sight more compelling than the attempted identity switch along a spectrum. Here the thought experiment seems much more plausible. There seems to be no presupposed Reductionism, yet the implausibility of the alternatives seem to oblige one to believe that the only explanation for the apparently inevitable success of the experiment is a Reductionist one. A more meticulous look at each stage reveals,

however, that the overall structure of the argument is not completely sound.

Let us now consider the first phase of the experiment. A brain is split in two and each half is said to have a stream of consciousness which is continuous with the original brain. As such each half is said to be "*exactly similar*" by Parfit. He asserts that there can be no significant initial difference between the two new persons, each with half of the original brain.

Assuming for a moment that the experiment succeeds the claim that the two new persons are "*exactly similar*" depends solely upon the similarity of the streams of consciousness which each has inherited. Parfit omits all discussion of other aspects of the self which are found in differing degrees in the two different sides of the brain. The aesthetic sense is said to be more pronounced on the right side while the rational, deductive abilities more pronounced on the left; other differences also exist.

By allowing this thought experiment to succeed Parfit is presupposing that the only constituent component of a person's identity which is significant to Personal Identity is the stream of consciousness, something which can be objectively described. So even here he seems to be presupposing the result for which he is arguing, namely his form of Reductionism.

There are, however, documented cases of one sided brain damage where the undamaged side took over the functions which it normally left undeveloped (*14), but there seems to be a cut off age of about seven years after which the take-over process is impeded or impossible. If the thought experiment were to be carried out on a five-year-old and his two identical triplets it would still be an open question whether the dormant characteristics of the left side were "*exactly similar*" to the existing manifest characteristics of the right, and *vice versa*. It may be that 'Lefty' is potentially an ill-tempered brute while 'Righty' is in actuality a pleasant sort of person and that the conjunction of the two - the pre-experiment individual - is an even tempered individual given to the odd emotional outburst. Parfit's "double success" presupposes that all

these other characteristics are unimportant or even not essential in discussions of Personal Identity (*15).

But this double success also raises a further question about the experiment. Should one accept the assumption that because either half of the brain had survived in some people, both halves could subsequently continue to survive independently of, and separately from, each other? There is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. People with split brains have retained single bodies while developing separate streams of consciousness. But separate streams of consciousness have also been observed in schizophrenic individuals whose eventual 'cures' have rested on the assumption that there is a single individual underpinning these streams.

Parfit is here in the true realms of thought experiment where not only the procedures but also the outcomes are conjectural. The possibility that there is a unique, essential and unanalysable factor associated with Personal Identity remains. This factor may at some point in the experiment either choose to sustain, or be forced into sustaining, only one of the two half brains thereby leaving the other half devoid of the essence of the individual. The deserted half may then either find or formulate its own unique factor or fail to survive.

In assuming his double success Parfit seems here to be presupposing the impossibility of a rival theory; an impossibility which is not yet supported by empirical evidence. Such evidence could indicate that the case is *"deeply impossible"* rather than merely *"technically impossible"* (*16).

But since he believes his first argument establishes the absence of a unique factor associated with Personal Identity he feels justified in assuming that the second involves merely a technical impossibility. Indeed he is aware that the case of the double brain transplant does not directly support his 'Reductionist' claim that Personal Identity is indeterminate. *"The case of division supports part of the Reductionist view; the claim that our identity is not what matters. But this case does not support another Reductionist claim;*

that our identity is indeterminate" (*17). What is clear, however, is that the case of division rests upon the validity of claims based on his first thought experiment. We have seen that the argument used in support of those claims is less than compelling.

Thought Experiments Assessed

The analysis of Parfit's two thought experiments helps one to focus on the problems associated with all such approaches to gaining understanding of the nature and behaviour of objects. The difficulties stem from the limited capacity of the imagination, isolated from praxis, to establish results which have application beyond the scope of operation of the imagination itself.

The capacity, in thought experiments, of the imagination to establish incontrovertible results is not limited to Parfit's two experiments. It extends to all thought experiments. These experiments have their roots in discussions on the nature of necessity and its relationships with concepts such as "*all possible worlds*" (*18). Clearly if something is necessarily the case it must be so not only in this world but in all possible worlds, so a test of necessity can be based on the possibility of finding a counter-example.

It is also possible to consider a concept of conditional necessity, that is given a precondition P_1 the existence or possibility of P_2 may be necessary. So P_2 is necessarily the case provided P_1 holds. This form of conditional necessity is widely used. It is used by scientists in underpinning the intelligibility of processes of scientific discovery. It forms the basis of the structure of many philosophical arguments.

Considerations of possible worlds can work well when moving from the actual world, where phenomena can be experienced and explained or described in the context of currently held theories, to a possible world where theoretical stresses are put on *explanations*. In the Parfit experiment referred to above, along with others such as the Williams thought experiments (*19) stresses are

put on an individual's conception of herself, a stress which may have the effect of changing all concepts.

The practice of placing stresses on explanations constitutes one of the stages of scientific development (and perhaps even constitutes one of the stages of the development of an infant's conceptual understanding of the world). Stress is placed on an explanation by the creation of abnormal situations concocted in laboratories (or the immediate environment in which an infant finds himself) where theories are tested. The transfer from experienced world to a possible world and back is licensed by the artificial creation of a facsimile of the possible world in the laboratory experiment. But the *holding* of such a licence depends upon the possibility of creating such a facsimile, and the *proper use* of the licence depends upon the experimenter being able to demonstrate that the facsimile has been created. As long as the actuality of the creation of a facsimile of the possible world is not achieved, the principles discussed in that possible world remain hypothetical with no compelling force for their acceptance in the experienced world.

Without the achievement of a facsimile of the possible world, the thought experimenter is attempting to move from an imagined world to the experienced world without using the check of experience to justify the move. In Parfit's case we have an imagined world where Personal Identity is seen as a spectrum along which it is possible to move. His claims for a licence of transfer are based on the assumption that the imagined world is a mutant of the experienced world, a mutant whose laws of nature and whose principles of concept-development are the same as those which hold in the experienced world. But his mutation involves assumptions about the laws of nature which can only be justified by the establishment of a facsimile of the possible world he describes. It further involves an assumption that the processes of concept-development remain unaltered in the mutant world. The second assumption does not, *prima facie*, seem to be justifiable. It seems unlikely that a group of individuals each of whom

conceptualises his or her identity as indeterminate could sustain the social structures by means of which processes of individuation are carried out.

The Strawsonian thought experiment referred to above (see note *6) involves placing a stress on concept-development. The conclusions he draws are not concerned with the nature of a concept but with the nature of the development; and even the development is limited by him to what has developed rather than what might develop. He restricts the scope of application of his conclusions to the particular cultural environment in which the thought experiment is formulated - he does not wish to indulge in what he describes as "*revisionary metaphysics*" (*20). Similarly this essay consists of a large thought experiment; but its conclusions are conditional - their acceptability depends upon the lack of acceptability of the denial of the intelligibility of certain practices such as concept-communication.

Further complications may exist. If the possible world is one in which the laws of nature are postulated as being different from those which are operational in the world we experience, it may be that the concepts which were needed to describe phenomena in that world cannot be applied to phenomena in the experienced world. A world in which the fission and fusion of individuals, and possibly of material objects, were normal occurrences may need different (perhaps stratified) concepts of identity and number from those applicable in our experienced world. The nature of scientific explanation and theory construction would be so different in such a world that it would be difficult to justify the transference of any conclusions (drawn from such theories and explanations) from that possible world to ours. It may be impossible to make the requisite transfer: the world into which the analysis is to be transferred may be one in which each of the transferred concepts can be given no meaning which corresponds to its original meaning.

It is incumbent upon the users of analyses involving such transfers to establish the applicability of the concepts they are using in all the possible

worlds they are citing. It is not immediately obvious that the concepts we employ, embedded as they are in our scientific (and explanatory) theories, could be adequately transferred to a possible world in which identity fission and/or fusion occurred. The arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 above show that the applicability of concepts is dependent upon the possible interactions between persons and objects in their social and natural environments; but particularly with the objects in their social environments. It is reasonably safe to assume that social interactions would be radically different if the premisses of thought experiments similar to Parfit's were to hold in the experienced world.

The general problem faced by all constructors of thought experiments lies in the restricted application of the thought experiment. The mere fact that the imagination can be used to conceptualise the possibility of, say, the identity fission of persons, is insufficient to guarantee the applicability of such a conceptualisation in an actual world. The successful application can only be assumed if the descriptions of the objects *and* their environments is accurate.

In the case of the description of the properties of a person, and the person's social environment, the very question of whether it is possible to formulate an accurate description is in question. This means that the thought experimenter is likely to be assuming the truth of one of the results which is at issue.

(Two Illustrative examples in Addenda to Chapter 5 *p. 266)

Beyond Thought Experiments

The strength of the thought experiment lies in its ability to put conceptual stresses on conceptual structures. Such stresses can point the constructor of a theory of the nature of a given object towards factors which need empirical investigation. The methodology of thought experiment construction can also direct a scientist away from a particular line of

Investigation. A given line of investigation may put intolerable internal stresses on a given body of knowledge.

The main thesis pursued in this essay consists of an attempt to direct investigations away from the idea that it is possible to construct objective descriptions of persons. Such an objective description would put an intolerable stress on any body of knowledge. It would prevent it from changing and so prevent it from performing the function which permits one to describe it as a body of knowledge: the function consisting of facilitating changes in the states of understanding of persons. The source of this stress is the requirement that an individual's conscious processes perform a dual function: they are simultaneously self-referential and refer to objects other than the self.

The next subsection will consist of an examination of J. R. Lucas' ingenious attempt (*21) to show that the incorporation of this self-referential function into an objective description of a person leads to a contradiction. The purpose of Lucas' argument is to show that an objective description of the self cannot be achieved.

There are two purposes motivating the analysis of the Lucas argument. The first is to indicate that there is a paradox associated with Lucas' very enterprise. The paradox is found in the process of setting up the *reductio ad absurdum* in which the contradiction is to be formed. The operation of this process itself involves the possibility of the formation of an objective description of a person; a possibility which the operation is attempting to negate. The second purpose is to demonstrate that the paradox is unavoidable. This means that the contradiction contained in the premisses of any such *reductio* is sufficiently strong to prevent the development of the very *reductio*.

The objective description of a person is necessarily elusive - the self-referential processes in consciousness defy objective descriptions which can then be coherently used in an argument.

Beyond Thought Experiments: (I) Lucas' Gödel Argument

Lucas' target is the physicalist description of the individual. He attempts to undermine such descriptions by invoking Gödel's incompleteness theorem. He tries to show that a mechanical description of the mind possesses the same sort of incompleteness as that which Gödel discovered in formal systems. A detailed understanding of Gödel's theorem is not needed for one to follow Lucas'. In essence Gödel managed to formalise the statement '*this formula is undervivable*' in the formal system where 'derivable', 'immediate consequence' and 'formula' are all themselves formalised in the system by means of *recursiveness*. Recursiveness is not itself formalised (*22). This Gödel statement is true, since it states its own undervivability; so truth in formal systems is separate from derivability.

Lucas takes the Gödel argument and fits it into a *reductio ad absurdum* which follows the scheme:

- (A) Suppose the physicalist reduction of mind to machine is correct
- (B) then the mind could be completely described by a logico-mathematical formal system S. S has a set of propositions P₁, P₂, P₃,... capable of being formalised and of being derived from the axioms of S.
- (C) The machine can determine as true, of the formalised propositions, only those which are derivable from the axioms of S, that is P₁, P₂, P₃,...
- (D) The proposition G '*This formula is undervivable*' is not derivable so the mechanical mind cannot see it as being true.
- (E) There exist some humans who can understand G in any formal system since they can follow the steps of Gödel's proof. In particular these humans can understand it in the system S which purports to describe them and they can see it to be true.
- (F) Statements (D) and (E) contradict each other so the initial claim (A) is false.

The main weakness of this argument is to be found in statement (C). But to be fair to Lucas it should be pointed out that this is also a weak link in the physicalist/determinist thesis. Such a thesis needs to maintain that the ascription of truth to propositions is a mechanical process and so susceptible to physicalist description and subsequently to reduction into a formal system S.

The separation of truth from the structural completeness of S places a requirement on the determinist to explain how truth is ascribed. Lucas holds that physicalists are restricted to ascribing truth in the same way as they ascribe consistency (or derivability) since they are imprisoned in the formal systems which describe them. Only those concepts which can be formalised within the system are available to the machine described by the system.

If this were so then the physicalists would not be able to avail themselves even of the means by which they formalise derivability in their formal systems since these means use the unformalised notion of recursiveness. Lucas' reply might suggest that physicalist theories themselves presuppose an acceptance of recursiveness as since this presupposition forms the basis upon which prediction and determinism are built. However, once we permit a machine to use one unformalised concept, our grounds for forbidding the use of further unformalised concepts, such as truth, are seriously weakened. Conversely if we restrict, as Lucas does, mechanical mind completely to using only formalised concepts, then one of two possibilities presents itself. Following one possibility one may find that Gödel's theorem cannot help us as it is constructed entirely from one unformalised concept. Following the second possibility one finds that the invocation of Gödel's theorem involves one in overelaboration. The fact that an individual can conceptualise a concept, such as happiness, which cannot be formalised in a logico-mathematical system will suffice: such a person cannot, *ex-hypothesis*, be described completely by propositions formalised in the system.

Other arguments (*23) which claim to refute Lucas have been collated by Douglas Hofstadter. These are, in general, over-elaborate and rely on applying

Lucas' own analysis back onto his own argument. They do not point out that the reason Lucas may face difficulties when his argument is turned on itself is precisely because of the problem identified above: the problem associated with the needed revision of the function of concepts which accompanies the assumptions which a physicalist description of the mind entails. Lucas' only fault is to use these assumptions in order to attempt to show that they lead to a contradiction without examining the full consequences of such a use.

Hofstadter himself criticises Lucas (*24) by negating proposition (B) above. In his argument he points out that there are some so-called Artificial Intelligence programs which defy description under a formal logico-mathematical system. This means that the Lucas argument cannot get going since not all machines are susceptible to 'Gödelisation'. As in the other criticisms of Lucas, Hofstadter could have reached the same conclusion rather more directly. We have already seen that nothing which handles concepts which cannot be formalised is susceptible to being exhaustively described in a logico-mathematical system in which the Lucas argument can gain purchase.

The failure of the Lucas enterprise does not invalidate the importance of the paradox upon which it directs us to focus our attention. The paradox springs from the simultaneous operations of two processes: the conceptualisations of individuals and the conscious interactions between individuals in given cultural environments. They must also form part of conscious, cognitive, communicable experience which, in part, necessarily refers beyond the scope of its immediate content. This means that the processes are, of necessity, partly self-referential and partly other-referential.

Being self-referential they cannot be encapsulated by *objective* descriptions formulated within the cultural environments in which they operate; at least they cannot be so encapsulated without ossifying the boundaries of that cultural environment. Lucas' reductio argument starts with the assumption embedded in the physicalist theory which he is attacking: the assumption that

such objective descriptions are possible. However, it is a starting point which incorporates an attempt to push the scope of the use of some concepts beyond the limits of the cultural environment in which the concepts claim application.

This means that Lucas' reductio starts with a self-contradictory premise, rather than with one which is empirically false. Self-contradictory premisses can be used to expose the limitations of a proposition embedded in the abstract formal systems in which the premisses are formulated. They cannot, however, be used to justify propositions which claim application beyond the abstract structures. Lucas identified a self-contradictory premise in the physicalist theory of the mind, but his argument failed to pinpoint the source of the self-contradiction. The arguments in this essay identify that source.

Beyond Lucas

The failure of a Lucas type argument does not oblige one to accept its contrapositive: namely that it is possible to formulate objective descriptions of persons which permit a reasonable understanding of human processes. A firm rejection of this contrapositive was developed in Chapter 4 above. The argument there focused, as does Lucas', on the requirement that a person needs to be capable of making a conscious appraisal of her own conscious experiences.

Given that a conscious being has this capability, the Chapter 4 argument does not preclude the possibility that a non-organically controlled object could perform all the functions which a person performs. But to do so such an object would have to convince the other 'persons' that it also has all the characteristics which are needed to sustain the operations of social structures.

In order to convince these other persons such an object would have to demonstrate that it is a 'good-enough individuator' of objects (as argued in Chapter 1); it would have to convince them that it is driven to make cognitive sense of its environments (as argued in Chapter 4); it would have further to demonstrate that, not only does it conceptualise its expectations of the progress of phenomena, it also has to be capable of evaluating degrees to which

such expectations have been fulfilled. In other words It would have to convince persons that it is **essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially knowledge-seeking** (see Part 2 above).

One is driven to conclude that the criteria for the ascription of personhood are not themselves determinate. They depend upon the operations of social kinds which are themselves dependent upon the conceptualisations of persons. There is an inevitable circularity in the relationship between the specifications of the procedures by which persons are identified and the development of those procedures. It is this circularity which lies at the heart of the paradox referred to above. It is the circularity which is faced most directly by theories of Personal Identity which claim that the self is ineliminable from adequate descriptions of human behaviour. These theories will be examined below, but first there will be an examination of a group of theories which involve claims that adequate objective criteria for the ascription of Personal Identity can be found.

Beyond Thought Experiments: (II) Criterion Theories Of Personal Identity And The Memory Theory

In this sub-section a variant of a group of theories of Personal Identity will be examined. The characteristic by which members of this group of theories are selected is the claim made by the respective proponents of each theory that some factor or other - memory, psychological connectedness, bodily continuity, etc. - can serve as a criterion by which an individual can be identified as the same individual at different points in time.

The discussion will lead to the conclusion that such theories are not inconsistent with one of the central tenets of the argument developed in this essay. This tenet is encapsulated by the assertion that objective, determinate definitions of a person cannot be formulated in cultural environments in which the learning of new concepts can occur. The problem faced by a 'criterion'

theory is the possible ossification of the cultural environment in which a specific criterion is applied. The application of the criterion may have the effect of thwarting any possible changes in the cultural environment's corpus of knowledge. The advantages enjoyed by a 'criterion' theory are found in its pragmatic nature: the theory gives one some of the rules by which an individual can assume the role of 'Paradigm Individuator' and qualify for the epithet of *person*. The particular criterion theory which will now be examined is the memory theory.

The Memory Theory

One of the foremost exponents of the Memory Theory of Personal Identity was John Locke (*25). A more modern exponent, who develops and sharpens the Lockean theory, is David Wiggins (*26). Wiggins combines the memory theory with a theory of identity based on an analysis of relationship between the use of sortal concepts and the notion of substance. Using the characterisations put forward in Chapter 1 above, one might say that Wiggins analyses the rules which govern the correct behaviour of a paradigm individuator: he analyses the processes of individuation.

Unlike the one in this essay, Wiggins' analysis does not involve an examination of the conditions which have to hold if changes in knowledge are to occur. He, like Locke before him, sets himself a descriptive task. In carrying out this task, it seems he succeeds in showing that the memory of an individual is used in the formulation of the sortal concept which individuates the individual. But this does not tell us what the criteria are for individuals to be classified as persons - where 'persons' are seen as those individuals who have the ability to alter the corpus of knowledge within the cultural environment analysed by Wiggins. According to his procedures one could easily individuate a computer as a person using the sortal concept which is applicable if the memory of the individuated object comes up to scratch.

In order for Wiggins' criterion to function in such a way as to individuate

those individuals characterised in this essay as 'persons' (Ch. 2 *p.73), a modification to his memory theory would have to be introduced. This modification would have to allow for the assessment of both the *potential* of the individual and her history. The problem which such an expanded assessment faces is one of incompatibility with the assertion that a fixed criterion can be found. *Ex-hypotesis* the potential to contribute to changes in the corpus of knowledge cannot be described: the fact that some individual has made such a contribution in the past may be a good indication that he possesses the potential, but it cannot *per se* suffice as a criterion to justify a claim that the potential to do so again exists.

It should be noted that the ability to make a contribution to the expansion of the corpus of knowledge is not restricted to those who make breakthroughs in research. The individuals who subsequently come to understand the alterations which have taken place are also making such a contribution. The changes in the corpus of knowledge brought about by the development of Relativity Theory in Physics needed scientists other than Einstein to understand them in order for them to constitute alterations to the corpus of knowledge. Similarly the formation of a new social grouping with previously unknown social powers needs to be understood and utilised by more persons than the originator of the idea (which led to the formation of the group).

Criterion Theories

The question of incorporating the potential to contribute to the expansion of the corpus of knowledge is one which has to be faced by any 'criterion theory'. The common feature possessed by criterion theories is the objective description of the characteristic which enables one to individuate an individual as a person. This leaves them inadequate to the task of accounting for the possibility that the concepts which specify the cultural environment in which the individuals operate might alter their meanings and so alter the properties of the to-be-identified persons. All changes in the meanings of terms which

refer to social processes would be inexplicable.

Beyond Thought Experiments: (III) The Self As An Unanalysable Entity

Critics of the memory theory, who do not have a criterion of their own, tend to conclude that it is not possible to formulate an objective concept of the self. Personal Identity is, at root, unanalysable. Perhaps the best known classical proponents of such a theory are Thomas Reid and Bishop Butler; some of their modern followers include J. M. E. McTaggart, Sydney Shoemaker, Anthony Flew, and Geoffrey Madell.

The theory of Personal Identity they propound has many meeting points with the one set out in this essay, but differs in some important respects. It is not being suggested here that the self is necessarily unanalysable. Rather, it is being suggested that the self is *ineliminable* from *adequate* conceptualisations of social behaviour. Further, the grounds put forward by the 'unanalysable' school for rejecting the memory, and indeed any other 'criterion' theory, seem to be insufficient to the task they are expected to perform.

These arguments are generally variants of one put forward by Butler (*27). In this he claims that memory cannot constitute Personal Identity for memory presupposes the identity of the self. This criticism smacks a little of the politician who imputes an untenable policy to an opponent then proceeds to show that the policy is untenable. The memory theorists do not claim that memory constitutes Personal Identity, they claim that it serves as a criterion for indicating the identity of an individual. It remains perfectly feasible for Personal Identity to presuppose memory while simultaneously using it as a criterion of identification.

It is even feasible to claim that the self is unanalysable and to use memory as a criterion of Personal Identity. All one has to do is to claim that those aspects of Personal Identity which *are* analysable give one sufficient grounds for being able to identify and re-identify individuals.

From the acceptance of the validity of the conclusions of the 'unanalysable' school, one can derive the validity of the following statement: an objective conceptualisation of the self cannot be sustained without some form of penalty. The validity of this statement can also be derived from the analysis in Chapters 1 to 4 above. This does not mean, however, that the arguments of the 'unanalysable' school and those developed in this essay are the same; nor that they are equally acceptable. To assert that they are would involve the commission of the fallacy of the assertion of the consequent.

However, the arguments used in this essay can be employed to support a claim that the self is unanalysable, but only in restricted circumstances. These circumstances have been frequently stated above as being those in which changes in the corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment cannot be brought about by the individuals who operate in that cultural environment. This argument has many meeting points with one of the more recent additions to the 'unanalysable' school's repertoire; the recent addition being made by Geoffrey Maddell (*28). It is worth dwelling for a little while on this argument as it is the only one in the 'unanalysable' school which is not a variant of Butler's argument cited above.

Maddell develops an argument which consists of a particular instance of the general argument in this essay. He argues that within the scope of influence of the use of the English pronoun 'I', all demonstratives are parasitic upon upon the use of 'I'. He argues further that 'I' cannot be eliminated by using a set of objective descriptions. He builds his case upon an examination of the psychological relationships between an individual on one hand and the individual's own perceptions and conceptualisations on the other. Invoking arguments by Shoemaker and others he points out that the objective description of an individual's behaviour cannot form the grounds for her ascription of certain perceptions (linked causally to her behaviour) as belonging to her. She would always be left with the problem of ascribing the perceptions involved in

the ascription process to herself; and if she had already ascribed these perceptions to herself then the objective description of her behaviour could not have formed the grounds of the ascription.

The argument is persuasive. However, the grounds for its persuasiveness are not examined by Madell. What he does not seem to have realised is that the compelling nature of his conclusions is not solely consequential upon the accuracy of his description of the psychological relationships between an individual and his perceptions. It rests rather on the reader's realisation that Madell's, and anyone else's, communications with her would themselves be unintelligible unless she were to accept the ineliminability of the self. In other words Madell is tacitly utilising the results of the arguments set out in this essay: arguments which centre on the interactions between individuals and point out the need for the operations of social structures.

Madell comes close to recognising the importance of social structures when he considers Geach's claim that 'I' is eliminable in soliloquy (*29). Here he notes that in soliloquy the individual is isolated from cultural environments. Indeed he indicates that there may be a case for stating that concepts in such an environment are not concepts at all.

If Madell, along with other members of the 'unanalysable' school, wish to apply arguments in cultural environments other than those of the English speaking world, then they need to examine the forces which facilitate changes in *any* cultural environment. Their criticism (of those who claim that determinate descriptions of the self are possible) is restricted to stating that an individual who is objectively defined cannot, by using the English language, find adequate grounds for ascribing any given set of experiences to herself. This may be because the English language is so structured as to accommodate the possibility that the corpus of knowledge it encompasses may change. Indeed, the cultural environment generated by the use of concepts in English covers an area of social space in which social kinds operate whose specific purpose is to

facilitate changes in the corpus of knowledge. But this does not mean that every cultural environment has these characteristics.

It can be seen that the 'unanalysable' school, like each of the 'criterion' schools, succeeds in capturing at least one aspect of the concept of Personal Identity. The arguments in this essay show that these two allegedly opposing schools do not oppose each other in the same battlefield; the battles they fight seem to be with opponents they construct rather than the proponents of the alternative theory; and when they do meet, they are found not to be in opposition.

Possible World Analysis

The critiques of theories of Personal Identity, which have been developed in this chapter, have all flowed from the arguments and methodology which have been employed in Chapters 1 to 4. In this the the final subsection of the essay, an alternative form of analysis will be criticised. This alternative is the one constructed and used by Saul Kripke (*30).

Kripke's methodology consists of the construction of possible worlds. These are used as devices for putting stresses on theories and concepts in order to discover the points at which they collapse. This is a somewhat similar process to the thought experiments discussed above (*p. 238-250). Kripke does not attempt to reformulate the laws of change in the possible worlds, as do Parfit and Williams, rather he restricts himself to the examination of abstractions such as the concept of Identity. As such, his conclusions should have some validity and, inasmuch as they are directed towards Personal Identity, should be pertinent to the discussions held in this essay.

The methodology coheres with essentialist conceptualisations of objects; indeed, it may even presuppose, and be presupposed by, such a conceptualisation.

It is only with an essentialist conceptualisation of an object that one can intelligibly discuss the operations of that object in distinct possible worlds.

Conversely, the intelligibility of discussions of possible worlds cannot be sustained with anything but essentialist conceptualisations of at least some objects which appear in more than one possible world: if no objects appear in more than one possible world then possible world analysis becomes vacuous. This essentialist view of the nature of objects, and indeed of persons, underlies most of the discussion in this essay. It is likely that the assumption that the possibility that the properties of objects apply across the boundaries of different environments obliges one to hold some form of an essentialist conception of the objects. This assumption is common to Kripke's analysis and the one undertaken here.

There are two questions regarding Kripke's analysis which are relevant to the arguments set out in this essay. The first concerns the question of the analysis of the identity of objects in general and the second concerns the analysis of persons. Kripke does not make a distinction in principle between these two. The central tenet of this essay is that there is such a distinction and that it is a significant distinction.

Before examining the differences between the Kripkean analysis and the one in this essay it may be worth discussing the similarities. A Kripkean possible world in which persons operate is closely connected to the notion of a cultural environment developed in Chapter 2 above. The main differences between a cultural environment and a possible world is that it must be possible for an individual to affect changes in a cultural environment whereas the individual may be restricted to *postulating* changes in a possible world.

This difference does not prevent the argument in Chapter 3, Part 4 from being applicable to possible worlds as well as to cultural environments. There it was argued that if some individual retains her identity in more than one cultural environment, then there must be some natural and some social kinds which operate in all the environments in which she retains her identity. The same holds in the case of the retention of an individual's identity across the

boundaries of various possible worlds.

The problems which arise in the case of the possible world analysis stem from attempts to sustain a distinction between natural and social kinds in a possible, conjectured world. The distinction was seen to be one which has to be made if one is to sustain the intelligibility of concept-communication. The problem with a possible world is that, basing itself on conceptualised entities whose existence is not even seen as being independent of conceptualisations, one cannot sustain a distinction between natural and social kinds in any world other than the one in which experiences actually occur.

The individuation of conceptualising individuals depends upon sustaining such a distinction. Further, the formation and development of all concepts is dependent upon the operation of processes involving the individuation of individuals. One can conclude that a possible world analysis cannot make a significant contribution to our understanding of persons; the conclusion being based on the contention that persons are conceptualising individuals. Only inasmuch as a possible world forms an extension of social (but not of natural) space from within a given cultural environment can it be a useful device for improving our understanding of the concepts used in that cultural environment. And even here, it is debatable whether the device helps us to understand notions such as the identity of natural kinds; or whether, as David Wiggins suggests (*31) possible world analysis is parasitic upon a prior conception of identity.

In not distinguishing between the nature of the identity of persons and natural kinds the Kripkean analysis restricts the scope of application of its conclusions. The restriction prevents application of the results of the analysis beyond the boundaries set by the use of the concepts which specify the cultural environment in which the analysis occurs. The analysis in this essay, by contrast, can claim such extended application since it is concerned with the nature of the relationships between cultural environments. One of the main claims being made here is that the possibility that objects move from one

cultural environment to another places requirements upon the nature of the concepts of Personal Identity and of object Identity.

PART 5: CONCLUSION

The arguments in this essay have all been directed towards one goal. This goal consists of the relocation of the debate on Personal Identity. It is intended that, with the relocation of the debate, it will be possible for social scientists to become more aware of the implications of any assumptions they make regarding the nature of Personal Identity. Underpinning the arguments which lead to the acceptance of the relocation has been the distinction drawn between the epistemological and ontological concepts used in social scientific, or indeed in everyday, explanations of social change. This distinction is encapsulated by the distinction, made in Chapter 2, between a 'cultural environment' and a 'social environment'.

The analytical methods employed have been Kantian in nature. There has also been a return to some traditional metaphysics. Both these approaches have tended to be ignored both by some philosophers who develop theories about Personal Identity and by some social scientists. By following the arguments and the methodology adopted in this essay, a social scientist will be able to assess the price to be paid for adopting any particular assumption about the nature of Personal Identity. It has been argued throughout that the main price, paid by a social scientist, for the adoption of any fixed criterion of Personal Identity is the sacrifice of the intelligibility of the social science itself. Fewest sacrifices seem to be made by the social scientist who assumes that persons are *essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially knowledge-seeking*.

ADDENDUM CHAPTER 5 (from *p. 250)

Two cases, one real the other fictitious, illustrate the necessity of incorporating considerations of the relationships between persons and their social environments in any theory of Personal Identity. The first is the celebrated case of Phineas Gage who, in 1848, while helping to lay a railway suffered an accident which caused a yard long steel rod to pass right through his skull. Both rod and skull are now preserved in a Boston museum. Gage or, as Colin Blakemore puts it, *"the body which bore his name"* (*32) survived with relations of bodily continuity intact. According to the Williams analysis cited above Gage would still be the same person. Psychological connectedness and continuity were not broken and his memory was intact. The accident had, however, induced a personality change so severe that those who knew Gage before the accident said it was not the same man. He had changed from a likeable, sociable person to an anti-social, bad-tempered man. The relationships between Gage and other individuals changed; and consequently so had his relationships with many of the social objects, such as railway companies, which he encountered. Whether or not the changes were sufficient to warrant the claim that the body which bore the name of Gage was no longer the same person is open to question. However, the intelligibility of the debate regarding whether or not Gage retained his identity indicates that it is necessary to discuss the relationship between a person and his social environment when formulating a theory of Personal Identity.

The second case is a fictitious one. Let us suppose that in 1950 one could convince the actor Humphrey Bogart that a set of beliefs, and their accompanying practices, similar to those held by the Lamas of Tibet were going, in 1956, to become predominant in the U.S.A. in general and in theatrical circles in particular. Suppose further that it were possible to convince him that through the sort of research which establishes the identity of the Dalai Lama it would be discovered that Humphrey Bogart is the reincarnation of the Greek Atomist

Democritus. Bogard's relations with his natural environment would, one assumes, remain unaltered. Assuming that he did not want to be venerated as one of the fathers of modern positivism he may object to his new identity. His rational concern for the future could not be divorced from his being related by social links to the future individual known as the reincarnation of Democritus any more than it could be divorced from his being related by physical links to someone who was to develop a fatal illness.

The case of Phineas Gage shows that the exercise of the processes involved in the cognizance and communication of concepts requires, in our conceptual scheme, that Personal Identity both depends upon and underpins social relationships. The Bogard-Democritus reincarnation shows that the individual's conception of self-identity itself invokes social relationships.

2 (*1) In this essay a 'linear' argument refers to an exposition which attempts to convince someone that something is the case by using a deductive model of explanation. (see, for example, C G Hempel and P Oppenheim, *Studies in the Logic of Explanation, Philosophy of Science* (1948)) In such a model it is thought that explanations follow the schema of a proof in mathematics where axioms are invoked along with accepted forms of deduction in order to reach a conclusion. If such a model is assumed then one also must assume that the concepts which are available to the formulator of the explanation must be fixed in meaning during the process of explanation.

This assumption carries with it at least two restrictions. The first restricts the operational scope of the objects whose behaviour is being explained; their behaviour cannot extend beyond the limits set by the concepts being used in the explanation. Such a restriction would prevent one from attempting to offer explanations which cross the boundaries of cultural systems; indeed, it would make cross-cultural explanations logically impossible to formulate. The second restriction would prevent any learning processes from occurring as a result of the communication of the explanation; such an occurrence would contravene the starting assumption of the linear explanation that concepts retain their meaning during the exposition which constitutes the explanation.

It is argued throughout this essay that neither of these restrictions is acceptable to a student of the behaviour of persons and other social objects. One might say that the problem faced by a student of the Social Sciences is also met by anyone undertaking a study into the basis upon which Social Scientific study is carried out; both exercises involve attempts to describe a non-linear, multi-dimensional process using a linear one-dimensional medium means of communication, namely language. The problem has had to be faced in compiling the arguments in this essay. One might say that any collection of arguments which is intended to throw light on the nature of social interactions is doomed

to failure - an argument can only capture a single view of a multi-dimensional object. This point was poignantly put by Umberto Eco when interviewed about his literary successes. He was asked to describe one of his novels. His reply was succinct: "If I could have described what it was about I would not have written a 503 page novel!". He went on to say that novelists are condemned to express themselves in many pages because single sentences always leave something out. He indicated that he believed that even a novel cannot quite capture the essence of the human condition.

(See also *page 11 where further reference is made to the consequences of using 'linear' arguments in the social sciences.)

3 (*2) The refusal to recognise the *need* to analyse concepts is only intelligible in a cultural environment in which the development of concepts is itself not recognised. One assumption underlying the recognition of such a need is that there is more than one 'self' to be specified; another is that there are mechanisms, or means, by which the analysis can be communicated by one individual to another. The justifications for the acceptance of these assumptions are offered below in Note 4 and in Parts 3, 4 and 5 of this chapter.

3 (*3) The rigorous justification of such a claim is not necessary at this stage. The arguments which follow in this and later chapters will serve to refine as well as to support the claim.

5 (*4) Solipsism rejected

Should the presupposition consist of the existence of only one 'knowledgeable being' then that being would be the only one needing to be individuated by the use of the concept and the application of any definition. Such a solipsistic being would also be the only arbiter regarding which non-'knowledgeable beings', if any, were to be defined as persons. The use of

the definition would, in such circumstances, necessarily be a process of self-individuation. Arguments in support of such conclusions will be found in Chapters 2 and 5. In such a case the possibility of having a yardstick against which to measure the putative definition would dissolve since the use of the yardstick involves the interpretation of a process.

In this solipsistic case there would be only one interpreter who could, at any time alter the interpretation. The proper application of meaning to concepts in these circumstances would be determined merely by the decrees made by the same being who is then to apply them; the purpose of using a process to determine a meaning would recede into insignificance (see note (*34) in Ch.2). This means that if the use of a concept is to have any purpose - and the need for concept application involves the assumption of a purpose - then it must spring from characteristics or properties of the users of the concept. The identification of one such characteristic lies at the heart of the argument in Chapter 4.

A comprehensive analysis of the concept of a 'knowledgeable being' will not be given in this chapter whose main purpose is to prepare the ground for the remaining ones. All that is meant by a 'knowledgeable being' at this stage is a being which can understand the concepts used in the body of knowledge which is being used - no other characteristic is as yet ascribed to 'knowledgeable beings'. As further sets of characteristics are added to 'knowledgeable beings' in the discussions which follow, so the justifications for the additions will be offered. In each case the justification will take the form of specifying the price to be paid for not accepting the need to incorporate the characteristic.

8 (*5) See for example *Personal Identity*, John Perry ed. and Geoffrey Madell, *The Identity of the Self*. In the introduction of the former, and in Chapter 1 of the latter, surveys of Personal Identity theories are undertaken which confirm the impression that the possession of a mechanism by which

learning occurs is not a matter whose impact is investigated.

8 (*6) The constraining effects do not have a similar effect on the setting of sufficient conditions. The sufficient conditions for developing a concept of an individual who is a member of a group which utilises a given body of knowledge, are contingent upon the mechanisms for concept formation which are operated by the group. These mechanisms may permit the exclusion of an individual who possesses the necessary characteristics (a)-(d) from being individuated by the use of either the codified, or the implicitly understood, conceptualisation of what it is to be an individual. Insane people may be defined as non-persons. The mechanisms may also allow for degrees of status of personhood as experienced by men, women, slaves and children in various cultures.

10 (*7) e.g. Bernard Williams 'Imagination and the Self' *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action* ed. P. F. Strawson

10 (*8) e.g. Derek Parfitt 'Personal Identity' *Philosophical Review* (1971) also *Reasons and Persons* p.245-265

10 (*9) e.g. Geoffrey Madell op.cit. p.84-90

17 (*10) In Chapter 4, the focus of the argument will be on other aspects of experience. In particular the emotional content of experience, along with some reference to the aesthetic content, is examined.

17 (*11) Much of current discussion on personal identity is taken up with considerations of fission, fusion and body-swaps - see, for example, texts to which reference is made in Notes (*5), (*7) and (*8). The arguments in this

essay sustain the claim that these considerations contravene the constraints imposed, by the need to facilitate concept communication, on a cultural system.

18 (*12) Since the term 'intentionality' has been used by different authors in different ways, it will perhaps have been noted that, in the analysis of experience and interpretation (Part 4), one of the uses has already been usurped; this being 'intentionality' as the character of a modality which points back onto the original object of which it is a modification, so remodifying it.

18 (*13) The operations, in the natural and social environments, of the mechanisms used to affect the conscious states of others, are not unconstrained. The constraints are investigated in Chapters 2 and 3.

19 (*14) Laing R.D. *The Divided Self* p.12

20 (*15) A point made by Umberto Eco *Il Nome della Rosa* Italian edition p.507

"Un narratore non deve fornire interpretazioni della propria opera, altrimenti non avrebbe scritto un romanzo, che e una macchina per generare interpretazioni."

A narrator ought not to provide interpretations of his or her own work, otherwise he or she would not have written a novel, which is a vehicle for generating interpretations.

20 (*16) An analysis of the impact of the forces which drive individuals to point to something beyond themselves is carried out in Chapters 4 and 5

22 (*17) For Hume and Kant an examination of the nature of the beings was limited to phenomena in Hume's case and to phenomena plus rational thought in

Kant's. In both cases any claim about the nature of an 'experiencing being' would have to be carried out at the levels of phenomena and thought and so could not escape the ontological limits of these 'modes' (used here in the Aristotelian sense of a "determination of being in general").

24 (*18) The importance of an individual being both *conceptualised* and *conceptualising* will be seen in Chapter 2 to extend to the areas of interactions between individuals and between individuals and social structures. In Chapter 1 the two characteristics are seen as being necessary for an individual to be able to take on the role specified by a PI.

25 (*19) The regress would take the following form. Suppose a 'knowledgeable being' H_1 is communicating with another 'knowledgeable being' H_2 and H_2 is operating a process g_1 in order to affect H_1 's experiences. If process g_1 were facilitated by a 'social kind' as defined in Chapter 2, then some aspect of its operation would be experienced and interpreted by a 'knowledgeable being' H_3 . If this experience and interpretation were to be conceptualised by the 'knowledgeable being' H_2 who was triggering the operation of g_1 , then such a conceptualisation could modify the operation of g_1 and involve H_2 in interpreting the operation of g_1 as altering the experiences and interpretations of both H_1 , with whom H_2 is communicating deliberately, and H_3 , with whom H_2 is communicating incidentally. So in communicating with H_1 , H_2 also communicates with H_3 . The communication with H_3 could also generate a further communication with H_4 so generating a possible regress.

31 (*20) Similar problems occur over the assessment *either* of the validity of any given individuating process *or* of the competence of a given individual to act as an individuator if the cultural system does not allow for the distinction to be drawn between objects of Type-2 and objects of Type-1. The absence of

Type-2 objects would preclude any concept-developing mechanism from operating endogenously to the cultural system - alterations in individuating processes and in the criteria for assessing the competence of a given individual to act as an individuator would necessarily be determined by some exogenous influence.

32 (*21) The argument does not preclude a marxist analysis of history whereby ideas of which individuals are not consciously aware have causal impact on the development of relationships between individuals. What it does preclude is an analysis which claims that such ideas are either in principle inaccessible to the individuals or that the processes by which the ideas change are inaccessible to the individuals. It rejects the theory of the inevitability of history.

36 (*22) The limitations of the models, which are necessarily simplifications, exist and are to be found in three areas.

Firstly, they do not seem to allow for ambiguity of interpretation either by the Paradigm Individuator or by a 'knowledgeable being' who can substitute for a PI. It is often the case that individuals shift their interpretations of experiences and the interpretations of a PI are not always specific enough to be codified precisely, although within limits this can usually be done.

In order to cope with the difficulties generated by shifting interpretations a term will be borrowed from D. W. Winnicott who, in *Playing and Reality*, explores the idea of *good-enough mothering*. If one had a concept of *good-enough individuating* and a 'knowledgeable being' could substitute for a PI if it were a 'good-enough individuator' then the burden of coping with alterations in interpretation would move from the level of concept analysis of the idea of a PI to the practical level of whether a 'knowledgeable being' could actually operate the structures and mechanisms involved in the process of individuation. The PI would then be merely a heuristic device to test whether a

given 'knowledgeable being' is a 'good-enough individuator'. Such a praxis based means of determining even what appears to be a fundamental concept in the operation of a cultural system, does not lead to problems regarding the development or modification of the concept of a PI. If the use of Model(C) were in a specific case to modify the notion of "licensed to individuate" in such a way that most licensees failed to communicate with each other then the cultural system would disintegrate; indicating that the praxis based means of determining the concept of a PI not only is workable but also acts as a constraining influence on the possible operations of Model(C).

Secondly, the models, especially Model(B) and Model(C), do not allow for the representation of any relationship which the individuated object of Type-2, in Model(B), or the other 'knowledgeable being', in Model(C), may have with objects of Type-1 - although this might be incorporated into experiences E_3 . This could become critical in the individuation process of an object of Type-2 in determining whether it should be included among those who could substitute for PIs and become "good-enough individutors". If an object of Type-2 saw no distinction between itself and say, a tree, then its relationship with trees might be considered to be significant. This may be sufficient for the concept-developing mechanism Model(C) to be used to exclude such an individual from the group whose members are competent to use the mechanism, pace the fact that this was not done in the case of George III who reputedly discussed matters of state with a tree.

Thirdly, the analysis using models indicates that it might not be possible to be at the same time an object of Type-1, one of Type-2 and an individual competent to operate the mechanisms of Model(C). *Prima facie* this triple identity does seem possible: medical teams in operating theatres often look upon their patients as objects of Type-1. There is no reason why a PI should be restricted to identifying a conscious Type-2 object using only Model(A) unless, in the specific case, the prior use of Model(C) had instituted rules of

individuation which forbade such a restricted use; but this would be a contingent characteristic of the particular cultural system. In other words there is no reason why you should not individuate me solely by using the evidence gained from observation; you do not need to communicate with me in order to identify me.

40 (*23) e.g. H P Grice 'Personal Identity', *Mind* (Oct 1941) p.340 where he states that "*the self is a logical construction and is to be defined in terms of memory*".

40 (*24) Peter Strawson, *Individuals*, Part 1

41 (*25) e.g. A J Ayer in *Persons*, Chapter 4, indicates as much although it is sometimes difficult to discern exactly what position Ayer attributes to Strawson.

41 (*26) Joseph Butler, in *The Analogy of Religion* and Thomas Reid in *The Intellectual Powers of Man*.

41 (*27) Geoffrey Madell op.cit. p.

41 (*1) George Herbert Mead *Mind, Self and Society* p. 357

41 (*2) Peter Berger *Invitation to Sociology* p. 124

41 (*3) Steven Rose *The Conscious Brain* p. 179

41 (*4) Donald Davidson *Enquiries Into Truth and Interpretations* p. 157

43 (*5) This is a distinction familiar to psychiatrists. See for example J. B. Lichtenberg *Psychoanalysis and Infant Research*

43 (*6) See David Hume *A Treatise of HUMAN NATURE* p. 633-636

45 (*7) As argued partially in Chapter 1 when it was established that there is a link between individuation and the behaviour of the individuated object, but much more extensively discussed by David Wiggins in *Sameness and Substance*.

45 (*8) Hilary Putnam in 'The Analytic and the Synthetic' *Minnesota Studies In the Philosophy of Science* takes this view.

45 (*9) Roy Bhaskar *A Realist Theory of Science* p. 202 f.

45 (*10) The difference between mathematical objects and natural kinds can be found in the differing methods used to determine their respective properties. Since mathematical objects are governed by their conceptual, often logical, relationships with other mathematical objects (even if one considers their origins to be dependent upon the culture in which they are developed), the 'single instance' method of discovery of the properties of mathematical objects is appropriate; the examination of a single case of a finite sub-cover of an infinite

cover of a given space is sufficient to determine the properties of all finite sub-covers since the context cannot be changed - it is given in the description of a cover of a space. By contrast natural kind concepts do not specify the contexts in which the objects they designate are to be found, so the 'single instance' method of discovery will only give information about a natural kind in the context in which the single instance is situated. Another way of seeing the distinction is by noting that mathematical objects do not have accidental properties; all their properties are necessary so deductive forms of explanation and discovery are both appropriate and justified.

For a more detailed examination of the single instance method of discovery of properties see Kenneth Craik *The Nature of Explanation* p. 3-5.

46 (*11) For an extended examination of the preconditions of and consequences of these see Roy Bhaskar op. cit. p. 1-250.

46 (*12) The price will be seen to be, as it was in the case of a refusal to accept the distinction between objects of Type-1 and Type-2, the forfeiture of concept-communication and concept-development.

50 (*13) The behaviourist, and other similar reductionist claims, were rejected in Chapter 1 (see note (*16)) on the grounds that they prevented the individuals (who sustain the cultural system from evaluating the competence of any given individual) from using the mechanisms by which the individuals communicated with each other.

50 (*14) Andrew Weigert *Society and Identity* p. 121

51 (*15) See Roger Trigg who, in *Reason and Commitment*, argued that the debate between cultural relativism and an absolutist stance could not be settled

and so apparently swung towards untranslatability between cultural systems. In his later *Understanding Social Science* he takes a rather anti-relativist stand.

51 (*16) Barry Barnes and David Bloor 'Relativism, Rationality and the Sociology of Knowledge' in *Relativity and Rationality* ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes

51 (*17) An attempt to find such a yardstick would be the "deep structures" postulated by Noam Chomsky - *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Ch. 3. Chomsky argues that each grammatical sentence exhibits features which are derived from "deep structures" and "surface structures". The former are "structures generated by the base component" of the grammar. The indications are that the elements of any set of grammatical sentences which have meaning adhere to the constraints imposed by the deep structures.

The arguments in Chapter 1 above show that the penalty to be paid by anyone who attempts to deny the existence of some form of constraining structure is the sacrifice of the intelligibility of concept communication. However, neither the arguments in Chapter 1, nor any others developed in this essay, can be used to support the validity of a claim like Chomsky's that the Transformational Grammar he describes provides an accurate account of the structure which constrains and enables us to communicate.

53 (*18) As indicated in Chapter 1, p. 10, Geoffrey Madell uses an argument citing the first-person perspective use of language. The argument being put forward here is deeper in that it attempts to explain why language use should make a first-person perspective so important. While the argument set out in this essay is in broad agreement with Madell that an account of Personal Identity should not be seen as an extension of the identity of physical objects through time, the justification given is fundamentally different: any account of the identity of

physical objects should be seen as an extension of the account of Personal Identity rather than *vice versa*.

55 (*19) Herbert Blumer 'Society as Symbolic Interaction' In *Human Behavior and Social Processes* ed. Arnold Rose p. 181

56 (*20) Harold Garfinkel *Studies in Ethnomethodology* p. 79-94 and ch. 5

57 (*21) e.g. in Arnold Rose ed. op. cit.

62 (*22) For an extensive examination of the relationship between symbol and meaning see either Kenneth Craik op. cit. ch. 5 or George Herbert Mead op. cit.

63 (*23) e.g. Richard Rorty in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* ch. VIII

63 (*24) It is worth examining an example of the inter-relationships between the understanding of the meaning of a concept and the contexts in which they are used. This will have the effect of highlighting the fact that the distinction between natural and social kinds is a very narrow one; there is a sense in which all objects are social kinds, or rather, the natural/social kind distinction is one of degrees of difference rather than a bifurcation.

One might consider a concept referring to the behaviour of an object whose properties are investigated by natural scientists, such as an electron. The concept usually associated with such behaviour is causation. J.R. Lucas in *Space, Time, and Causality* attempts an analysis of the concept of causation without reference to the contexts in which it is used. He argues, both forcibly and convincingly, that the concept is inextricably linked to the notion of continuity.

This would mean that one would have to be able to trace the path of an electron in order to justify any claim that a causal influence had affected it.

By contrast, Roy Bhaskar (op. cit.) indicates that, because scientific application of the concept of causality makes use of 'closures', causality is linked to the boundary conditions of the space in which it is considered to apply. In this case the claims that causal influences were at work would be justified on the basis of the confidence which the scientist had in the efficacy of the system which established the closure.

Interestingly enough, these two analyses can be brought together by invoking the Heine-Borel theorem in mathematics which, broadly speaking, states that if a *closed* space can be covered by infinitely many small neighbourhoods then it will always be possible to find a *finite* number of the neighbourhoods which will also cover the space (see also ch. 4 note (*13)).

This does *not* apply to an open space. So the boundary conditions of a given space are determining factors in permitting one to move from an infinite to a finite analysis of the space. The move to a finite analysis of space allows one to enter the world of Humean (as contrasted with Lucas') causation, which depended on a discrete analysis of space. But what is interesting to us now is that the understanding of the meaning of causation is dependent upon its application. As the knowledge gained from experimental activity in determining the properties of the electron is applied beyond the limits of the boundaries set in the experiment, so the notion of causation will alter to encompass an unbounded space - and with it a continuous space - but it cannot divest itself of the impact of the boundary conditions which helped to formulate the concept. Lucas' abstract analysis will have application only in the abstract world in which it is formulated - even if he incorporates the Heine-Borel analysis into his model. As soon as the concept is applied it comes under the influence of the interpreted experiences of individuals and as such is dependent upon a process such as that represented by Model(C) to obtain meaning.

If the meanings of concepts which help individuate natural kinds are dependent upon their contextual use then it is very likely that the same will be

the case with concepts which help one to individuate social kinds. The meaning of the concept 'marriage' is affected and affects the operations of social kinds such as families. Changes in both the meaning and the operation have gone hand in hand during the recent history of Western Europe. Similarly, the meaning of the concept 'justice' has changed as the institutions such as government departments administering social security benefits have altered their operations. As Social Security departments have extended the scope of provision for members of the population who are deemed to be in need so people's expectation of what is due to individuals has changed. Accompanying this change there has been a change in the perception of responsibility and justice. Neither of these two cases refutes the platonic theory of fixed universals; what they help demonstrate is the fact that the actual meanings associated with given concepts by the individuals who use them are heavily dependent upon the operations of the social kinds which are affected by that use (see also note 10 above).

68 (*25) An example of (ii) might be a person who is a traffic warden. The traffic warden would be a constituent CI of the person. Such a CI would operate in a social environment defined by the interactions between CIs which are affected by the operations of the social structure (social kind) which enforces traffic regulations. The concepts used by the traffic warden, and indeed those used within his social environment, such as 'regulation', 'fine' and 'summons' generate one or more cultural environments. The person must be capable of distinguishing between the social environment and the cultural environments. The warden must be capable of realising that he is not just a traffic warden.

70 (*26) A thesis postulating entities which are defined by an infinite series of recursive relationships is outlined by Douglas Hofstadter *Godel, Esher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid* p.138

70 (*27) See Roy Bhaskar op.cit. p.171 for an argument supporting the notion that 'ultimate' entities can never be known to be ultimate in natural science.

73 (*28) In the biological sciences evolutionary changes, which may be emergent characteristics of the entities which undergo the changes, are postulated. Such postulates involve the assumption either that the entity which is to change cannot be ultimate, since its changes result from evolutionary processes, or that the emerged property is truly novel and so inexplicable in terms of the original putatively ultimate entity. In such a case the behaviour would have to occur as a result of the external agents triggering the operation of some of the causal and dispositional properties of the putatively ultimate entity (the same is not true of the behaviour of a social kind). Both the triggering process and the operation of the properties would themselves need to be explained. We now have an ultimate entity whose behaviour is entirely explained by reference to other entities, which is clearly self-contradictory. Since the need to explain the triggering process and the operation of the putatively ultimate entity's causal and dispositional properties cannot be simply wished away, the existence of an actual ultimate entity would leave the scientist in a perennial state of doubt regarding the explanation: there would be no way of knowing that it was needed. It is true that at the sub-atomic level some physicists take it as given that electromagnetic waves/particles/wavicles move with no external agency. But in such cases a conceptual shift has occurred. In these scenarios the *environment* in which the movement of the objects is measured is itself that of the electromagnetic wavicle's movement; space itself is defined in terms of the wavicle. It may be that the domain assumptions of the theoretical physicists ensure that some of the particles conceived by them are 'ultimate', but for the present (as chess grandmasters say when confronted with a tricky position) "things are unclear". See also note (*31) below.

73 (*29) See **Malcolm Pines** *Mirroring in Group Analysis Spheres of Group Analysis* T. E. Lear ed. for a psychoanalyst's perception of the relationship between action and the affirmation of self-identity.

73 (*30) **David Niven** *The Moon's a Balloon* p.130

76 (*31) The argument supporting the validity of a conception of secondary social forces which are not at the same time primary ones rests on two propositions. Firstly, that non-CI social kinds exist and secondly that these can interact with each other at a level which is independent of the individual CIs which sustain their operational matrices. These are the propositions which concern themselves both with the refutation of methodological individualism and with the separation of the disciplines of psychology (the study of the operations of CIs) and sociology/economics (the studies of the operations of non-CI social kinds). Justification for such refutations has been varied. **Roy Bhaskar** in *The Possibility of Naturalism* bases his on the possibility of generating new social scientific theories while **Steven Lukes** in *Methodological Individualism Reconsidered* *The British Journal of Sociology* xix 1968 bases his on the dilemma individualistic explanations face of being either inadequate or vacuous.

The justification offered here is based on the mutual ontological dependence which exists between CIs and non-CI social kinds. If a CI's ontological status depends upon the existence of non-CI social kinds then explanations of the behaviour of these CIs cannot be given without reference to these non-CI social kinds then individualistic explanations (even of individuals) are, at best, inadequate. This means that any primary social force inducing a change in a CI must either also be, or trigger off, a secondary social force inducing changes in non-CI social kinds.

By the same argument holistic explanations are inadequate. Secondary social forces must also induce changes in CIs and so also trigger primary social forces.

The necessity of accepting that such inductions occur means that the conception of a secondary social force is not only justified but may also be a useful tool for explaining social phenomena. It tells us that the matter of the reduction of sociology and/or economics to psychology is a question which cannot be decided *a priori*. But if it is justified by the adequacy of psychology in explaining social phenomena, then the earlier argument leads one to conclude that sociology/economics and psychology will have merged (rather than that one has been reduced to the other). They will have become two aspects of a much broader study in which all social forces inducing changes in social kinds would be simultaneously both primary and secondary social forces.

77 (*32) Underlying the claim that a scientist's concern with the formation of laws is subservient to the search for an understanding of the operation of forces (or agents of change) is the conception of causality which focusses on the realm of efficient causes. Such a concept is developed by Kenneth Craik op. cit. ch. 4 and encapsulated by a single sentence on p. 47: *"We are supporting the idea of causal interaction in nature, not of isolated and precise objects and events which may be labelled as causes or effects."* So the realms of material and final causes are subservient to efficient causes in that the latter need to be investigated in order to justify claims about the former two. Similarly formal causes stand blindly isolated until they are investigated by examining the efficient causes which constitute any instantiation of the formal cause.

Newton's great achievement was not merely the formation of the laws of motion, thermodynamics and gravitation, it was also the realisation *that* they work in the way they do. Central to this realisation was his liberation from the restrictions imposed upon intellectual thought by the notions of agents of change which preceded him. The agent of change, or 'force' as he called it, became central. Other concepts became subservient to it to the extent that some, including Newton himself, considered the idea to be occult (see Karl Popper

Objective Knowledge p. 174).

It might be argued at this point that the developments resulting either from relativity theory or from quantum mechanics negate the point just made regarding the primacy of the concept of force. Newtonian notions of force, encapsulated in his gravitational theory and his laws of motion, break down according to quantum and relativity theories. Both of these last two theories seem to start with change as a given phenomenon. Such a standpoint with either electromagnetic radiation as self moving or 'bare particles' propagating from one point to another seems to be suggesting that precise objects may be labelled as causes and supports a notion of material causes as being the fundamental ones in need of investigation. But when one digs deeply into both theories one finds that efficient causes are, even here, what the scientist is searching for. 'Bare particles' which propagate from one point to another are hypothetical entities. Propagation, when it occurs, is seen in terms of interactions with other particles: the electron is conceptualised as moving through, or interacting with, 'virtual photons' which are emitted then reabsorbed by the electron. It seems that the electron has an internal 'motor' which enables it to propagate, but this depends on its interactions with other particles - even though they are emitted and absorbed by the electron. The reason behind such an introduction of another particle and the interaction with it lies in the vacuousness of an explanation which centres on a material cause; such an explanation which cannot be supported or refuted as investigation is, *a priori*, excluded.

80 (*33) Peter Strawson in *Individuals* throughout the text but particularly on p. 98-103 argues that the concept of a person is a primitive concept. Stage 2 in the current text helps to show why this should be so.

80 (*34) William Shroeder in *Sartre and his Predecessors: the Self and the Other* suggests (p. 225-6) that an experience of a social self can be obtained from

a natural phenomenon and so can be externally induced as well as be distinct from any social structures. The example he gives is of a Crusoe figure who has lost ~~all~~ his (sic) memories and is left with only "sentience and goal-directedness". Such a Crusoe might, upon learning to survive, some day have his discouragement reinforced by, say, a clap of thunder. In this way the Crusoe could develop a sense of itself as a social self.

Now, this argument presupposes either that there is an inherent social sense in the individual which can be activated by an external trigger or that the social sense is somehow developed by the process of reinforcement (or perhaps both of these two options simultaneously). The first option, taken alone, involves a proposition which cannot be tested since the testing process would take one into the second option. The second option, if it is not to degenerate into the first, involves the association by the Crusoe figure of the clap of thunder with his discouragement which he has to see as already different from usual experiences: he has to conceptualise both that the thunder is a contributory factor in his discouragement *and* that the discouragement is categorically different from other sensations such as hunger - otherwise the clap of thunder must be seen by the Crusoe as just another phenomenon like any other with a physical cause and a physical effect. A requirement of Crusoe's ability to differentiate sensations and to conceptualise the thunder's contribution in generating the different category of sensation would be Crusoe's ability to test his conceptualisation (described in Chapter 1 above as involving the use of Model(C)) - but the ability to test a conceptualisation which involves one's being a social being carries with it the assumption that one already is a social being. This means that Schroeder presupposes the result he wishes to establish at the point at which the example is actualized.

81 (*35) The argument in Chapter 1, Parts 4 and 5, supporting the claim that objects of Type-2 (*p. 28) who can substitute for PIs indicated that a second

order monitoring facility was needed in order merely to operate Model(B). What is being suggested now is that the competence to operate Model(C) hangs on the individual's possession of a second order monitoring facility. The reason now is slightly different: in the case of Model(B) the second order facility was needed in order to interpret series of interpreted experiences; in the case of Model(C) the second order facility is needed in order that the individual can distinguish the proper use of the concept whose meaning is being determined from the context in which it determines that proper use.

83 (*36) See Chapter 1, Part 4, **Communication And Cognitively Interpreted Action** where it is argued that the acceptance of the possibility that the individual might not be unified in all his modes of experience carries with it the penalty that concept-communication becomes incoherent.

85 (*37) The phrasing is that used by Rom Harre *Social Being* ch. 11

87 (*38) It may be argued that the rejection of the possibility of an objectively defined self and/or person is embedded in the definition of a Conceptualising individual and of a social kind. This is quite likely to be the case, but supporters of the possibility would then have to do without the possibility that interactions between conscious beings can be both meaningful (where a recognisable structure in which to operate is needed) and constitute a vehicle which facilitates any learning processes.

88 (*39) Derek Parfit, op. cit., argues that not only is an objective definition of the self possible, but the acceptance of its objectivity is somehow liberating p. 281 f. He does not actually attempt any specific objective definitions of individuals but claims them to be possible. Chapter 5, Part 4, below will include a demonstration that Parfit's own arguments in support of his

thesis presuppose their conclusion.

88 (*40) In such a case the conceptualising process whereby a person conceptualises the activation of its own component parts (in this case further persons) would seem to be too cumbersome for an individual in our culture to grasp. Usually such individuals are schizophrenic and are unaware of the embedded structure of their personalities and normally the eventual awareness removes the embeddedness.

89 (*41) As is indicated in the introduction/conclusion to this essay (*p. 223), there is a difference between the space in which material objects operate and the space in which social objects operate. The former space is conceptualised as having a structure which is independent of any specific material object which occupies it. By contrast, the structure of social space (which partly constrains/enables social interactions) is not independent of the social objects which occupy part of it.

93 (*42) Note (*38) is also appropriate here.

95 (*43) The requirement that an individual has a sense of *being with* other individuals in order to *interact with* them is supported by the empirical findings of some clinical psychoanalysts. See for example J D Lichtenberg, op. cit., who has found that the mothering function, which is conceptualised as the one which provides a sense of *being with* rather than the sense of *interacting with* others (which is provided by the father), is the one which predominates even when the primary care giver is a man. It ought to be emphasised that psychoanalysts do not assume that these functions are sex stereotyped, neither are they exclusively the preserve of either parent figure. The terms "mother" and "father" are used as they represent the persons who *normally* undertake the given functions with respect to their offspring.

100 (*44) See Richard Shweder and Joan Miller *The Social Construction of the Person: How Is it Possible?* In *The Social Construction of the Person* Kenneth Gergen and Keith Davis ed.

100 (*45) The concept of the non-person CI is similar the one generated by the picture of the self which emerges from Hume's writings and causes him so many problems (The *Treatise of HUMAN NATURE* Selby-Bigge edition p. 633). The problems stem from Hume's desire to separate the exercise of a power from the conceptualisation of that exercise; even in the object which exercises the power. The argument set out in this chapter, by contrast, suggests that the separation of the conceptualisation of the exercise of power from the exercise itself by the agent who exercises it, prevents that agent from gaining any understanding of any exercise of power whatsoever - even if, in Hume-like fashion, the agent conceptualises the exercise of power in terms of mere constant conjunctions of events.

101 (*46) Roy Bhaskar *The Possibility of Naturalism and Reclaiming Reality*.

102 (*47) This phrasing is also borrowed from Rom Harré *ibid*.

103 (*48) Peter Berger *An Invitation to Sociology* ch. 6

103 (*49) Roy Bhaskar *The Possibility of Naturalism* p. 40-42

103 (*50) *ibid*. p. 42-47 and *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation* p. 118-135.

103 (*51) *The Possibility of Naturalism* p. 45

104 (*52) *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation* p. 132-5.

106 (*53) The intelligibility of much of psychoanalytical treatment hangs on the possibility that the patient has the capability of affecting his/her own social conditioning. Indeed, the intelligibility of parental attempts to socialise their offspring by means other than pavlovian conditioning also rests on the possibility that the child can contribute to her/his own social conditioning. See Note (*43)

117 (*54) The pivotal role of understanding and control of natural kinds is identified by Roy Bhaskar in *A Realist Theory of Science* where the intelligibility of the interference with the operations of natural kinds under closed conditions is argued to be central to the understanding of those operations.

122 (*1) Immanuel Kant *The Critique of Pure Reason* B225-232

122 (*2) Henri Poincaré In *Science and Hypothesis*

124 (*3) Poincaré is asking a question like "What makes it possible to develop and apply concepts of space?". By contrast, the types of question being asked in this essay are: "Why do individuals develop and apply concepts of space?" and "What are the consequences of satisfying the requirement that both the development and application should be intelligible?". It is clear that answers to these questions are parasitic upon the prior answers to Poincaré's question.

125N. (*4) It will be seen that Kant's attempt to substantiate claims that the material world (which it is possible to perceive) must exist in a three-dimensional (3-D) space, is flawed. This claim is too specific for a substantiation to be possible on *a priori* grounds: Kant needs to show not only

(i) that the perceptual apparatus of humans is such that it can only receive 3-D signals but also

(ii) that the interpretative faculties of individuals are so restricted that they cannot take those 3-D signals and interpret them as originating from a non-3-D source.

The fact that (ii) needs to be established forces Kant to have to establish (i) on empirical grounds, which is precisely what he is attempting to avoid. It will be argued below, in note (*12), that even (i) does not hold and that even a perceptual apparatus which receives single dimensional signals can be used to interpret multi-dimensional inputs.

125 (*5) Immanuel Kant *op.cit.* B274-279

126 (*6) The integrated nature of conscious experience will be investigated in some detail in Chapter 4.

127 (*7) W.H. Walsh *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics* p124

128 (*8) Jonathan Bennett *Kant's Aalytic* Ch.5. The discussion of Anthony Quinton's example, cited on *p. 129, takes place on *p.64-67.

129 (*9) Some argument is needed to substantiate the claim that the singularity of the object captured by an *a priori* intuition cannot be equated with the singularity of objects referred to by proper names. If it were then there would be no difference between the *process* of referring which involves the use of a proper name and the *possession* of an *a priori* intuition. The mere fact that one is a conscious process and the other is a state of affairs, albeit in consciousness, indicates that there are deep differences between them. Indeed, had Kant wanted to talk about a process such as proper-name referring, it is probable that he would have done so. It seems more likely that, in talking about *a priori* intuitions, he was aware of the fact that there is a logical problem involved in attempting (by referring to it) to bring into consciousness that which one claims to be part of the basis of consciousness: as soon as one refers to it and it enters consciousness, it ceases to form part of the basis of consciousness and so changes. Any discussions on its nature, including its putative singularity, have to take place without conceptualising it fully and so are limited to examinations of the various consequences of assuming that its nature is constituted in various ways. The notion of a singularity is not, in this case, a working notion similar to that encapsulated by the use of a proper name. It is, instead, more akin to a limiting notion - similar to the scientific notion of a universe with no energy imbalances between any two points: experience of such a universe would involve its disappearance since

experience is only possible if there is a transfer of energy. One can conceptualise, but not experience, such a universe. Similarly one can intuit, but not conceptualise, the basis of conceptualised experience.

136 (*10) Thomas Kuhn *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chapter 2

143 (*11) The discussion in Part 3 will be restricted to an examination of arguments concerning the dimensional nature of space. A reader who is familiar with Poincaré's work is likely to have noticed that there are many points at which the arguments here are in harmony with those of Poincaré. His own insights into the relationship between

(i) *the nature of the material world;*

(ii) *our means and our understanding of those means of gaining access to its operations and*

(iii) *our understanding of those operations*

are insights which are in harmony with the ideas developed here.

Poincaré does, however, seem to end in a too heavily conventionalist position. Had he investigated the *restrictive effect* which the nature of

(iv) *the interdependence between the social and material worlds and*

(v) *the possibility that 'persons' (defined in a manner similar to that*

used in Chapter 1 above) should be able to operate in both worlds

have on the possible formulations of theories about the material world, then it is likely that he would have modified his conventionalist approach.

144 (*12) Henri Poincaré op.cit. p.55

While there is some merit in Poincaré's argument that the number of dimensions which can be perceived is heavily dependent upon the number of muscles (or the individual's motor active sources of interference within her environment) possessed by the individual, he makes it do too much work. He

argues that the maximum number of dimensions which an individual can perceive in 'motor space' is set by the number of muscles. The reason he gives is that the individual has to gather information from this multiple source in order to determine the number of independent variables from which the information originated.

Since mathematical analysis requires an independent piece of information for the determination of each independent variable (dimension in non-mathematical language), he suggests that an individual cannot provide herself with more independent pieces of information than she has sources. Motor space is, accordingly, deemed to be restricted *a priori* to having a limited number of dimensions.

The weakness of the argument is to be found in its omission of considerations of the importance of both temporality and the interpretative faculties of individuals - both of which have already been seen to be inter-related. Modern developments in computer technology have demonstrated the ease with which a single dimensional series of signals can be interpreted as originating from multi-dimensional sources. This can be illustrated simply by imagining all series of signals as arriving in batches of, say, fifty. The first ten of each batch of fifty might indicate the dimension to which the remaining forty referred. The number of dimensions would then be restricted to the number of distinct dimensions to which a batch of ten signals could refer - if the signals were restricted to binary coding the number would be 1,024 dimensions. It can readily be seen that there is no theoretical restriction on the number of dimensions which could be differentiated by batches of one-dimensional signals; all one needs to do is to alter the size of batch and size of the part of the batch which refers to the dimension. As long as the individual's interpretative faculties are sufficiently sophisticated to cope with decoding the batches of information she will be able to interact with a multi-dimensional world using a single-dimensional temporal source of

information.

It will have been noted that this argument still relies on the assumption that the individual's sense receiving equipment's operations can dovetail into the operations of changes in the environment which the individual is attempting to understand. In this respect it leaves both Kant's and Poincaré's arguments unaffected. Indeed, it also lends support to the general Kantian enterprise in this field. Neither does it in any way weaken Poincaré's argument which indicates that the existence of solid objects, and with this existence the ability to displace and deform such objects, are preconditions for an individual's ability to develop and apply concepts of dimensions.

The argument set out in this note also pinpoints a weakness in Peter Strawson's account of a purely auditory world - *Individuals* p.59-86. The world he describes is one-dimensional and temporal so an individual could interpret signals as originating from a multi-dimensional environment and so could develop and use concepts of material bodies enabling the individual to identify and re-identify objects. However, as Poincaré's arguments demonstrate, a being in such a world would have to have motor-active abilities and so be capable of displacing and deforming the material bodies with which the individual interacted. Admittedly if Strawson's auditory world did not have material bodies - and it seems he considered it to be materially empty - then the individual would not have been able to displace and deform such bodies.

Strawson's argument cannot get off the ground, not merely because of the absence of material bodies, but also because of the absence of motor-active capabilities. The presence of material bodies in the natural environment, combined with the absence of motor-active capabilities, does not permit an individual to develop concepts of dimensionality; and the concept of dimensionality is one of the concepts which underpins any processes of identification and re-identification. Strawson's failure to provide the hypothetical 'auditory' individual with the ability to interfere with the

signals it received, prevents *ab initio* any individual in that world from identifying and re-identifying objects and events.

One suspects that, had Strawson had the benefit of the computer model with its 'fetch-execute-decode' cycle, it is likely he would have modified either his argument or his model. While he points out (ibid.), that his model may be inadequate, he does not give his 'auditory' individual the ability to interfere with the auditory signals.

146 (*13) George Berkeley *A New Theory of Vision*.

Visual Space is not isotropic (I to XXX of A.N.T.of V.)

The fact that 'tactile space' and 'visual space' are not isotropic relative to each other is illustrated by his example of the person born blind who can recognise some solid objects before gaining sight but has to be taught what they are in 'visual space' once seeing becomes possible (XLI ff.).

The relationship between 'tactile' and 'visual' spaces is examined in (XXXXIX) ff. But unlike Poincaré, Berkeley does not use the terms 'visual', 'tactile' and 'motor' space. Further, he does not separate 'motor space' from 'tactile space'.

147 (*14) Henri Poincaré op.cit. p.57

148 (*15) Poincaré is here assuming that an individual has what Russell describes as "knowledge by acquaintance" of the two-dimensional retinal image. There seems to be ample neurological evidence to suggest that the individual is acquainted with one-dimensional impulses which travel from the retina in single-dimensional paths. The fact that the one-dimensional signals are also temporal is significant - see note (*12) above.

148 (*16) Henri Poincaré op.cit. p. 51-7

152 (*17) Roy Bhaskar in *A Realist Theory of Science*

153 (*18) See Richard Schweder and Joan Miller 'The Social Construction of the Person: How is it Possible?' in *The Social Construction of the Person* Kenneth Jergen and Keith Davies eds. for an account of traditional Hindu conceptualisations of the relationship between the individual, the moral-social order, and the natural order.

154 (*19) The absence of even one of these other individuals would prevent I₁ from being identified as the same individual in both environments. Identification involves the existence of, and use of, processes such as those represented by Model(A) and Model(B) described in Chapter 1, p. 27-28. It was seen there that the operation of these processes makes necessary (i) the existence of the possibility of interactions between individuals and so the existence of more than one individual and (ii) the possibility that an individual can learn and/or form a critique of the interactive processes between individuals. Condition (ii) involves the possibility of witnessing the interactions and so must involve the existence of an individual other than those who take part in the identifying processes. This means that any cultural environment which can sustain a learning process must itself be sustained by more than two individuals. The condition that a 'cultural environment' has to be sustained by more than two individuals if learning in that environment is to occur was discussed at some length in Chapter 2. It was seen there that the role of an individual who is *not* the prime carer of an infant is seen in some psychoanalytical circles as essential for the socialisation of the individual (in the language of this essay one would say that the existence of an observer who is separate from a given interaction between individuals is essential for functioning of the learning of the mechanisms which operate in a given 'cultural environment'). See Chapter 2, Parts 3 and 4.

156 (*20) The possibility of concept communication without the facilitating functions of either a natural or a social kind have been explored in science fiction works. A well known example is found in the writings of John Wyndham. In his novel *Chocky*, he describes the interactions between a young boy and an 'intelligence', named Chocky, which occur entirely in the mind of the boy.

The communicative process is a telepathic one and the interface between the boy's understanding and that of the 'intelligence' is not described. The boy does not have access to the mechanisms which enable communication but it is hinted that, not only does Chocky have such access, but so do all the other 'intelligences' who/which operate in the same world as Chocky. The boy's lack of access to the mechanisms which facilitate concept communication, prevents him from being able to establish and retain his identity as a separate identity from Chocky's in the world in which he communicates with Chocky. By contrast Chocky seems to have such access and with it can substantiate her(?) claim to retain identity in both her and our worlds.

158 (*21) Immanuel Kant op.cit. B37-73 and B275

163 (*1) For the definitions of 'social kinds' and 'persons' see Chapter 2 (*p. 55 and 71)

163 (*2) In Chapter 1 it was seen that the unacceptable consequences were the prevention of the communication of concepts. In Chapter 2 the consequences were seen to be the prevention of the possibility that individuals can learn both how to use concepts and how to interact with other individuals.

164 (*3) This distinction was embedded in the definition of a 'person', and the existence of 'persons' was seen to be essential for the possibility that processes involving the learning of concepts can occur. See Chapter 2 Part 5.

164 (*4) R G Collingwood's exposition is found in *The Principles of Art* and Sir John Eccles' theories are to be found in J Eccles and K Popper *The Self and the Brain*.

167 (*5) David Hume in *A Treatise of Human Nature* considers the 'simple impression' to be the building block from which all experience is constructed. It is isolated and, initially at least, unconnected to any other phenomenon; it is seen as an atom of experience. Connections between simple impressions are made by the mind in response to the ways in which the impressions are presented to the experiencing individual. The connections help to form 'complex impressions' and 'ideas'. Hume's starting point is the atom of experience, the 'simple impression'. In this essay, therefore, Humean metaphysics and atomism in experience will be treated as interchangeable notions.

169 (*6) Note 5, above, deals with this point.

174 (*7) G E Moore *Principia Ethica* p. 13

174 (*8) *Ibid* p. 10

174 (*9) Errol Bedford *Aristotelian Society Proceedings, LVII (1956-57)*, reprinted in *The Philosophy of Mind* V C Chappell ed.

174 (*10) In *Essays in the Active Powers of Man* Chapter VII, Thomas Reid argues that moral approbation cannot be equated with feelings. His justification for this claim lies in the fact that one can disagree with an approbation "without any ground of offence, ..., to a reasonable man", since one is disagreeing with the man's opinion. By contrast, disagreeing with a statement about a man's feelings questions his veracity. If Reid's argument is inverted, the parallel with the Bedford question is immediate.

175 (*11) Geoffrey Madell in *The Identity of the Self* (throughout, but particularly in Chapter 2) argues in favour of the unanalysability of aspects of the self. He invokes the uniqueness of the first person perspective and its function in language usage to support his claim.

178 (*12) See Harold Garfinkel *Studies in Ethnomethodology* Ch. 3 where he describes 'The Counselling experiment' in which the participants demonstrated a marked reluctance to relinquish their expectations of the possibility that their experiences in some way could be explained according to discoverable principles.

179 (*13) The concept of a 'closure' is referred to by R N Carew-Hunt in *The Theory and Practice of Communism* p. 53 where he identifies the central role the concept plays in Marx's explanation of scientific investigative processes. Roy Bhaskar in *A Realist Theory of Science* points out that the concept underpins

much scientific practice. He goes on to investigate the consequences which the application of the concept of a closure has on the view of reality which is presupposed by that application. He argues convincingly that this view of reality is one in which events are seen as determined by the operations of mechanisms; and that, in closures, constant conjunctions of events result from (rather than constitute) the operations of causal processes. The intelligibility of the deliberate creation of closures together with the application (in non-closed environments) of knowledge gained in the closures, is sacrificed unless one accepts the view that reality is constituted of mechanisms whose operations generate events.

179 (*14) This point is made in the argument by Roy Bhaskar op.cit. referred to in note (*13).

183 (*15) This categorisation has been culled from W Lyons' *Emotions*.

183 (*16) This view of consciousness is similar to that expressed by Gilbert Ryle who categorised emotions as "turbulences in the stream of consciousness" - *The Concept of Mind* p. 166.

184 (*17) R W Hepburn *The Arts and the Education of the Emotions* **NUQ Winter 1980**

185 (*18) R G Collingwood op. cit. p. 166.

186 (*19) Ibid.

186 (*20) op. cit. Ch. VII

186 (*21) op. cit. p. 231

187 (*22) op. cit. p. 232

189 (*23) Dante as quoted by R D Laing *The Self and Others* p. 125

190 (*24) Descartes *Second Meditation*

192 (*25) The scope of operation of a social kind was defined in Chapter 2 as a 'social environment': see Chapter 2 (D4) (*p. 59)

196 (*26) See for example Sir John Eccles op. cit. In *The Self and Its Brain*, he puts forward a theory of perception which is the same as the one which has been developed in Chapters 1-4 above. The picture Eccles paints of the operation of perceptive faculties involves the perceiving individual constructing and utilising a perceptual framework. This framework is believed to be located in the neurones at the rear of the temporal lobes - its precise location is not important to the argument which is being developed here. Within this physical location a normal brain retains a 'picture' of an external world and the relationship of the individual's body to that world. This picture is built up by inputting information drawn from all the sensory organs which constantly feed more information into the system, thus constantly updating the picture. The picture itself is not built afresh each time the individual resumes conscious experience after a break, however caused; rather, the individual uses learned and retained patterned structures around which the perceptual information is fitted. Once the individual finds a suitable structure on which to hang her sense data, she is able to build a picture and then can constantly update it with further information.

Eccles' model is not only consonant with the position adopted in this

essay, it also offers it considerable support. The model has embedded in it the requirement that the individual has expectations of the likely progress of the perceptions he is experiencing. This requirement is fulfilled by the operation of a specific mechanism which Eccles describes as *ante-dating* (page 250).

Ante-dating is a process by which a conscious mind copes with the time lapse, up to 0.5 seconds, between the neuronal messages reaching the cerebral cortex and their being assimilated into the individual's 'picture' of the external world.

The model Eccles describes is all but identical with the conception of conscious experience which is outlined in Part 3 above: sense inputs modify rather than constitute experience.

Eccles would undoubtedly support the acceptability of his model on similar grounds as those offered by most medical scientists. He would look to the application of the theories within which the model is resident. As is seen in Parts 2 and 3 above, philosophical argument can also be offered in support of the acceptance of the model. A brief resumé of the philosophical argument will demonstrate the very close similarities between Eccles' theory of perception and the theory of experience which is being developed in this chapter.

The possibilities of continuous conscious perceptions broken by discontinuities, such as sleep, vanish unless one presupposes that the individual can gain access to a perceptual framework (which exists independently of the passage of time which is characterised by the break in consciousness) within which the individual can construct and sustain a 'picture' of his environment. This presupposition hangs on what is *de facto* a changing world. In a world where experiences could be identically reproduced, in a laboratory fashion, the supposition would not be needed. But in a changing environment, each time one emerges from a state of lack of consciousness one is faced with sets of sensory signals whose exact replicas one has never previously met: indeed it is not only possible but highly likely that no two sets of sensory signals are identical. The absence of a perceptual framework - whose form (in

the Aristotelian sense) pre-existed one's experience, and whose matter (also in the Aristotelian sense) consisted of sensory signals provided by sense organs and the imagination - would necessitate the constant recreation of each successive experience. It would also necessarily involve the experiencing individual having the illusion that memory linked the current experience with previous ones. The absence of the perceptual framework would also render unintelligible any purposive conscious actions of individuals.

We are left with a general model of experience in which the individual is seen as possessing conceptual structures (not stored at a conscious level in the mind) around which the information supplied by the senses is hung in order that the individual can build and continue to update a picture of external reality. The argument may be used, *mutatis mutandis*, to establish the pre-existence of conceptual structures around which a picture of social reality can be built. So that if an individual were to walk into a room he would already have a conceptual framework which would determine parameters of possible spatial, textual visual and olfactory components of a room and into which he could fit the sensory information constituent of the particular room. He would have a further conceptual framework which would determine possible social relationships between the individuals in the room, and even of the relationships between the individuals and the natural objects present in the room. His senses would then provide information which would enable him constantly to update his natural and social pictures of the room. The interplay between the sensory information and the underpinning conceptual frameworks generates expectations of further sensory inputs. The need for the sensory information to be processed and located in the picture turns the existence of the expectation into a necessity; without this need the expectation might be merely a more efficient way of generating experiences.

(Addenda)

problem of moving from propositions involving *is* to those involving *ought*. The acceptance of the arguments which are being put forward here will involve the acceptance of the claim that no propositions involving *is* can be independent of all propositions involving *ought*.

200 (*28) Thomas Kuhn *The structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chapter 2

201 (*29) Virtually all of Freud's writings show parts of this development. He brings most of them together in his last book *An Outline of Psycho-analysis*, translated by James Strachey.

201 (*30) See Sigmund Freud op. cit. p. 1-9.

205 (*1) It is possible that a critic of the type of analysis undertaken in this essay might consider that the theory outlined here suffers from similar restrictions; the theory is, after all, developed in a specific cultural environment. It may appear to such a critic that the validity of the conclusions drawn are themselves restricted to that specific cultural environment.

Such a criticism might be compelling if the argument in the essay involved an attempt to formulate a specific definition of a person; a definition which specified the criteria of what it is to be a person and which had application in all cultural environments. There is no attempt here to offer a definition of Personal Identity in this or any other cultural environment. What is offered is an analysis which gives criteria by which one can judge whether any given concept of Personal Identity can cope with the possibility that learning processes can occur. This has the effect of giving culturally universal criteria, from within a particular cultural environment, which necessarily apply to concepts of Personal Identity. It does not furnish one with a set of criteria which are sufficient to encapsulate the concept of Personal Identity in any given cultural environment.

Cultural universality is achieved by a knock-on process. If a concept formed within one cultural environment is such that it is possible for the individuals operating in that environment to expand their sphere of social influence into another environment, then conceptualisations within both the original unexpanded environment and the new expanded one must comply with the results of the analysis set out in this essay. The process of expansion from one cultural environment to a larger one will then permit one to apply the results to all cultural environments with which mergers are possible. Persons in all these cultural environments must be such that the conceptualisation of a person in completely objective terms cannot properly be formulated. The conceptualisation of a person in completely objective terms creates the mechanism which prevents the merger of two cultural environments and the formation of expanded cultural environments.

The other conclusions reached in the essay also apply to all cultural environments which are either expanded or merged with other cultural environments.

Three of these are worthy of note. The first is that the definitions of objects in general will be dependent upon an existing understanding of what it is to be a person; Personal Identity will not be a special case of general Identity. The second consists of the claim that 'society' cannot itself be a social kind, it cannot have constraining and/or enabling powers with respect to the behaviour of persons. Rather than being a social kind, society is an ensemble of social kinds, each of which possesses such enabling and/or constraining powers. The third result, obtained in the analysis in Chapter 4, consists of the assertion that the fact-value dichotomy cannot be applied in any given cognitive experience without contravening the rules governing the operations of that experience.

206 (*2) E.g. Saul Kripke *Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic*, in *Acta Philosophica Fennica*

208 (*3) The need for a third person in interactions was established in the discussions in Chapters 2 and 4.

221 (*4) Mary Daly in *Gyn/ecology: The Metaethics of Rational Feminism* p. 374-7 argues that the value system which has been hitherto imposed on women has been one of self-sacrifice which ties in with women's other-focused value system. She indicates, somewhat paradoxically, that it is only through becoming self-focusing (and so absorbing the value system she criticises as being male) that women can liberate themselves. She does not seem to appreciate that the tension which exists between self-focusing and other-focusing value systems is built into the very fabric of any cultural system. This lack of appreciation does not, however, detract from her analysis of the nature of the social structures found in the society she is examining - these structures do seem to promote

self-sacrificing characteristics in women and self-enhancing ones in men.

The arguments in this essay identify the logic underpinning the tension between the self- and other- focusing aspects of social interactions. The tensions cannot be avoided but it is possible, as Daly's arguments show, for the tensions to be either consciously or subconsciously manipulated to achieve a particular end. Since the fusion or harmonisation of self- and other- focusing value systems leads to a blurring of the distinctions between social and cultural environments (see Chapter 2, above) the price paid for harmoniously achieved emancipation is the abolition of the expansion of social scientific understanding.

This means that emancipation, whether social or sexual, is faced with an unavoidable paradox. The process of emancipation relies on the drawing of a distinction between the epistemological and ontological aspects of social interactions - the distinction underpinning the distinction between cultural and social environments - yet the emancipatory process is aiming towards the abolition of that distinction. If it succeeds, the emancipatory process will result in the construction of a social kind whose operations cannot be altered by the conceptualisations of any of the individuals whose behaviour reproduces the social kind - since it removes the perception of the distinction between the individual's value system and the value system which drives the operations of the social kind. The social kind will have reached an ontological status similar to the Hindu Karma or perhaps of those in a Marxist society where there are no distinctions between any individual's value system and the value system of the social kinds which that individual sustains and reproduces.

In such cases social kinds would be difficult to distinguish from natural kinds. Furthermore, when one is operating entirely within them it is not even possible to know that they could be social kinds. The emancipatory process, if complete, destroys the prospects of any future emancipation.

denies the claim that there is an assumption, even if unrecognised, that social kinds are sustained by 'persons' as defined in Chapter 2 above. The price paid was seen in Chapter 2 to be the negation of the possibility that social change could be understood. Since the development of any theory of Personal Identity involves an attempt to provide a basis on which the understanding of social phenomena can emerge, the construction of the concept of a person has to take on board the constraint of having to accept the schema of a 'person' as set out in Chapter 2.

231 (*6) Peter Strawson *Individuals* Ch. 2

231 (*7) (i) Derek Parfit in *Reasons and Persons* and (ii) Bernard Williams in *The Self and the Future*, *The Philosophical Review* April 1970

232 (*8) Derek Parfit op. cit., p. 236

232 (*9) op. cit. p. 255

233 (*10) David Wiggins *Sameness and Substance* p. 92-4

234 (*11) Derek Parfit op. cit., p. 238

236 (*12) op. cit. p. 255

236 (*13) Ibid

237 (*14) see for example Colin Blakemore the Reith Lectures published in *The Listener* 25th November 1976

238 (*15) Factors such as emotional stability could well be included in

Parfit's 'psychological continuity' as a criterion for determining whether Personal Identity has been maintained during the part brain transfers. But if they are and he assumes they are transferred in the part brain transplants, then he is already assuming he knows what it is to be a person. He is assuming the result he wishes to establish.

238 (*16) Derek Parfit op. cit. p. 219 where he defines something as "deeply impossible" if it contravenes the laws of nature.

238 (*17) op. cit. p. 264

239 (*18) E.g. Saul Kripke op. cit.

239 (*19) Bernard Williams op. cit., and in *Imagination and the Self*, *Proceedings of the British Academy 1980*, reprinted in *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*, Peter Strawson ed. uses conjectures involving brain and/or body and/or memory swaps to test the acceptability of his concepts.

241 (*20) Peter Strawson *Individuals* in the Introduction

243 (*21) G. R. Lucas in *The Freedom of the Will*

244 (*22) As G. T. Kneebone puts it, *Mathematical logic and the Foundations of Mathematics* p. 236, when describing Gödel's recursive relations: "Only the elements of recursive arithmetic were needed for this purpose, and Gödel gave the following explanation of what he understood by recursive functions and relations. The explanation is expressed intuitively, of course, not formalized in the system."

- 245 (*23) Douglas Hoffstadter in *Gödel, Escher and Bach* p. 471-77
- 245 (*24) Douglas Hoffstadter op. cit., p. 577-78
- 248 (*25) John Locke *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II, xxvii, 2
- 248 (*26) David Wiggins *Sameness and Substance* Chapter 5
- 251 (*27) Bishop Butler *Firsty Dissertation to the Analogy of Religion*
- 252 (*28) Geoffrey Madell op. cit.
- 253 (*29) Geoffrey Madell op. cit. Ch. 2
- 254 (*30) Saul Kripke *Naming and Necessity* p. 255
- 256 (*31) David Wiggins op. cit., p. 213
- 257 (*32) Colin Blakemore op. cit.

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